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Abstract

Barnes, Corey Lorenzo. PhD. The University of Memphis, May, 2016. UnLockeing the Beauty which Prejudice has Overlaid: On Alain Locke’s Philosophical
Anthropology, Value theory, and the Movement Towards Cosmopolitanism. Dr. Bill E.
Lawson, PhD.
This work is an elucidation of Alain Locke’s philosophical anthropology and value theory
as devices to combat racial superiority, which Locke took to be the greatest challenge to
the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community. For Locke, the possibility of
establishing a cosmopolitan community implies healthy social and political relations,
which themselves imply respect. However, respect is denied to members of certain races
because they are perceived to be the bearers of inherently inferior cultures, which are
grounded in values. Locke needs a philosophical anthropology that combats the idea of
distinct differences in races that are caused by either nature or God, and a value theory
that displaces value-hierarchies. These two, taken together, provide the grounds for
establishing a cosmopolitan community.
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Introduction
Locke’s Fundamental Concern:

“[D]emocracy, looked at nationally or internationally, is seriously beset with internal
inconsistencies, political, social, and cultural. It is weakened by these all the more as it
tries to pull itself together as a corporate body of United Nations fighting a world defense
of democracy. The net prescription is mandatory advice to correct these shortcomings at
the earliest possible moment and in the most immediately practical ways, both for health
and strength in the arduous war effort and for vision and moral authority in the making of
a just and successful peace.”
––Alain Locke (“Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy”)
“It is not our differences that divide us. It is our inability to recognize, accept, and
celebrate those differences.”
––Audre Lorde (Our Dead Behind Us: Poems)

In the first epigraph above, we see Alain Locke’s faith in establishing a
community wherein perpetual peace among humans is secured. We also see Locke’s
commitment to democracy, a system that Locke takes to be freedom- and equalityaffirming. Moreover, the epigraph shows us Locke’s faith in democracy’s being a
political system that ought to be spread throughout the world because of its power to
produce a community wherein peace is secured. Despite the many benefits of political
democracy, in the epigraph Locke alludes to particular problems that weaken both the
faith in, and the justification for, democracy as a freedom- and equality-affirming system.
These problems, it would appear, threaten to stop the spread of democracy. And insofar as
these problems weaken democracy, and threaten to stop its spread throughout the world,
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these problems threaten the possibility of establishing a community wherein peace among
humans is secured.
The title of the work from which Locke’s words were taken gives us a clue about
the particular problems––call them internal inconsistencies––that threaten
cosmopolitanism by threatening the legitimacy of democracy. For Locke, these problems
are race-related. And Audre Lorde’s words indicate why race is a problem for the
possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community. Particular ideas about human races
take racial differences to divide humans permanently, particularly on the issue of culture.
Certain cultures are perceived as being better than others, and all human races necessary
produce certain better or worse cultures. When viewed in this way, human differences
cannot be celebrated or appreciated. Racial differences are considered permanent and
value-laden, such that the differences can be cashed-out in terms of differences in
humans’ worth. Certain races become more worthy of certain freedoms because of the
idea that human differences imply human inequality. Locke was deeply concerned about
racial differences being viewed this way because democracy, and thus cosmopolitanism,
rely on human equality. Locke’s concern with the possibility of establishing a
cosmopolitan community, given race-related problems that deny what the community
presupposes, is the subject of this dissertation.
The argument of the dissertation regards conditions that are necessary in order for
a cosmopolitain community to be established in the world. Specifically, I argue that in
Locke’s work as a whole we find a principal commitment to establishing a cosmopolitan
community, and that both his philosophical anthropology that regards race and value
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theory support this commitment. For Locke, there are two principle reasons to commit to
establishing a cosmopolitan community. First, establishing such a community is
imperative given the proximity of people/nations to each other in the world. For Locke,
human survival depends on peace, and peace implies a particular type of community.
Second, Locke thinks that cosmopolitanism is the completion of our move from
individual families to larger communities such as states/nations. As I argue in chapter
one, Locke thinks that people have a natural desire to assemble that is completed in a
cosmopolitan community.
Cosmopolitanism is the subject of the first chapter of this dissertation. I open the
work with an examination of Immanuel Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism. I open
with Kant because he marks the beginning of the modern sense of cosmopolitanism,
which is a sense that Locke engages. In so doing, I largely neglect ancient conceptions of
cosmopolitanism that have been introduced by Stoic philosophers. Further, I think that
from Kant’s work we can construct a minimal conception of cosmopolitanism. By
minimal conception, what I mean is that Kant’s work gives us a basic conception that all
types of cosmopolitanism must incorporate.
Moreover, I begin with Kant’s conception because Kant illustrates, in a very real
way, the possibility of being committed to both cosmopolitanism and the type of ideology
that fundamentally denies the possibility of its establishment. The essential thesis of this
dissertation is quite intuitive, namely that (for Locke) cosmopolitanism is inconsistent
with ideas of racial superiority. And this could lead us to think that one who is committed
to cosmopolitanism cannot possibly be committed to racial superiority. Kant gives us
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both the modern notion of cosmopolitanism and the scientizing of race that justifies
inequality and disrespect in a manner that his own conception of cosmopolitanism denies.
In a real way, Kant shows us how easy it is to commit to radically contradictory views.
Thus, looking at Kant’s cosmopolitanism gives us a deeper appreciation for what Locke
was up against, namely theorists who might support cosmopolitanism on the one hand
while having a deep commitment to racial superiority on the other. In this way, Locke’s
work can cause us to think more deeply about the consistency of the commitments that
we hold if we support cosmopolitanism.
Now, Kant’s views on cosmopolitanism show us that in order for such a
community to be established, there must be respect between people and nations that is
implied by healthy social/political relations. Social and political policies must be set up in
a way that promotes certain relations between peoples and states, and this implies that
people within those states, and the states themselves (in relation to their dealings with
other states), respect each other. When we respect others, what I maintain is that we
perceive, have an attitude of acknowledgement towards, and treat other persons as
deserving bearers rights that are equal to our own.1 And what this requires is that we see

1

When fleshing out an understanding of respect that is implied by cosmopolitanism, I
diverge slightly from the metaphysical notion of dignity and respect that Kant gives us.
For example, in Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Kant claims that respect is “a
feeling wrought by means of a rational concept” when there is an immediate cognition
that something is a law for me. In Critique of the Power of Judgment, respect is “the
feeling of our incapacity to attain to an idea that is a law for us.” Here, respect is a
moral feeling of admiration or the affect of astonishment. What Kant gives us is a
metaphysical understanding of respect (and dignity) that is grounded in rationality.
Without engaging in a debate regarding metaphysical claims about dignity and respect,
I follow A.I. Melden’s more political notion of dignity and craft a notion of respect
from it. My thinking is that the end of any metaphysical debate about dignity and
respect leads to this political notion. Insofar as this is the case, I suggest that we begin
with a political notion of dignity and respect.
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others as fundamentally equal to us. I think that this notion captures the democratic spirit
that Locke wants to preserve, along with its being a notion that seems to run through his
work.
After illustrating a minimal notion of cosmopolitanism, particular social and
political relationships that cosmopolitanism implies, and the notion of respect that these
relationships imply, I show Locke’s agreement with Kant’s minimal conception of
cosmopolitanism. Further, I show what could be an expansion of the minimal conception
in Locke’s work through principals of tolerance and pluralism. Still further, I show
Locke’s arguments that democracy is a cultural constant and that cosmopolitanism is a
logical extension of a fundamental human desire to assemble. With regard to democracy’s
being a cultural constant, I illustrate Locke’s thinking that there are fundamental values
that undergird every community. This thinking licenses us to conceptualize ourselves as
more similar than different. Recognizing these fundamental similarities in value-systems
should foster more respect for people with different overlaying values in their valuesystems.2 For Locke (it would appear), democracy, as a concept that promotes the basic
equality of persons, is a cultural constant. This, in part, grounds his thinking that political
democracy is necessary for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community.
Now, the problem of racial superiority is the chief problem that challenges the
establishment of a cosmopolitan community. Racial superiority (or at least the type that
Locke engages) relies on two primary beliefs. First is the belief that there are inherent

2

Overlaying values will be those values that are built upon cultural constants. They will
be what has been influenced by the socio-historical circumstances that communities
have faced.
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differences between people. These differences are either natural or divinely-mandated.
Second is the belief that there are fundamental differences in peoples’ value-systems that
accord to racial divisions. The different value-systems can be rank-ordered because value
is both real and objective. Insofar as different races’ value-systems can be rank-ordered,
the different races’ worth as human beings can be rank-order. Value-differences cannot be
reconciled between the races because certain races, as either products of nature or God,
produce certain culture-products necessarily and unfailingly. This makes certain races’
values either ungraspable (if they are superior races) or lacking respectableness (if they
are inferior races). What derives from racial superiority is that it becomes justifiable to
treat members of certain races without respect. The problem that Locke’s work takes on is
the inconsistency of cosmopolitanism and racial superiority, which denies what is
fundamental to cosmopolitanism, namely respect. Essentially, Locke wants to uproot the
challenges to the type of community that secures peace.
Philosophical anthropologies that either justify or challenge unequal perceptions
and treatment of different races because of a necessary correlation between culture and
race are the subject of chapters two and three. In chapter two I look at three figures. First
I look at Kant’s philosophical anthropology. I look at Kant because, similar to modern
cosmopolitan theory, Kant marks the beginning of a shift in thinking. Kant marks the first
in a lengthy list of academics who sought to make racial divisions a matter of scientific
inquiry. And insofar as Locke responds to scientific conceptions of race, I find that it is
important to begin by examining the views of the figure that scientized race. Secondly, I
look at Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Blumenbach is important because Blumenbach
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gives Arthur de Gobineau––the figure who Locke is chiefly concerned with––a nuanced
conception of degeneration. Finally, I examine Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology. A
part of the reason why Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology is so problematic for
Locke is because, in addition to arguing the divine superiority and thus inferiority of
certain races, he also argues that respect accorded to inferior races, and along with it
cosmopolitan commitments, lead to the degeneration of states. To conclude chapter two I
show that all three figures give us clear conceptions of racial superiority that block the
establishment of a cosmopolitan community.
To solve the problem that racial superiority poses to cosmopolitanism, Locke
needs a theory of human races that denies the inherent superiority of any particular race.
This theory must undercut the natural or divine superiority of certain races by severing
the necessary correlation between culture-products and races. In other words, Locke
needs to deny what Kant, Blumenbach, and Gobineau assert. We might think of this as
Locke’s philosophical anthropology as it regards race. Locke’s philosophical
anthropology is the subject of chapter three. Essentially, Locke conceptualizes race as a
product of culture (as opposed to the reverse), and as a product of culture, race depends
on history and social development.
Now, Locke cannot simply end with a philosophical anthropology that refutes the
anthropologies of the figures presented in chapter two. Locke needs a theory of value that
can allow for differences between racial groups (which are, for Locke, obvious and
appreciable, though not permanent and natural/divine). Locke needs a value theory
because he denies both that we should eliminate the concept of race/race-talk and that
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there is no correlation between race and culture. Locke’s socio-historical conception of
race requires a value theory to move past the problem that racial superiority poses to
cosmopolitanism. This theory of value must allow respect for racial and cultural
differences, and must be one that does not support the view that particular differences in
values imply a value-hierarchy where one set of values is less respectable than others. In
so doing, the theory denies the superiority or inferiority of those who possess particular
value-systems.
Locke’s value theory is the subject of chapter four. What I show is that Locke’s
relativism is a position in-between value-objectivity and value-subjectivity. We can think
of Locke’s relativism as a position that, though it denies that value is either correct or
incorrect in the way that objectivists tend to, also denies that the value conferred upon
objects is dependent on the valuations of individual agents in the way that subjectivist
positions tend to. For Locke, we can assert a type of quasi-objectivity of values in
community through the way that community teaches us to perceive objects through
language and use.
In all, the dissertation attempts to systematize Locke’s work in a way that has not
been done before. What this means is that it connects parts of Locke’s thinking over a
very large span of his life. For instance, this work shows how Locke’s belief in
democracy and cosmopolitanism are consistent with his relativism, and shows why he
thinks that we have reasons to support cosmopolitanism despite a relativism that appears
to go against objective normative claims. It shows how his philosophical anthropology
undergirds his value theory and cosmopolitan theory.
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The value of Locke’s thinking is that it causes us to question what commitments
must we have, and likewise what commitments we must abandon if we are truly/
consistently committed to cosmopolitanism. One can very easily substitute racial
superiority for religious superiority and question whether our commitments to particular
religious ideas are consistent with our commitment to cosmopolitanism. One can raise
questions about issues of gender or sexuality and cosmopolitanism. One can question
how cosmopolitanism squares with rectificatory justice. In short, if cosmopolitanism is
something that we either are committed to or ought to be committed to, then Locke forces
us to ask what other commitments we must abandon or accept in order be consistent in
what we are committed to. I now turn to the issue of cosmopolitanism.
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Chapter 1
Cosmopolitanism and Its Race-Related Discontents:

“As the new international dimension comes into our lives with its transforming changed
scale and perspective of human group relations, it begins to dawn upon us that, if
democracy is to survive, it can do so only on an international basis and over a common
denominator of liberty, equality and fraternity for humanity at large.”
––Alain Locke, “Color: Unfinished Business of Democracy”
“The Negro question is too often put forward merely as the Negro question. It is just as
much, and even more seriously, the question of democracy. The position of the Negro in
American society is its one great outstanding anomaly.”
––Alain Locke, “Should the Negro be Encouraged to Cultural Equality”

Introduction:
It is my argument in this dissertation that chief among Locke’s concerns over his
life was cosmopolitanism. And further, Locke has the goal of combatting racial
superiority, which he took to be the greatest obstacle affecting the possibility of
establishing a cosmopolitan community. What I would like to show is that Locke’s
philosophical anthropology and his theory of value were both attempts to set conditions
for the possible emergence of a lasting peace among the world’s human population by
combating racial superiority. Taken together, Locke’s philosophical anthropology and his
value theory seek to lead to progressive racial contacts, and ultimately to the possibility
of a cosmopolitain community, by proving the falsity of inherent traits distributed to
humanity by nature or God and the type of value-hierarchy that is implied by natural or
divinely-mandated racial differences that together undergird theories and practices of
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racial superiority. For Locke, the type of value-hierarchy that is implied by racial
superiority causes a lack of respect for those who are thought to be inferior. However,
Locke understood that respect is necessary if a cosmopolitan community is to be
established.
If we are attempting to get at Locke's thinking, and in rendering it applicable to
today's world, we must understand particular background concepts and arguments that are
operating in both Locke's thinking and the world in which Locke is writing. These will
involve both the historical moment as it regards race and race-contacts that Locke lived
and worked within, along with Locke’s own ideas regarding race and race-contacts.1 The
first of these, namely the historical moment as it regards race and race-contacts, refers to
the state of affairs regarding race in America, as well as across the world. The second of
these, namely Locke’s own ideas regarding race and race-contacts, refers to Locke’s
particular conception of race and the state of affairs regarding racial-tension. I take
Locke’s own ideas regarding race and race-contacts to undergird his conception of
cosmopolitanism and our ability to establish such a community.
Prior to understanding race and race-contacts, there is the issue of
cosmopolitanism that must be fleshed out. We need to understanding what
cosmopolitanism is, and why it is inconsistent with particular views about races.
Additionally, there is the issue of what healthy social and political relations are, if in fact
they are implied by cosmopolitanism. Moreover, there is the issue of the concept of

1

In addition, if our goal is to render Locke's theory of value useful, there will be a need
to see overlap between the historical moment within which Locke lived and worked and
our present racial/societal condition.
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respect, specifically what it means to respect another person. Locke’s thinking on the
inconsistency of holding both cosmopolitanism and racial superiority hinges on the
notion of respect, insofar as cosmopolitanism relies on a particular understanding of it
that is rejected by those committed to racial superiority.
I have three principle aims in this chapter. First, I would like to elucidate a
minimal conception of cosmopolitanism. 2 My reasoning for introducing a minimal
conception of cosmopolitanism is as follows: examining every conception would make
this work quite expansive. However, Locke’s argument that cosmopolitanism is
inconsistent with racial superiority can be asserted by looking at principals that gives
cosmopolitanism its nature, and then showing cosmopolitanism to be contrary to racial
superiority. In deriving a conception of cosmopolitanism that every type of
cosmopolitanism must accept, and then in showing that cosmopolitanism relies on certain
ideas that are inconsistent with racial superiority, one can show that every type of
cosmopolitanism is inconsistent with racial superiority; if every type of cosmopolitanism
relies on this minimal conception, and this minimal conception is inconsistent with ideas
of racial superiority because it necessarily affirms what is explicitly denied in these
ideologies, then every conception of cosmopolitanism is inconsistent with racial
superiority because every conception must affirm what is explicitly denied in ideas of
racial superiority. In providing a minimal conception of cosmopolitanism, I largely
neglect classical cosmopolitanism, as conceptions introduced by the cynic Diogenes of

2

What I seek to show is a minimal concept of cosmopolitanism that undergirds all
specific concepts of cosmopolitanism. I seek to illustrate the core concept of
cosmopolitanism that all who are committed to the concept must embrace.
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Sinope and the stoics, and focus on the modern and contemporary conceptions of
cosmopolitanism that began in the time during which Kant wrote.3
Secondly, I show how the minimal conception implies relations that we might
take to be healthy or progressive. Thirdly, I demonstrate that healthy social and political
relations imply respect between agents. For Locke, this respect is denied by racial
superiority because of the value-hierarchy that grounds the ideologies. And it is this
hierarchical structure that Locke's value theory participates in displacing, thereby proving
racial superiority false, and allowing for respect between peoples that allows for the
possibility of establishing a cosmopolitanism community.
After presenting a minimal conception of cosmopolitanism that we can take from
Kant’s work, I seek to sharpen the conception, showing principals that can be inferred
from it by looking at Locke’s conception of cosmopolitanism. I argue that Locke accepts
the essential idea of Kantian cosmopolitanism (as he must, insofar as he has a concept of
cosmopolitanism and Kant's conception gives us a minimal conception). However, Locke
sees the completion of the idea as embracing more of an effort at pluralism and tolerance
than Kant might be said to embrace. Thus, by sharpening the conception a bit, Locke
distances himself from Kant, and would perhaps refer to Kant’s complete conception as
uniformitarian (when it is fleshed out beyond the minimal conception that I will
elucidate). For Locke, Kant’s conception is incomplete in theory, and further cannot be
put into practice.

3

For the distinction between the two types of cosmopolitanism, see the introduction and
Martha Nussbaum’s “Kant and Cosmopolitanism” in The Cosmopolitan Reader, edited
by Garrett Wallace Brown and David Held (Malden: Polity Press, 2010) 27-44.
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Kantian Cosmopolitanism: Hospitality, Freedom, and Respect:
This chapter has aims of giving a minimal conception of cosmopolitanism and
showing that the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitain community––in the modern
and contemporary sense––implies healthy social and political relations, which themselves
imply respect accorded to all human agents. Insofar as we are looking at
cosmopolitanism in the modern and contemporary sense, we should begin by reviewing
Kant’s conception of the cosmopolitan community and the conditions necessary to bring
it about. My reasoning is that Kant (along with the lesser known Martin Wieland) marks
the beginning of the modern sense of cosmopolitanism. Further, Kant’s work appears to
give a minimal conception of cosmopolitanism that fits the constraints of the present
work. Still further, Kant’s conception has had a major impact on our world, insofar as his
work is the guiding idea behind the formation of the United Nations, and appears to
present the view that most contemporary thinkers on cosmopolitanism engage in some
way. Additionally, Locke’s own understanding of cosmopolitanism derives from Kant’s
conception. And as such, Kant’s conception is one that is important for understanding
Locke’s. Locke accepted and rejected parts of Kant’s completed thinking, which is to say
that Locke wrestled with Kant in many ways.
Kant gives us versions and descriptions of cosmopolitanism in a number of
works.4 However, one of Kant’s latest, and in fact his fullest, description is given in an

4

One can find descriptions for the different versions of cosmopolitanism in “Idea for a
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784), Critique of Judgment (1790), “On
the Common Saying:That May Be True in Theory, But it is of No Use in
Practice” (1793) Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), Metaphysics of
Morals (1797), and The Contest of the Faculties (1798).
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essay entitled, “Perpetual Peace.” Kant’s ultimate goal in the essay is to provide reasons
for why humanity has an obligation to seek measures to secure peace and freedom in the
world, thereby ending all hostilities (meaning wars) between nations.5 In so doing, Kant
seeks to set the conditions for which peace and freedom in the world can be met, and
attempts to argue what a lasting peace in the world looks like.
Kant gives us particular conditions that are necessary for peace and freedom at the
outset of the essay, insofar as he gives us the kind of state that is able to secure peace and
freedom. Kant claims that nations who are able to secure peace and freedom in the world
must govern their citizens with a republican constitution. Kant defines a republican
constitution as that constitution that satisfies three criteria. First, a republican constitution
is one that is founded on the principles of freedom for all members of society. Second, a
republican constitution is one where each member of the state depends on a single
common legislation. Finally, this constitution is one wherein there is legal equality for
each member of its society.6 Kant thinks that a state can only aim at establishing peace
and freedom in the world if there are certain values endorsed by a state in its governing
constitution.
Kant seems right to constrain the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan
community by limiting the community to a confederation of republican states. A state
needs freedom as a social value if it is to value freedom (and peace) in relations between
states, as well as practice it in its relations with the citizens of other states. If a state does
5

Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” in Kant: Political Writings,
trans. Hans Reiss, ed. H.B. Nisbet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 93

6

Ibid, 99.
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not have a freedom-valuing constitution, then it seems right to think that such a state will
not concern itself with the freedom of other states’ citizens, and therefore will not commit
to a constitution of lasting peace in the world that is grounded by certain freedoms for all
human beings. Further, a state’s citizens seemingly need to embrace a freedom-affirming
constitution if the state’s goal of seeking a lasting peace in the world is to be supported in
practice. If citizens’ values generally reflect the political values of the state's constitution,
and the state's constitution is not freedom-affirming, then it seems to follow that the
citizens of such a state will not affirm a cosmopolitan constitution, either abstractly as a
possibility or in practice when engaging other non-citizens.
Now, we can take a few things away from the above insofar as it relates to what
healthy social and political relations look like under the type of constitution that must
govern states committed to a cosmopolitan community. For Kant, healthy social relations
are the result of all citizens being governed by a common constitution. A state committed
to cosmopolitanism cannot be fractioned. Thus, the possibility of establishing a
cosmopolitan community requires social stability. And what this seems to imply is that
the citizens of the state value certain ideals and understand both themselves and others in
certain ways that do not separate them irrevocably. As such, certain beliefs about
citizens––the belief that certain people are either inhuman or a lesser kind of humanity,
that certain groups' culture and values are fundamentally unworthy of respect, or that
certain people should not have certain rights––cannot exist in a state where there is social
stability, and thus where there is a commitment to cosmopolitanism. These beliefs seem
to separate people in ways that, of necessity, bring social instability.
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Further, primacy is placed on the freedom of citizens in a state; a citizen’s
freedom is a nonnegotiable social and political value. A state cannot have disparities in its
commitment to the freedom of its citizens, where certain citizens are thought to be
worthy of certain freedoms while others are not. A state that is committed to freedom
seems to promote equal rights for all of its citizens, insofar as inequalities in rights seem
to produce social instability by leading to fundamental differences in both ideals and how
citizens within the state understand themselves and others. Citizens must be committed to
the ideal of equal freedoms for all citizens within the state in order for a cosmopolitan
community to be established. And further people seem to need to understand themselves
as deserving neither more nor less of the freedoms of others. There seems to exist the
possibility of social instability through a loss of faith in a constitution that all citizens
need to affirm if there are inequalities in freedoms within the state.
Thus, underlying the idea of freedom is the idea that such a state must value the
social and political equality of all of its citizens. Healthy social and political relations
imply a state of affairs whereby citizens can expect equal treatment before the law. No
one can be expected to promote a contract between nations that promotes peace if he/she
is treated unequally before the law of his/her own state. And likewise, no one can be
expected to promote a contract between nations that promotes peace among all
individuals in the world if he/she does not conceptualize all human beings as worthy of
equal treatment before the laws of his/her own state.
With the preceding in mind, one can see Kant making claims about relations
within the state that rely on, or imply respect between the state and its citizens, between
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citizens and their fellow citizens, between citizens and non-citizens, and between the state
and non-citizens. This is particularly true if (and I will adopt this notion throughout) “the
dignity of a person is not a matter pertaining to some precious internal quality of his
nature as a human being––his rationality or his autonomy––but that sense he displays of
his own status as a being who is authorized by his rights to conduct himself in the
expectation that his rights will be honored by others…” 7 From this understanding of
dignity, I accept the following definition of respect (as it applies to another’s dignity):
Respect, as applied to a person because of an inherent dignity, would be the perception
of, attitude of acknowledgement towards, and treatment of a person as a deserving bearer
of rights equivalent to the respecting agent's. Respect in this sense appears to be implied
by healthy social and political relations, and is required for cosmopolitanism. 8 The
possibility of a cosmopolitan community, in its dependence on a state’s having a
republican constitution allows us to see that the possible establishment of a cosmopolitan
community implies social and political relations that are healthy, and this implies that
people have respect for others. Just what sort of treatment this respect entails will become
clear below.
Now, with regard to a definition of a cosmopolitan community, Kant tells us that
“a constitution based on cosmopolitan right, in so far as individuals and states, coexisting
in an external relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of a
7 A.I.
8
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This concept of respect is a very minimal concept that will be fleshed out at the end of
the current chapter, where I argue that Locke's understanding of reciprocity, tolerance,
and democracy derive from an understanding of the fundamental cultural constant of
respect, which is a value that necessarily undergirds every "coming-together" of a group
of people, and thus the formation of a state.
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universal state of mankind.”9 A cosmopolitan community, at its foundation, “concerns not
the interaction between states, but the status of individuals in their dealings with states of
which they are not citizens. Moreover, it is concerned with the [political] status of
individuals as human beings, rather than as citizens of states.” 10 This is one of the key
distinctions between a cosmopolitan constitution and an international constitution, which
concerns interactions between states.11 Thus, we might say that a cosmopolitan
constitution concerns the issue of world citizenship, wherein we may infer a concern with
rights not conferred to an individual because he/she is a citizen of a particular rightsconferring state, but concerns the rights of individuals as human beings simpliciter, which
are conferred to them by an agreement between a multiplicity of states.
Kant seems to think that a cosmopolitan community is not an absorption of all
states into a singular state. We should not think of individuals as world-citizens because
states relinquish their right to govern in an absorption into a larger state. In a critical
passage, Kant tells us the following:
Peoples who have grouped together into nation states may be judged in the same
way as individual men living in a state of nature, independent of external laws; for
they are a standing offence to one another by the very fact that they are neighbors.
Each nation, for the sake of its own security, can and ought to demand of the
others that they should enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civil
one, within which the rights of each could be secured. This would mean
9
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establishing a federation of peoples. But a federation of this sort would not be the
same as an international state. For the idea of an international state [being a
univocal or singular state] is contradictory, since every state involves a
relationship between a superior (the legislator) and an inferior (a people obeying
the laws), whereas a number of nations forming one state would constitute a
single nation. And this contradicts our initial assumption, as we are here
considering the right of nations in relation to one another in so far as they are a
group of separate states which are not to be welded together as a unit.12
Kant begins this passage by making a critical observation about states that have not
established some kind of constitution between them that aims at a lasting peace, namely
that there is a constant threat of hostility that likens to the threat that morally obligates
individuals to form a state. States without a constitution between them that aims at a
lasting peace are in a sort of state of nature. Kant argues that states can and ought to
demand that other states enter into a constitution wherein states can be secure, just as
individuals contract with one another to form a state for their security. In fact, Kant seems
to think that a contract leading to cosmopolitanism completes the original contract
formed by individuals in their movement out of the state of nature. And thus for Kant,
this command seems to have normative force. As such, Kant grounds the basis for both
international and the cosmopolitan constitutions in social contract theory, where the
formation of the contract implies a categorical command of reason. 13 However, in such a
contract between nations, Kant thinks that states do not contract with each other to form a
singular state, whereby states give up their own right to autonomous decision-making as
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it regards its laws and political values. Kant wants to preserve a state’s right to selfdetermination, even in its commitment to a cosmopolitan constitution. 14
Given what has been discussed, we may begin by asserting that a cosmopolitan
community is a community formed by a contract between autonomous states aimed at
preserving or promoting peace, which is defined as the end of all hostilities (wars). This
contract confers certain rights to individuals as human beings irrespective of their
particular states. Each state in the contract maintains its own autonomy in matters relating
to the governance of its citizens as citizens of their respective states.
Now, we just averred that cosmopolitanism is concerned with interactions
between individuals as human beings, and that this concern extends across borders. We
might add that cosmopolitanism “covers any kind of communication, interaction, trade,
or business. It applies to travel, migration, intellectual exchange, as well as to commercial
endeavours.”15 In short, cosmopolitanism concerns the political rights that individuals
have in virtue of their being world citizens. What remains to be settled is which rights
Kant thinks humans have that transcend state-borders.
Kant tells us that the content of a cosmopolitan constitution––the political right
that humans have as citizens of the earth––is the right to hospitality. In another critical
passage in “Perpetual Peace,” Kant tells us the following:

14
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As in the foregoing articles, we are here concerned not with philanthropy, but
with right. In this context, hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be
treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory. He can be
turned away, if this can be done without causing his death, but he must not be
treated with hostility, so long as he behaves in a peaceable manner in the place he
happens to be in. The stranger cannot claim the right of a guest to be entertained,
for this would require a special friendly agreement whereby he might become a
member of the native household for a certain time. He may only claim a right of
resort, for all men are entitled to present themselves in a society of others by
virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth’s surface.16
Kant distinguishes philanthropy from right. With regard to right, which is the form of
cosmopolitan constitutions, Kant thinks that we can never demand that we be embraced
by other nations. States have a right to turn down appeals for settlement made by
individuals. That we desire to settle within a state, or be taken in by members of another
state, is beyond what we can demand. For Kant, we can only demand that we are able to
make appeals to nations, and that when we make appeals we will not be harmed for the
appeals' having been made. Thus, Kant makes cosmopolitan right a negative right; it is a
right not to be harmed when we pass beyond the borders of our states and enter other
states. Cosmopolitan right is a right to visit, which reduces to a right that an individual
has to present him/herself to other states (the right to resort) and to attempt to establish
contacts with states that an individual is not a citizen of.17
Now it may appear that Kant’s negative definition of the cosmopolitan right to
hospitality, as the content of the cosmopolitan constitution, is too limited. However, as
Kleingeld notes, Kant’s negative definition of cosmopolitan right has broader
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implications than one might think. Recall Kant’s claim from the block-quote above that a
person “can be turned away, if this can be done without causing his death, but he must
not be treated with hostility, so long as he behaves in a peaceable manner in the place he
happens to be in.” Kleingeld informs us that: “When refusing a person at the border is
impossible without the person being killed, admission is obligatory. And one cannot
legitimately send a person back to a country where she or he will die or be killed as a
result of being sent back.” 18 Thus, the cosmopolitan right to hospitality may produce an
obligation of a state to accept refugees and political prisoners from other countries when
sending them back to these countries would be tantamount to killing/harming them. In
short, there are certain positive duties that derive from the negative definition that Kant
provides.
Kleingeld reads Kant as not merely telling us that we must stop short of taking
active measures (such as killing or maiming) to harm an individual in his/her attempt to
visit, but further tells us that we must not allow the individual to be harmed by rejection.
Kant constrains states to assure that no harm be done to the individual in the state’s
denying entry to the individual. Kleingeld writes: “Kant draws this implication himself in
a draft for Perpetual Peace, mentioning that people who are forced by circumstances
outside their control to arrive on another state's territory should be allowed to stay at least
until the circumstances are favourable for their return.” 19 Kleingeld justifies her reading
Kant in this way: “He gives the examples of shipwreck victims washed ashore and of
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sailors on a ship seeking refuge from a storm in a foreign harbour, thus in effect stating
that cosmopolitan law implies the right to a safe haven.” 20 My argument is (and one can
already see this formulating) that this implies a certain sort of respect conferred to all
individuals. Respect is an implication of the healthy social and political relations that the
possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community implies.
Kleingeld seems to be aware of a central issue governing cosmopolitanism and
respect, namely that a lack of equal respect conferred to all individuals that is implied by
racial superiority is a problem for the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan
community. Kleingeld frames this issue in terms of the credibility of Kant’s cosmopolitan
law. Kleingeld writes that: “Kant's view that states have the right to reject visitors for any
reason unless it causes their destruction raises the question of whether this does not make
cosmopolitan law too restrictive. For example…are states free to reject foreigners on
racist grounds [so long as it does not cause their destruction]?”21 Kleingeld reasons that
Kant’s cosmopolitan law would be unreasonable if it did allow for racists grounds in
rejecting foreigners. And Kleingeld tells us that this question must be answered in the
negative if Kant’s notion of cosmopolitan right is to be defended.
In defending Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan right, she argues that Kant’s
notion allows that certain groups of people can be rejected because they are members of
that particular group. However, we need legitimate reasons to reject particular groups of
people. Kleingeld’s example is Kant’s endorsement of China’s and Japan’s exclusion of
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European traders on the grounds that allowing Europeans access to Chinese and Japanese
goods might lead to colonial efforts by European nations. Thus, in rendering Kant’s
thinking on a state’s right to deny entrance on the basis of membership in a particular
group, we must distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for excluding
these members of different groups. “Arguably, such a distinction could be drawn in terms
of whether or not the exclusionary law or policy respects the rights of others, and whether
its criteria are related to the actions and proposals of the foreigner rather than being based
on an arbitrary, irrelevant characteristic.”22 Kleingeld argues that we cannot exclude
members of a group merely for their being members of a particular group, as this “a
priori” rejection would nullify the very right that constitutes the state’s cosmopolitan
commitment.
What Kleingeld ultimately realizes is that Kant’s cosmopolitan right relies on
respect for freedoms referring to the dignity inherent in every person. This includes
innate equality, which is “the independence from being bound by others to more than one
can in turn bind them.”23 Kleingeld tells us that this is an appropriate grounding and
justification for the idea, and “implies precisely the two aspects central to Kant’s
understanding of the hospitality principal: that prospective visitors have no right to
intrude into the sphere of freedom of others against their will, and that neither states nor
individuals have the right to refuse visitors when this would lead to the annihilation of
their freedom (their distinction).”24 With the first aspect, no visitor can be respected
22
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above another, and with the second aspect, no state can disrespect a visitor. If this respect
for every person's freedom––along with the innate equality of each––is denied, then
hospitality, which is the content of cosmopolitan right, is impossible. Respect for freedom
is lacking where arbitrary discriminations are made based solely on race, insofar as those
who belong to the race being denied entry are not perceived, acknowledged, or treated as
deserving bearers of this cosmopolitan right. And this seems more than possible where
racial superiority is the norm, which seems to be why Kleingeld sees the need to reject
this potential interpretation of Kant’s thinking.
The idea that the establishment of a cosmopolitan community implies healthy
social and political relationships, which implies respect, along with the idea that racial
superiority cancels this possibility is further at the heart of Kant’s rejection of European
colonial efforts.25 The idea of colonization, which includes ideas about the unfitness of
non-white peoples to hold land, the idea that whites have a rightful claim to land and
resources irrespective of its possession by non-whites, the idea that certain lands had not
yet been “discovered” until whites settled there, that whites ought to conquer non-white
land and peoples, etc. are all staples of racial superiority. And Kant recognizes both that
these efforts and ideas illustrate a lack of respect that seems implied by the community
25
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that he thinks ought to be established in the world. Further, Kant seems to recognize that
colonization causes social/political instability, which is a clear sign of unhealthy social/
political relations that seems to deny the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan
community. In a word, Kant seems to understand that racial superiority is inconsistent
with the establishment of a cosmopolitan community that is morally required.
Now, before moving to Locke’s engagement with Kant, along with his own
conception of cosmopolitanism that will guide his theory of value, I would like to add a
bit more content to Kant’s conception, content that will be filled out with an examination
of Locke's conception. Without these additions, it is unclear how Kant’s conception of
cosmopolitanism leads to a lasting peace insofar as it is unclear as to how the principal of
hospitality leads us to the end of all hostilities. This is because Kant’s principal of
hospitality aims at answering a specific set of political questions: “What are the rights
and duties of states toward foreigners? And what are the rights and duties of individuals
or groups toward foreign states? Do they have a right to enter foreign states…. And do
states have a right to take possession of foreign territory if the individuals using it do not
form a state?”26 Kant’s principal of hospitality is not intended to complete the view of
what cosmopolitanism entails, insofar as cosmopolitanism requires characteristics of the
community of individuals that comprise it. Cosmopolitan right is a necessary, but not
sufficient element of a condition of lasting peace. In order to establish a lasting peace,
more is needed.
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At the very beginning of an important text on Kant’s cosmopolitan thinking,
Kleingeld writes that: “In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View of 1798 he
writes that they [Germans] are hospitable toward foreigners, they easily recognize the
merits of other peoples, they are modest in their dealings with others, and they readily
learn foreign languages. Finally, ‘as cosmopolitans,’ they are not passionately bound to
their fatherland.”27 With this perhaps inaccurate description of German people,
particularly in their being rank-ordered above all other peoples, Kant gives us more of his
thinking on what the cosmopolitan’s character is. Here, in addition to endorsing
hospitality––perhaps one that extends beyond accepting the state’s principal of
hospitality––to endorsing a more personal conception of hospitality, Kant seems to aver a
willingness to cultural recognition and perhaps even cultural sharing (reciprocity),
fairness and humbleness in engaging others, as well as tolerance. Kant thinks that these
are the characteristics of a cosmopolitan.
Now, whether Kant was committed to the values illustrated in the last sentence,
which is to say, whether Kant consistently endorses them in his works, namely cultural
recognition, reciprocity, and tolerance, is an unsettled question in the literature on
Kantian cosmopolitanism. As we will see in the next chapter, Kant provides a type of
thinking about the world’s human population that deeply supports white-supremacist
ideology. Kant provides a scientific justification for both inherent and permanent racial
differences and racial hierarchies that get taken up by later thinkers who look to use his
scientivizing anthropological investigations to justify racial superiority. And in
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scientivizing race in this way, Kant makes claims about the cultural worth and values of
groups within the hierarchies that would render a cosmopolitan community impossible.
That Kant was committed to racial superiority is not an issue that is typically debated, but
generally conceded. The issue is whether Kant conceptualized racial superiority as
consistent with his moral/cosmopolitan claims or whether Kant changed his views on
race in order to endorse a consistent cosmopolitan theory.
Against theorists such as Robert Bernasconi and Thomas McCarthy, Kleingeld
argues that Kant does in fact change his views, and further that he embraces cultural
recognition, reciprocity, and tolerance.28 Essentially, Kleingeld's argument is that Kant
seemingly realizes the inconsistency of his earlier conceptions of cosmopolitanism after
engagements with, and critiques from, Georg Forster and Johann Herder.29 Kleingeld
argues that Kant gives up his notion of the racial hierarchy that he provides in his early
writings on race that influences his earlier conceptions of cosmopolitanism. 30 She argues
that Kant grants races such as Negros and Indians that he devalued earlier in his writings
greater intellectual capacity and the right to sign contracts.31 Further, Kleingeld notes that
Kant extracts moral capacities from his conceptions of racial differences in his later
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writings, and that he promotes both blood-mixing and cultural sharing in his later
political writings.32
These changes may or may not be inferable from the evidence that Kleingeld
provides, insofar as she seems to overstate both the evidence from Kant’s own words and
certain silences or omissions of discussions of race in Kant’s later political writings. For
example, that Kant grants Africans and Americans (Natives) the right to sign contracts
does not license the inference that Kant thinks they are intellectually equal to whites or
that there is no racial hierarchy in his thinking. Kant does take Africans and Natives to be
to be respect-worthy insofar as they must be contracted with. However, equality to
whites, and thus worthiness of respect in the sense that seems to be a requirement for
cosmopolitanism is questionable. Further, that Kant rejects colonization does not license
the inference that he thinks whites must respect non-whites, particularly in the sense of
respect that I have argued is required for the possible establishment of a cosmopolitan
community.
Now, if the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community (or a consistent
cosmopolitan theory), in implying healthy social/political relations, implies respect,
which requires equality, then what needs to be established is not merely that Kant thought
that non-whites were intelligent enough to put their mark onto paper, or that they should
not be enslaved or have their land and resources taken from them, but that they were
equivalent to whites––that they must be respected in the same way. And it is not clear that
Kant is committed to this claim, particularly when reading Anthropology from a
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Pragmatic Point of View, where he seems to place Germans atop a more advanced racial
hierarchy––one whereby both broader construed races and sub-races within the white
race are ranked ordered.33
Beyond all of this, it is not clear, as we will see when engaging Locke’s thinking
on cosmopolitanism, that Kant promotes reciprocity/cultural sharing or tolerance. In
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (which is a work published around the
time of his cosmopolitan writings) Kant promotes a clear hierarchy of cultural products
and religions that seems to lead to the idea that both reciprocity/cultural sharing and
tolerance are undesirable. So, from Kleingeld’s discussion of the differences between
Kant, Forster, and Herder, it is clear that both Forster and Herder endorse the kind of
respect necessary for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community (or in Kleingeld's
terms, a consistent cosmopolitan theory). However, it is unclear that Kant ever does. And
this distinction between Forster and Herder (on the one hand) and Kant (on the other) can
be seen when distinguishing Locke’s thinking from Kant’s.
Lockean Cosmopolitanism: Moving Beyond What Separates the US:
Kant’s writings give us an appropriate background for understanding the type of
community that Locke is committed to establishing, and thus the type of community that
Locke fears cannot be established due to racial superiority. Fundamentally, this is a
community of states that are each jointly committed to ending all hostilities (wars). These
states, each one sovereign, have a republican constitution that satisfies three criteria.
33
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First, their respective constitutions are founded on the principle of freedom for all
members of society. Second, each state is one wherein each member of the state depends
on a single common legislation. Third, each constitution grants legal equality for every
member of its society. Additionally, we have states that are hospitable to non-citizens.
Finally, within the state, citizens possess a willingness to cultural recognition and perhaps
even cultural sharing (reciprocity), fairness and humbleness in engaging others, as well as
tolerance. We have seen how the establishment of such a community implies certain sorts
of relations, and how these relations imply respect between them.
Locke, in his writings on cosmopolitanism, embraces this basic idea.34 Still,
Locke has a somewhat extended conception that shows us certain other commitments that
this basic idea implies. Locke wants to hold more of a culturally and religiously pluralist
and tolerant position that is not grounded in what he calls a uniformitarian theory of
culture, religion, and values that might be attributable to Kant when Kant’s notion is
filled out. What I mean to say here is that Locke takes this basic conception to its furthest
logical conclusion, showing what a commitment to it implies.
Now insofar as Locke worked on both race and value theory for the entirety of his
mature life, my argument (that Locke’s philosophical anthropology and his value theory
seek to provide a grounding for cosmopolitanism by combatting racial superiority) only
makes sense if in fact Locke had a conception of cosmopolitanism that can be seen
throughout his entire mature life. And though Locke doesn't use the term
“cosmopolitanism” very early in his mature life, he has a clear conception of it, one that
34
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can be traced to a series of lectures delivered a year before his Harvard dissertation on
value theory was defended.
Locke conceptualizes a cosmopolitan community in the fifth lecture of a series
delivered at Howard University that have been put into book-format and entitled Race
Contacts and Interracial Relations.35 This conception emerges at the same time as his
understanding of racial superiority, and follows very complex conceptions of society,
beginning with an argument regarding the incipience of societies, their nature, and
dilemmas that afflict them. In presenting and evaluating Locke's conception of
cosmopolitanism, I would like to begin with his understanding of society, and then show
how his conception of cosmopolitanism develops from his understanding of society.
Locke’s theory of society, which gives us particular insights into principles
fundamental to his thinking on cosmopolitanism, emerges out of a theory of how
societies form. For Locke, much like W.E.B. Du Bois’ work written nineteen years before
his, societies begin, not so much with a contract created by individuals aimed at
protecting their lives, but by humans naturally coming together on the basis of kinship
ties.36 Here, Locke must assume a sort of loose collection of individual families existing
35
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before the formation of the state, one in which has no set traditions or value-systems,
whose only concern is with their own wellbeing. In conceptualizing the incipience of
race-practices, Locke asserts that: “The basis of all social organization is upon some sort
of kinship; in that sense [,it is clear] that kinship is really at he root of human society.”37
What Locke claims is that social organization requires cohesiveness––a type of
familiarity or affinity with each other wherein the members think themselves to be linked
to each other in some fundamental way. A few lines later, Locke writes that: “A primitive
civilization made its [kinship] naturally, there being very little infusion of new blood[.]
Anything large enough to constitute a city or state or tribe had this ethnic relation and
was of one kith and kin.” 38 The way that the primitive civilization, in its incipience, was
linked together was by blood.
Locke, again like Du Bois, calls any conglomeration of members a “people”: “If
you will stop to consider ‘peoples’ as a sort of term that mediates between the [kinship]
type and the larger ethnic group, what we mean by ‘people’ in the political sense is
simply the large group or collective of folk that do more or less have a common
consciousness.”39 A people understand themselves and the world in a particular sort of
way, and it is on this basis that they are bound together. In the beginning of a peoples’
history, there is an emphasis placed on blood. As a people flourishes and develops, they
become defined by common values, emphasizing less kinship bonds. Locke’s thinking on

37

Alain Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, ed. Jeffrey C. Stewart
(Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1992) 21.

38

Ibid.

39

Ibid.

!34

cosmopolitanism begins here, with the understanding that the world is fundamentally
constructed of peoples, which we can think of as collective agents who have different
ways of understanding and thus valuing the world. Locke’s cosmopolitanism is centered
on bringing them together, and doing so without either disrespecting particular people(s)
or homogenizing differences. A cosmopolitan community, for Locke, must preserve
difference as a project aimed at world-scale unity.
Now, as opposed to Kant, Locke cannot ground the normative force of
establishing a cosmopolitan community in the same normative principal that causes/
commands rational agents to contract with each other. For Locke, states do not emerge
out of a contract. And thus, as opposed to Kant, cosmopolitanism cannot be the
completion of our contract to secure our lives. However, Locke seems to think that we do
in fact have a reason (perhaps even a normative reason) to establish a cosmopolitan
community. And like Kant, Locke thinks that we have a reason for establishing a
cosmopolitan community that traces back to the formation of states, albeit not one
grounded in contract theory.
For Locke, again, states begin with individual families coming together on the
basis of kinship ties. These families blossom out to form larger communities on the basis
of similarities in values. However, one might wonder why families blossom out in this
way. Why do families form larger communities with other families if they are not
contracting to better secure their lives? Locke thinks that families bind with each other on
the basis of values because of a natural desire that people have to assemble into
conglomerates. Locke argues that there is a natural tendency in humans to amalgamate.
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For Locke, arbitrary distinctions on the basis of race or class “keep people from
following the natural tendencies which would lead to complete assimilation and
absorption.”40 Locke seems to think that people have a social nature such that humans
both desire community with others and social approval, which seems to be the only
reason why “complete assimilation” is the end of this natural tendency. People tend to
want to be with others, and tend to want to be looked upon favorably, which both leads
them into larger conglomerations and would lead to “complete assimilation” if not
checked.
Now, though Locke wants to say that the natural tendency is good, insofar as it is
through this natural tendency that we can hope that humans establish a cosmopolitan
community, he does think that this natural tendency needs to be checked. Locke does
think that complete assimilation of all groups is undesirable, and must think that it is
unnecessary for establishing and living in a cosmopolitan community. Locke tells us that:
“All of the fundamental tendencies of earlier civilizations are counter tendencies to
[assimilation] and run against the current of the natural instincts of human beings. So
much so[,] that the civilized human being has these distinctions ingrained in his
disposition by centuries of heritage.”41 The tendencies of earlier civilization (Locke’s
example is India’s caste system) are social divisions that counter the natural tendency to
amalgamate. Locke continues: “The distinctions are not harmful in themselves, but
harmful only as they are unjustly perpetuated or irrationally practiced.”42 As will become
40
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clear, when we investigate Locke's philosophical anthropology as it regards race in
chapter three, distinguishing between in-group and out-group members is not, in itself,
negative or unprogressive. The practice becomes negative or unprogressive when it leads
to disrespecting members of out-groups. In fact Locke thinks that distinctions are quite
helpful in cultural expressions, particularly art, insofar as they are a means through which
respect between groups can either be formed or cultivated, and as such are good for the
aim of establishing a cosmopolitan community.
As a result, for Locke, not everyone has to embrace the same values, expressions,
tastes, religions, sexual orientations, etc. And this is a fundamental aspect of Lockean
cosmopolitanism. More than merely being tolerant of human difference, human unity will
be grounded in human difference. With regard to assimilation, Locke speaks of this
concept as what would occur if there were no blocks on people following this natural
tendency. And what this seems to signal is the strength of the natural tendency to
associate or assemble into conglomerates. Though complete assimilation should be
checked, it is because of this natural tendency that we can establish a cosmopolitan
community.
There is support for the claim that we have a reason for establishing a
cosmopolitan community that traces back to the formation of states, albeit not one
grounded in contract theory. In looking at the formation of states from individual families
coming together on the basis of value because of a natural inclination to assemble, Locke
comes to the conclusion that there are fundamental values that all human communities
have in common. Locke calls these cultural constants (or cultural cognates). For Locke,
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these are core values that undergird any human community, without which the
community would not exist. These values must exist at every stage of a community's
“life” (local community, state, empire, etc.), and thus must be, either explicitly or
implicitly, embraced by the members of the community. This being the case, Locke
thinks that we have something of an obligation (perhaps merely a practical obligation) to
embrace and develop them. If we accept that we are beings who desire social assembly
(community), and constants are necessary for that end, then we have something of an
obligation to embrace and develop these constants to the end of satisfying the desire.
Locke's ultimate claim seems to be that establishing a cosmopolitan community is the
logical extension, or the completion, of embracing and developing cultural constants that
aim to satisfy the desire to assemble into conglomerates. Thus, if we have something of
an obligation to embrace and develop fundamental values––cultural constants––that
allow a collection of families to be a people, then we have an obligation to establish a
cosmopolitan community, as this is the highest level of embracing and developing these
constants.
Locke gives us his thinking on cultural constants in a few places in his corpus. In
an essay entitled, “Cultural Relativism and Ideological Peace,” Locke attempts a
clarification of the cultural relativist position in order to present “the prospects and
techniques of ‘an enduring peace.’”43 Here, I take Locke to mean, in addition to Kant’s
notion of ending all hostilities (wars), solving value conflicts that have the potential to
produce animosity or resentment. Locke’s goal is to layout certain conditions and
43
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something of a methodology for establishing peace, not only between nations but
between citizens within nations. What Locke offers is a way in which in-group members
(irrespective of how this is defined by those members) can amicably relate to members of
out-groups. And in this clarification, we see Locke’s commitment to much of Kant’s
vision of cosmopolitanism, along with a bit of an extension of it.
Locke shows us his agreement with Kant’s latter claims regarding the
characteristics of a cosmopolitan, namely that the cosmopolitan is tolerant, humble, and
endorses principles of recognizing and sharing cultural products, while also grounding his
argument for why we have a reason to establish a cosmopolitan community due to
cultural constants. In the article mentioned above, Locke writes that “the relativistic
philosophy nips in the psychological bud the passion for arbitrary unity and conformity.
This mind-set, we know only too well and sorrowfully, constitutes the intellectual base
and ideological root of all those absolutistic dogmatisms that rationalize orthodoxy.”44 By
relativism, Locke does not mean a merely subjectivist position that finds no unity or
universality in human experience. There are cultural constants. As such, there is
universality in human experience. Still, relativism rejects absolutism, which is a major
barrier to Locke’s pluralism and cosmopolitanism. “Absolutes are concepts, or principles
that are thought to pertain to all human beings, at all times. Absolutism then is the belief
that the things (at least some of the things) that one values are ultimately justified (or
justifiable) independently of social or historical conditions, and that the professed values
apply equally to all human beings regardless of any actual social or historical
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differences”45 Locke’s relativism is “a more authentic universalism––that is, a provisional
generalization, always open to revision, that is derived inductively from a fair sampling
of the rich variety of perspectives cultivated by the numerous cultural traditions
inhabiting our globe, and never a universalism arrived at a priori as some particular
perspective universally imposed.”46 For Locke, a relativistic philosophy “contradicts
value dogmatism and counteracts value bigotry without destroying the sense of active
value loyalty.”47
Much like Kant in his consideration of the relationship between patriotism and
cosmopolitanism, Locke thinks that it is important for people (whether citizens––in
Kant’s case, or communities––in Locke’s case) to be loyal to the ideals of their group
without overvaluing their group’s ideals in a way that leads to a failure to respect others.
What Locke thinks is that “absolutism in all its varieties––religious, philosophical,
political, and cultural––despite the insistent linking together of unity and universality,
seems able, so far as historical evidence shows, to promote unity only at the cost of
universality. For absolutism’s way to unity is the way of orthodoxy, which involves
authoritarian conformity and subordination.”48 What Locke requires is our toleration of
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others’ ideals, from an understanding both that overlaying values (ideals) are a
development of socio-historical circumstances and that they govern others’ behavior,
making them important to others, just as our values govern our behavior.49
Moreover, Locke agrees with Kant’s notion of cultural reciprocity. 50 Locke tells
us that:
The principle of cultural reciprocity, which, by a general recognition of the
reciprocal character of all contacts between cultures and of the fact that all
modern cultures are highly composite ones, would invalidate the lump estimating
of cultures in terms of generalized, en bloc assumptions of superiority and
inferiority, substituting scientific, point-by-point comparisons with their
correspondingly limited, specific, and objectively verifiable superiorities or
inferiorities….51
In this passage we see a few things. First, we see Locke pointing to the idea that
cosmopolitanism is severely challenged by superiority, which reduces to value
superiority.52 Second, as we will see in chapter three, Locke thinks that cultures are
highly composite, meaning that cultures form through a process of intergroup contact and
sharing. (Further, intergroup sharing allows cultural development and it, along with the
respect for differences––a sort of essentialism––progresses cosmopolitanism by
producing/cultivating respect between people.) Locke thinks that if we understand the
composite nature of cultures and cultural development, then we are more likely to be
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open to reciprocation deriving from an attempt to understand others’ cultures. What we
see here is the idea that earnest attempts at understanding and sharing promotes respect,
or the perception of, attitude of acknowledgement towards, and treatment of a person as a
deserving bearer of rights equal to our own. But more than that, cultural reciprocity
seems to lead to a deeper since of hospitality (in the Kantian sense), where it becomes
much more likely that out-group members will become guests for having presented
themselves. And this would perhaps be more likely on both an individual and state level.
Now, Locke thinks that coming together in this way is possible once we see that,
fundamentally, we all (as groups and individuals) embrace particular “functional” values.
What this amounts to is that all communities’ cultures are built on certain values, and all
reasonable individuals within these communities embrace these values. In a critical
passage, Locke asserts the following that promotes a greater level of reasonableness in
our interrelations:
The principle of cultural equivalence, under which we would more wisely press
the search for functional similarities in our analyses and comparisons of human
cultures; thus offsetting our traditional and excessive emphasis upon cultural
difference. Such functional equivalences, which we might term “culturecognates” or “culture-correlates,” discovered underneath deceptive but superficial
institutional divergence, would provide objective but soundly neutral common
denominators for intercultural understanding and cooperation….53
Again, Locke thinks that there are fundamental similarities in our cultures’ value-systems,
and that these similarities ultimately trace back to the ways in which communities are
formed. Locke claims that these constants are the bases by which we can understand
(perhaps even in the strong sense of sympathizing with) each other, and are the reasons
53
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why cooperation is possible. If cosmopolitanism requires understanding and cooperation,
which seem to be entailed in both Kant’s and Locke’s argument, then these constants go a
ways in explaining how cosmopolitanism is possible.
Now, Locke does not explicitly say what these cultural constants are. For
instance, Locke suggests that it is the job of science (here, I think that Locke means
anthropology) to investigate different cultures to find cultural constants, and can
investigate these cultures properly if doing so from a culturally relativistic framework. 54
Further, while thinking that our noticing differences in value-systems does not necessarily
lead to constructing value-hierarchies wherein others’ value-systems are ranked lower
than ours in a way that causes our disrespecting them, Locke seems to think that belief in
fundamental differences in value-systems increases the chances of constructing valuehierarchies and would decrease the natural tendency to assemble. Thus, noticing that we
are more similar, fundamentally, than we are different allows us to search out differences
by socio-historical circumstances as opposed to essential composition. A socio-historical
explanation for value-differences seems to allow us to better appreciate others’ valuesystems through seeing them as “not-so-different” from our own.
Though Locke does not explicitly state what these cultural constants are, and even
seems to aver that they have not yet been discovered, we can infer both from his words
and his thought on the formation of the state certain values that there must be cultural
constants. We know that Locke thinks that people have an inclination (and a desire) to
assemble into conglomerates. Thus, in answering the question of which values are
54
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necessary for a community to exist, we need to first ask which values satisfy the desire to
assemble. A better way to get at this is to ask which values would people promote insofar
as they desire to move from individual families to larger assemblies? This would allow us
to see which values must be constants.
From this idea and Locke’s own words, it would appear that people would desire
democracy such that democracy is a cultural constant. Now, by democracy Locke means
two things. First there is political democracy, wherein political power is vested in the
citizens of the state. Democracy in this way is government by the people. However, in
addition to political democracy, Locke has more of a fundamental understanding of
democracy that conditions political democracy. Consider Locke’s words:
In fact, it will be a tragedy as catastrophic as military defeat itself should the
Atlantic charter turn out to be another deceptive mirage of war rationalization. For
it not to be, it will need to become the long-awaited Magna Carta of the colonial
people, an international bill of rights for all minorities, and a revolutionary
extension of the democratic principle of equality to cover the parity of all peoples,
races and nations. 55
Here, Locke seems to builds democracy in the political sense on a more basic form of
democracy. Here, democracy has a “principle of equality.” Consider Locke here: “Just as
the foundation of democracy as a national principle made necessary the declaration of the
basic equality of persons, so the founding of international democracy must guarantee the
basic equality of human groups.”56 Political notions of democracy rely on a more basic
notion of democracy, one essentially characterized by the equality in freedoms and the
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essential equality of persons in treatment before the law. By democracy being a cultural
constant, Locke would mean something like the presumption that, as a human I am equal
to all others. My voice is just as important as all others, and my rights and freedoms do
not exceed, or are not judged below, others’ rights or freedoms. And this reading seems to
be confirmed by Locke’s thinking that there are five types of democracy, namely local,
moral, political, economic, and cultural.57 If there are five types of democracy, with
political democracy being one type, then we are seemingly licensed to infer that there
must be an understanding of democracy that unifies the five types; there must be a
definition of democracy that allows us to categorize each of them under the concept.
Now, Locke shows many convergences with Kant in this passage. In the essay
from which this passage has been taken, Locke is describing world democracy. And we
can take him to think that world democracy conditions cosmopolitanism. Locke tells us
that:
[I]f the new democracy is to be realized, are irresponsible national sovereignty,
power politics, military and economic imperialism, racialist notionals [sic] of
world rule and dominance, the persecution of particular minorities and the bigotry
of cultural superiority. This is a formidable list, but it seems to be the indicated
strategy of the war as well as the imperatives of the peace. These are the stakes of
world democracy…. 58
Like Kant, Locke seems to recognize that cosmopolitanism requires certain types of
states, as Locke tells us that it is an imperative that we spread political democracy in
order to counter totalitarianism.59 What Locke sees is growing momentum for certain
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types of government that cannot possibly produce a cosmopolitan community. Thus, it is
up to democratic nations to restore and create confidence in democracy so that
cosmopolitanism becomes possible. We may infer from this that Locke thinks that certain
forms of government are necessary in order for cosmopolitanism to be established. Locke
supports the basic Kantian vision of the type of commitments a state must have in order
to contribute to establishing a cosmopolitan community.
In the passage, Locke seems to recognize that political democracy, which is the
type of government necessary to establish a cosmopolitan community, implies certain
types of relationships. Locke tells us that: “The net outcome, it would seem, is an
objective finding that democracy, looked at nationally or internationlly [sic], is seriously
beset with internal inconsistencies, political, social, and cultural. It is weakened by these
all the more as it tries to pull itself together as a corporate body of United Nations
fighting a world defense of democracy.”60 Locke thinks that these relations imply respect,
defined principally by the equality of persons, and that the lack of respect is the reason
why there are internal inconsistencies. 61 Locke argues that: “Morally speaking, then, the
crucial issue is whether our vision of democracy can clear-sightedly cross the color line,
and whether we can break through the barriors [sic] of color and cultural racialism to
reach the necessary goal of world democracy. Certainly here, both nationally and
internationally, color becomes the acid test of the basic honesty and self-consistency of
our democratic practise.”62 For Locke, racial issues, and particularly the inequality in
60

Ibid, 538.

61

Ibid.

62

Ibid, 535.

!46

perception and treatment of non-white people, creates the instability that challenges the
establishment of world democracy.
Now, nothing stated licenses the inference that democracy is a cultural constant.
In other words, I have yet to say why Locke thinks that democracy is a cultural constant.
In a very little article wherein he gives us the five distinct phases of democracy (local,
moral, political, economic, and cultural democracy), Locke states:
Thinking Negroes, of course, know much about what democracy is not, and have
a more workable conception of what democracy truly means than those who have
just enough to be content with or those to whom it is just a commonplace concept
and way of life. Democracy, of course, is one of the basic human ideals, but as an
ideal of human association it is something quite superior to any outward
institution or any particular society; therefore, not only is government too narrow
to express democracy, but government from time to time must grow to realize
democracy.63
For Locke, particular African Americans know the antipodal of democracy because of
what they experience in America. Still, Locke considers democracy to be one of the basic
human ideals. By this, Locke must mean either that democracy is an ideal fundamental to
the human spirit or that it is a cultural constant. For reasons that will be discussed in
chapter four, namely that Locke is not committed to value-realism, Locke cannot think
the former. Further, Locke suggests that democracy is an ideal of human association.
What he seems to suggest to us is that the basic ideal of democracy, as one that implies
the basic equality of persons, conditions associations between persons. In short, he seems
to think that the ideal of democracy is assumed in associations, and is necessary in order
for associations to function in any productive or progressive way.
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Suggesting that democracy is a cultural constant is not at all absurd. One can
imagine that when we freely form groups or associate with others there is an assumption
that our voices will be heard, that we will be considered equal to the other persons who
we associate with, and that the freedoms that our associates enjoy will not be denied to us
for our associating with them. If so, then we would seemingly refrain from the
association. And though communities, people, states, etc., do not practice them perfectly,
or even very well at all, there seems to be a basic assumption by those forming the
various groups that they should. Moreover, this ideal could be said to condition
revolutions, protest when “injustices” have occurred, or peoples’ welcoming political
democracy when given the opportunity, and seems to be at work in micro-communities
where associations are free (even within undemocratic states).
Now, it is clear that Locke does not think that democracy is the only cultural
constant. In “Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,” Locke claims that:
There would also be the further possibility of a more objective confirmation of
many basic human values, and on a basis of proof approximating scientific
validity. For if once the broader relativistic approach could discover beneath the
expected culture differentials of time and face such common-denominator
“universals” as actually may be there, these values would stand out as
pragmatically confirmed by common human experience. Either their observable
generality or their comparatively established equivalence would give them status
far beyond any “universals” merely asserted by orthodox dogmatisms. And the
standard of proof would after all not be very different from the accepted scientific
criterion of proof;— confirmable invariability in concrete human experience.64
Here, Locke tells us that with an investigation, principally one grounded in value
pluralism with corollaries of tolerance and reciprocity, we are able to discover a
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multiplicity of core values that undergird what can only be human social-experience. He
thinks that many of the values that we hold will then show themselves, in a justifiable
way, to be universals. And it is clear that Locke thinks that we both can and need to
discover them. Consider Locke once more:
Since we cannot banish our imperatives, we must find some principle of keeping
them within bounds. It should be possible to maintain some norms as functional
and native to the process of experience, without justifying arbitrary absolutes, and
to uphold some categoricals without calling down fire from heaven. Norms of this
status would be functional constants and practical sustaining imperatives of their
correlated modes of experience; nothing more, but also nothing less.
Locke took there to be many cultural constants that connect different cultures and peoples
by showing humans’ experience to be more similar than different. My goal has not been
to give us Locke’s entire view on the matter of cultural constants. It is doubtful that
Locke’s view was complete on the issue. Rather, I took as my aim to show that Locke
thought there to be cultural constants that ground human experience.
Locke relies on cultural constants to show us the possibility of cosmopolitanism
by showing us the similarities or the connectedness of humanity and human communities.
Further, Locke seems to show us that a cosmopolitan community is the logical extension,
or the completion, of embracing and developing cultural constants. Thus, if we have
something of an obligation to embrace and develop fundamental values that allow a
collection of families to be a people, then we have an obligation to establish a
cosmopolitan community, as this is the highest level of embracing and developing these
constants. However, we are able to see the challenge that racial superiority poses to
establishing this kind of community that we seem to have some sort of obligation to
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establish. In Race Contacts, Locke states that “race prejudice is really fundamentally
based upon the differences in social culture and the differences in type of civilization.”65
Racial prejudice emphasizes racial differences in a rank-ordered system, rank-ordering
human worth by that system. And Locke tells us that this is done biologically.66 What
biologically rank-ordering human worth in accordance with fundamental or essential
differences in values produces is a denial of respect to certain peoples.
Locke’s thinking on society and racial superiority leads us squarely to an
investigation of its cause, a cause to which I not turn. I would like to investigate the
philosophical roots of racial superiority, looking at how the idea of non-white inferiority
arose out of a scientivizing of racial difference. These racial differences get cashed out in
terms of value-differences, which are natural and insurmountable. And insofar as they
are, non-white inferiority is thought to be permanent. This will (in the third and fourth
chapters) lead to Locke’s engagement with racial superiority on anthropological and
axiological grounds.
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Chapter 2
Is it Because I'm Black: Racist Theories and Practices:

“And always the study of the abnormal seems to establish what is really normal. If we
regard certain of the reactions of race contacts as abnormal phenomena in society,
perhaps, in society, we not only gain a scientific notion of what they themselves are, but
gain in addition a knowledge of what the normal functional reactions of human society
are and should be. In the light of the abnormal, the normal constitutes itself.”
––Alain Locke, Race-Relations and Interracial Contacts

Introduction:
The title of the present chapter, “Is it Because I’m Black,” is the title of a very
moving song written by Syl and Jimmy Johnson. The lyrics of the song speak to the lack
of respect for African Americans that derive from ideas of racial superiority. And while
African Americans have made important gains in achieving equal treatment in America,
and while we have made important strides towards cosmopolitanism in political relations,
racial superiority continues to be one of (if not the) most significant hurdles to achieving
a cosmopolitan community. As we will see, racial superiority is grounded in the belief
that there are differences between human races such that certain races produce (either
necessarily or arbitrarily) particular cultures with specifically different values, and that
there is a hierarchy of human values that allows for the human beings that make up these
races to be rank-ordered, many of which place white peoples at the top of the order. As
such, racial superiority has an anthropology regarding race (as well as a value theory) that
is behind it, one that it has both created and reasserts.
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In this chapter I would like to elucidate philosophical anthropologies as they
regard race and race-contacts that Locke was responding to with his theories on race and
race-contacts. To this end, I focus not so much on the state of affairs for African
Americans during the time that Locke was developing his theories, but on the philosophy
that has, in many ways, produced and justified it. This is to say that I minimally elucidate
the state of affairs for African Americans through the history of the concept of race as
developed in anthropology, as it began to become more than merely exploratory, but a
matter of scientific analysis. As one might imagine, the thinking about, and thus treatment
of, African Americans (and in fact all non-white and certain white peoples) was quite
bleak during Locke’s lifetime. Theories of race during this period recreated, justified, and
reinforced non-white inferiority, and by large is a significant reason why respect could
not be conferred to these groups in race-contracts. Thus, my reasoning behind devoting a
chapter to certain historical figures' philosophical anthropologies regarding race is to set
the stage for the issue, namely the racial superiority, that Locke introduced his theories of
race and value to combat.
Locke’s theory of race, upon which his value theory stands, is made in
consideration of theories of race and race-contacts that either deny races as facts in the
world and those that draw a necessary connection between races and culture-types and
products, and then deny that certain races have cultures that are worthy of respect. Most
of his work that seeks to reject the second conjunct takes aim at Arthur de Gobineau. 1
Specifically, Locke attempts to respond to two claims that are fundamental in Gobineau's
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work, namely that races are products of God and that there is a necessary connection
between race and culture such that races must produce certain culture-products which can
be objectively judged to have greater or lesser value than the culture-products of other
races.2 And as such, certain races are inherently better than others insofar as they are able
to produce culture-products that other races cannot because of natural limitations placed
on them by God. Thus, Locke takes aim at the idea of natural superiority and inferiority
(and in-fact the very concepts of superiority and inferiority as they relate to humanity)
that is averred by Gobineau.
Now, with very few exceptions, Gobineau's ideas are not original. The idea that
races are natural and that certain races are superior to others because culture-productive
capacity is fixed is an idea that can be found earlier in philosophical anthropology––in
both Immanuel Kant and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Kant’s philosophical
anthropological statements were made to show that all humans had the same origin and
were of the same species. This argument was made against those who thought that racial
distinctions signified differences in origin.3 Thus, Kant cannot be taken to exclude certain
races from the human community, and thus claiming that certain races were unworthy of
any respect. However, as we have seen, it may very well be the case that Kant became
aware that his anthropology as it relates to racial divisions had major problems for his
moral and cosmopolitan considerations.
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Kant and the Scientific Division of Man:
Kant begins a rather lengthy list of persons who attempted to make racial
divisions, and thus philosophical anthropology as it regards a division of races, a matter
of science. Until Kant, European racial distinctions were made by travelogues and
Christian missionaries who provided information about different peoples’ appearances
and customs. This produced pressure to develop a more academic/scientific notion of
race.4 Insofar as Locke responds to what he takes to be scientific misconceptions of race,
I would like to begin looking at Locke's response to racial superiority by examining how
it is elucidated and defended by Kant.
Now, though Kant conceptualized members of all races as members of the same
human race, Kant's goal was to account for the differences in human beings that he
thought licensed him to categorize people as members of different races; he thought that
he must account for the subcategories into which human beings should be placed. And
Kant accomplishes this with the concepts “germs” and “predispositions.” Kant claims
that: “The grounds of a determinate unfolding which are lying in the nature of an organic
body (plant or animal) are called germs, if this unfolding concerns particular parts; if
however, it concerns only the size or relation of the parts to one another, then I call them
natural predispositions.” 5 Germs and predispositions account for differences in human
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beings insofar as environmental conditions have affected or influenced them for some
time at the beginning stages of the human species’ development. Kant thought that human
beings, in the beginning of history, were destined for all climates, insofar as humans had
germs and predispositions that would allow them to adjust to, or survive in, all climates.6
Though human beings were destined for all climates, settlement in a particular
climate for a lengthy period of time (at or towards the beginnings of human history)
allowed particular germs and predispositions within the human organism to flourish,
while suppressing other germs and predispositions because of a lack of use or need. Once
particular germs and predispositions flourished or were suppressed, these developments
were reproduced in humans’ offspring unfailingly. In other words, suppressed germs and
predispositions will continue to be latent in humans’ offspring, irrespective of changes to
the offspring’s environment. In fact, Kant seems to think that radical changes in the
condition of the offspring, once the humans’ offspring has become accustomed to
particular environmental conditions, can retard the posterity of the offspring.7
For Kant, the theory of unfolding germs and predispositions accounts for what he
thought to be large differences between human subcategories while at the same time
allowing Kant to claim a sameness in all human origin. Human beings have the same
origin, and this original group possessed equivalent germs and predispositions. Yet, as
human beings were affected by their respective environments, some germs and

6 As

an aside, Kant thought that the human species being destined in this way was
evidence that humans were on a path towards the establishment of a cosmopolitan
community. Kant reasoned that humans were destined to spread across the earth
because nature intended humans to seek peace.
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predispositions were able to flourish and others were suppressed in different racial
groups. The differences in the suppression and flourishing of germs and predispositions
are what accounts for racial difference.
So, from changes in germs and predispositions, which stem from the influence of
environmental conditions, namely air and sun (but also diet, bathing, etc.), we get
difference in human beings. For Kant, only those differences that occur unfailingly in the
human organism can allow one to be classified as a member of a race. Kant thinks that
varieties, strains, and sorts within groups of people can change without marking a
difference in racial classification. For instance, there can be black haired or blond haired
strains within a particular racial category.8 However, insofar as hair types are not
reproduced unfailingly, they do not demarcate differences in races. And with regard to
races, Kant will argue that there are four main types: White; Negro; Hunnish (Mongolian
or Kalmuckian; and Hindu). All other races have derived from these.
Now, Kant would have us to believe that only physical properties account for
differences in races. Kant tells us that: “What comes into question for establishing a
division of the species into classes [of races] are the physical characters through which
human beings…differ from one another, more precisely, only those physical characters
which are hereditary. Now these classes are to be called races only if those characters are
unfailingly hereditary….”9 This passage makes it quite clear that what is supposed to
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determine classification into races are physical properties, not psychological or moral
ones. However, when speaking about different races, Kant seems to leave this thinking
behind, smuggling in psychological traits with clear implications for the culture that is to
derive from these races, and thus the values that will characterize the races. Certain races
are more worthy of respect because they possess certain psychological traits (as they are
defined using value-terms).
In his works, Kant tells us that laziness and immorality are inherently found in
Negroes, along with weakness and lack of intelligence being inherent in Indians. And
these, Kant thinks, are a part of the natural predispositions of these two races.10 They are
clear value-terms that will play out in the respective cultures, and will be fundamental to
the value-systems of the Negroes and Indians.
And as opposed to these races, Kant locates the highest type of human beings
(which can only be understood in physical, intellectual, moral, and aesthetic terms)—
those who have been most fortunate due to environmental conditions in the development
of germs and predispositions—in Germany. In fact, Kant thinks that it is fair to assume
that the pheletic species (the original human race) is from Germany because of the
superiority of features inherent in this group.11 Here, one is able to see a clear hierarchy
for the races, and even a bit of an intra-racial hierarchy, a hierarchy in which becomes
clearer when one looks at Kant’s Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the
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Sublime, where he rank-orders races, intra-racial groups, and even men and women
according to natural predispositions in temperaments toward beauty or sublimity.12
Now, Kant’s thinking on the division of human beings into races will have a very
devastating effect for non-white people. Here, one is able to see a rank-ordering of human
beings that accords to psychical properties from which culture and values will derive.
Further, Kant thinks that races have degenerated from one higher race, which will come
to be thought of as a master race, and which he claims has greater physical and psychical
properties. And though Kant seems to think that all persons deserve respect insofar as
they are persons (irrespective of the divergent levels of intellect or cultural capability),
and thus that a cosmopolitan community might be possible because basic respect, and
therefore moral obligations that include the obligation to be hospitable, is conferred to all
human beings as persons, one should wonder about the possibility of establishing such a
community because of the social instability that this will create and the lack of equality in
rights that this implies (a fact that Kant himself, if we accept Kleingeld's suggestions,
became aware of). If someone is by nature inferior to another, ought he/she to enjoy
equivalent rights before the law, even if he/she can legitimately make certain moral
demands that are equivalent to a superior man or woman. What of the social instability
that is caused by a person receiving particular jobs and other social goods when that
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person is deemed inferior to another vying for the job or social goods. We will come back
to this discussion. For now, it is enough to show that Kant’s philosophical anthropology
shaped thinking on race that would allow the value-hierarchies implied by racial
superiority, which are the hierarchies that Locke’s theory of value is constructed to
combat. I would like to push forward in showing the anthropological background that
influenced Locke’s anthropology through Gobineau. This discussion continues with an
examination of Blumenbach’s philosophical anthropology.
Blumenbach and the Degeneration of Man:
Blumenbach’s philosophical anthropology diverges from Kant’s in many ways.
However, like Kant's, it has been influential insofar as it has had a great affect on the way
that people are rank-ordered. Essentially, the ways in which persons are rank-ordered,
and thus valued as members worthy of respect are equivalent in both Kant and
Blumenbach. Thus, like Kan’s anthropology, Blumenbach’s philosophical anthropology
presents challenges to the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community because
of its use in establishing and justifying the lack of respect conferred to non-white peoples.
Blumenbach sets up his study by proposing a stark contrast between humanity and
animals. This distinction is essentially grounded in the faculty that makes humans both
superior to, and worthy of dominion over, animals. Blumenbach writes that the “gifts in
which man so far surpasses the rest of the animals, of whatever disposition and nature
they may be, we call reason.” 13 For Blumenbach, this gift was implanted into humanity
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by God so as to allow them to accommodate the environments into which humans were
to dominate. “Hence, even from the most ancient times, by the wisest nations, the chief
power of man, that is, the genius of invention, has been celebrated with divine honors.”14
Reason's divine superiority is confirmed, for Blumenbach, in its having been glorified
throughout human history. What is evident here is that Blumenbach does not want to
establish humanity's natural superiority in physical properties, but psychical ones. And
this should be understood when engaging Blumenbach, insofar as the implication of
ranking reason as the highest or “most divine” mark of a being is that arguments for this
feature being unevenly distributed among human groups by God (or nature) produces the
result that certain groups are superior to others, and that this superiority is designed by
God (or nature). We will see this shortly.
However, it is important to see how Blumenbach sets up the derivation of human
beings into races. Blumenbach gives us two ways to think about human origins: “whether
the origin can be traced to degeneration, or whether it is not so great as to compel us
rather to conclude that there is more than one original species of man.”15 As such,
Blumenbach suggests, as did Kant, that we must begin by engaging the debate between
monogenesis, where all human beings have a common origin, and polygenesis, where
humans have different origins. Apparently, Blumenbach thinks that if monogenesis is
true, then degeneration is also true––that all races degenerate from an original race.16 This
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initial assumption, much like that found in Kant, will lead Blumenbach to set up the
problem of human origins such that part of the goal of anthropology is to make inferences
as to what the original race was or looked like, and to attempt to match it with a current
race on earth, averring that one race is most like the original race (if not the original race),
while all others are further degenerations from this original race. In both Blumenbach's
and Kant's construction, the race that most matches the original race will be that race that
is superior to the further degenerated races. And this is an idea that Gobineau will pick up
on.
Now Blumenbach further sets up the problem by laying out what a species and a
variety are. Afterwards, Blumenbach attempts to justify a position on the potential origin
of human races by specifying whether they are of a different species or variety. With
regard to a species, Blumenbach writes that: “We say that animals belong to one and the
same species, if they agree so well in form and constitution, that those things in which
they do differ may have arisen from degeneration.” Blumenbach seems to think that
species-inclusion relies on exactness in the essential nature or construction of the animal,
perhaps with regard to shape and function, that cannot be explained by adaptations or
external conditioning. Blumenbach continues: “We say that those, on the other hand, are
of different species, whose essential difference is such as cannot be explained by known
sources of degeneration, if I may be allowed to use such a word.”17 Here, Blumenbach
rejects a very significant supposition in the Kantian claim of species-differences leading
to the demarcation of races, namely Buffon’s rule “that animals which produce fertile
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young with one another (whatever difference in shape there may be) still belong to one
and the same physical species….” 18 For Blumenbach, there is nothing that licenses this
inference because we cannot observe all animals in nature, which Blumenbach takes to be
required if we are to prove the rule true; one would need to observe animals that are not
(and in fact cannot be) in contact with each other in order to prove this rule true.
Blumenbach uses the example of the orang-utan and the chimpanzee as evidence. We
cannot know whether these are of the same species because they do not share a natural
habitat and therefore are not naturally in contact with each other. Bringing them together
would disqualify a principle presupposition of the rule, namely the need for nature to be
the instrument producing fertile offspring from these two animals.19 For Blumenbach,
“the principle sought to be deduced from copulation is not sufficient to define the idea of
species and its difference from variety, so neither are the other things which are adduced
with this object, for example, the constancy of any character.”20 In separating different
varieties of the same species of elephant, Blumenbach avers that: “I see, for example, that
the molar teeth of the African elephant differ most wonderfully in their conformation
from those of the Asiatic. I do not know whether these elephants, which from such
different parts of the world have ever copulated together; nor do I know any more how
constant this conformation of the teeth may be in each.” Here, copulation is not the
deciding factor in determining whether two animals are of the same species. “But since,
so far in all the specimens which I have seen, I have observed the same difference; and
18
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since I have never known any example of molar teeth so changed by mere degeneration, I
conjecture from analogy that those elephants are not to be considered as mere varieties,
but must be held to be different species.”21 As such, a variety seems to regard animals
that possess equivalent essential features, diverging only in what is not essential to how
an animal functions or is constituted.
Blumenbach’s understanding of species and variety may appear to be
scientifically suspect. What allows animals to be determined as varieties of the same
species or of a different species altogether seems to be the perception and judgment of the
anthropologist, with no evidence being required externally. In other words, there does not
seem to be a need to justify the perception and judgment of the anthropologist with
phenomena in the natural world. Further, an anthropologist's demarcation of what counts
as essential seems arbitrary. One might wonder what criteria Blumenbach's uses in
determining which features or properties of an animal are essential to its constitution or
function. For Blumenbach, anthropological classification is an explicitly subjective and
arbitrary art. This seems to be in stark opposition to Kant’s more scientific method of
observing the offspring of two animals. Kant’s understanding takes classification outside
of the classifying subject, and places it within a process of nature that is in some sense
independent of the subject, namely copulation. Observation is confirmed by a separate
process of phenomena in the world.
However subjective Blumenbach’s classificatory scheme for animals might be, he
argues that it should extend to humans, insofar as “the same causes should be assigned to
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account for natural effects of the same kind.” 22 Blumenbach’s statement here is
ambiguous. Blumenbach's adherence to a rule attributed to Newton can be interpreted in
two potential ways. First, Blumenbach could be claiming that if we have determined a
way to classify animal-species and separate them into varieties, then we should use this
classificatory scheme to understand humans. Second, Blumenbach could be claiming that
every kind of classification for deriving the differences in varieties of animals should
apply to differences in humankind, such that we can know if/how to categorize varieties
of humans. This interpretation seems plausible given the next two sentences: "We must
therefore assign the same causes for the bodily diversity of the races of mankind to which
we assign a similar diversity of body in the other domestic animals which are widely
scattered over the world." 23 Here, Blumenbach states that if we claim that animals
diverge in variety, where they are members of the same species, then we should expect to
be able to find varieties of humankind, who are members of the same species.
Thus, Blumenbach appears to mean the latter, namely that every kind of
classification for deriving the differences in varieties of animals should apply to
differences in humankind, even though his use of the term “kind” is left undefined if he
does mean the latter. The reason why Blumenbach seems to mean the latter is because he
seems to account for the first when he writes his second rule for answering the question
of the application of the animal-species/variety issue to humankind, namely “that we
ought not to admit more causes of natural things than what are sufficient to explain the
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phenomena.”24 Therefore, Blumenbach reasons, if degeneration, and by implication
monogenesis, is sufficient to explain differences in human groups, then we need not
complicate or multiply explanations by averring polygenesis. Further, what Blumenbach
seems to think is that monogenesis is a simpler explanation than polygenesis.
In applying the classificatory scheme to humankind, Blumenbach lists several
animal-traits as those that are altered when degeneration occurs. These are the color, hair
texture, stature, figure/proportion of parts, and most importantly skull size of the
animal.25 And the causes of these features of degeneration, namely changes in climate
(primarily exposure to air), diet, and mode of life, will set the stage for value-hierarchies
as implications of racial superiority.
Blumenbach gives a theory of degeneration by first constructing a theory of
generation, whereby he proposes that generation is the result of the interplay between
physical and the immaterially God-infused substances. Of the causes of degeneration,
Blumenbach tells us that when certain external stimuli has a constant effect on the
formative force of an animal over several generations, changes in the animal occur.26
Now for Blumenbach, the formative force is that which exists within the sperm cell of a
male that has the essential form, force of development, and (teleological) future of the
animal within it. Blumenbach tells us: “That the genital liquid is only the shapeless
material of organic bodies, composed of the innate matter of the inorganic kingdom, but
deferring in the force it shows, according to the phenomena; by which its first business is
24
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under certain circumstances of maturation, mixture, place, &c. to put on the form
destined and determined by them.…” 27 Sperm cells are infused by God with a form that
develops and performs certain functions. And Blumenbach distinguishes this formative
force as an invisible and perhaps unintelligible or indescribable force that is “excited by
the stimuli which belong to it, that is, by the kindling of heat in the eggs during the
process of incubation. But as other vital forces, as contractility, irritability, &c. put
themselves out only by the mode of motion, this, on the other hand, of which we are
talking, manifests itself by increase, and by giving a determinate form to matter.” 28 For
Blumenbach, this allows each animal to replicate itself through propagation.
“Now the way in which the formative force may sometimes turn aside from its
determined direction and plan is principally in three forms.”29 Blumenbach tells us that
these are either genetic mutations that we might think of as deformations, crossfertilization/breeding, and degenerations into varieties. As stated, degenerations occur
when formative forces begin to alter to accommodate changes in climate or diet, or
differences in modes of life (cultivation, education, habit, etc.).
Thus, with regard to the varieties of the human race, changes in climate, diet, and/
or modes of life have caused the singular human race to degenerate from an original
group. And of the varieties of the singular human race, Blumenbach claims five.30 Each
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variety has its own unique skin-color (white (Europeans), yellow/olive-tinge (Mongolian
nations), copper (Americans), tawny (Malay race and those of the Souther Archipelago),
tawny-black (Ethiopian nations)), which are the results, primarily, of exposure of the skin
to the air and sun. Blumenbach writes that “the approximate cause of the adust or tawny
colour of the external integuments of the skin, is to be looked for in the abundance of the
carton in the human body, which, when it is excreted with the hydrogen through the
corium, and precipitated by the contact of the atmospheric oxygen, becomes imbedded in
the Malpighian mucus.” 31
Now, while it may be questionable as a justification for the claim that there are in
fact varieties of human beings, Blumenbach’s assertion that differences in human skin
that have been caused by exposure to air and sun is innocent enough when considering
our connection between philosophical anthropology and the respect that cannot be
conferred to non-white people. However, Blumenbach makes assertions about skin-color
that clearly contributes to racial superiority, and shows themselves to be linked to valuehierarchies, which present a problem for cosmopolitanism. Though one might think that
there is no greater beauty or value to be attributed to skin color because skin color is
merely the result of exposure to air and sun, Blumenbach clearly rank-orders humans
because of it. Blumenbach rank-orders human beings in a problematic way for
cosmopolitanism in three principal ways. First, Blumenbach places whites at the top of a
rank-ordered hierarchy in terms of aesthetic valuation. Second, Blumenbach places
whites at the top of a rank-ordered hierarchy in terms of social values. Finally,
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Blumenbach places whites at the top of a rank-ordered hierarchy in terms of intellectual
properties. The result of this is that non-whites appear less deserving of equal respect in a
way that makes establishing a cosmopolitan community problematic insofar as the
images of non-whites are perceived as less respectable.
One is able to observe the aesthetic value-hierarchies that Blumenbach provides
with his claim that white skin is brilliant, particularly when he makes the claim in
comparison to the jaundiced skin of every other race.32 For Blumenbach, warmer climates
have had an affect on non-whites’ skin and liver, causing both the jaundiced skin and
white region of the eyes. And this is, in-turn, caused by the “abnormal” amounts of
carbon buildup in the blood that must be purified.33 As such, for Blumenbach non-whites’
liver and skin (which are the two principal organs of blood-purification) work too hard.
What we have here is Blumenbach asserting that non-white skin-color is abnormal.34 And
thus, Blumenbach appears to have greater justification in claiming that white skin-color is
more aesthetically valuable than non-whites.
Blumenbach provides more evidence for his aesthetic overvaluation of whites
over non-whites with his assertion that he prefers to name whites the caucasian variety: “I
have taken the name of this variety from Mount Caucasus, both because of its
neighborhood, and especially its southern slope, produces the most beautiful race of
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men.”35 Here, Blumebach is clear that whites have more aesthetic worth than every other
race. And this claim is supported both by the more perfect symmetry attributed to the
white face, which makes it the most handsome and becoming, and the belief that the
white color is “the primitive colour of mankind, since...it is very easy for that to
degenerate into brown, but very much more difficult for dark to become white, when the
secretion and precipitation of this carbonaceous pigment has once deeply struck root.”36
Finally with regard to aesthetic value-hierarchies, one can observed that the
description of every non-white racial variety makes them aesthetically inferior to the
white variety.37 Blumenbach is careful in choosing his adjectives and adverbs when
describing the varieties of humans. White cheeks are rosy, chins are full and rounded,
faces are handsome, skulls are beautiful. Non-white hair is stiff, foreheads knotty and
uneven, noses are apish. Blumenbach is careful to load his descriptions of other varieties
with aesthetic value-laden terms, such that readers will come away with a devalued view
of non-whites.
Blumenbach makes further claims that contribute to the over-valuation of whites
over non-whites with claims about the social values of whites verses non-whites, which
derive from his arguments about skin-color. Blumenbach argues that whites value
healthier dietary lifestyles and leisure more than non-whites, and this contributes to the
jaundiced skin-color that non-whites have.38 Thus, the social lives of non-whites can be
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deemed less valuable, and as a result, less worthy of respect in relation to white social
lives. In short, whites’ cultural values are more conducive with “the good,” and thus more
respectable than non-whites’ cultural values.
Moreover, Blumenbach makes statements about the intellectual properties of the
races that have direct bearing on the worthiness of respect for non-white persons.
Blumenbach argues that “the temperament of most inhabitants of tropical countries is
choleric and prone to anger” as a result of their being influenced by climate. What
Blumenbach tells us is that the effect of climate on non-white people, the same effect that
produces the effects on non-white skin and liver and produces the jaundice and colorvariations that are irreparably permanent, produces psychological effects that make
certain varieties of humankind more irascible, and thus more prone to violence than other
varieties. Now, Blumenbach admits that the darker the color, the more effect that climate
has had on the skin and liver. And if this is the case, then one is licensed to infer that
whites are least irascible, while blacks are most irascible. In fact, one has a clear
hierarchy of proclivities towards violent behavior that regards the varieties of humankind.
And this hierarchy is both grounded in nature and permanent insofar as it is natural that
climate has this affect on varieties and these affects do not admit to change.
Now, to be fair to Blumenbach, he seems to waver on the permanent inferiority of
non-whites’ intellectual capacities, though does so in a way that maintains a racial
hierarchy relating to intelligence. In his later writings, Blumenbach argues that non-white
races are capable of cultivating intellectual gifts if they are exposed to white culture.
Thus, Blumenbach seems to diverge from those who argue of the inability of non-white
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races becoming intellectually gifted; Blumenbach seems to dismiss the view that nonwhites are irrevocably inferior in intellectual capacity because of a natural lack in
intellectual properties. In Contributions to Natural History, Blumenbach concedes that
blacks have intellectual gifts, and possess the ability to rival whites in areas that require
advanced levels of abstraction or reasoning skills. He cites Anton Amo and Phillis
Wheatley, and claims to possess works by Jac. Elisa Joh. Capitein. He states clearly that
he refutes the idea that “the negroes are specifically different in their bodily structure
from other men, and must also be placed considerably in the rear, from the condition of
their mental capacities.”39 However, Blumenbach does not seem to think that blacks can
maximize their intellectual capacities without contact with whites. Thus, while blacks
might have intellectual capacities that are not completely stunted or non-existent by
nature, Blumenbach still seems to think that blacks are intellectually inferior to whites, or
that there is a hierarchy at play that whites are at the top of, while blacks––being
dependent on contact with whites for intellectual development––are somewhere
underneath whites (presumably at the bottom of the hierarchy40). Consider Blumenbach,
who tells us that:
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I am of opinion that after these numerous instances I have brought together of
negroes of capacity, it would not be difficult to mention entire well-known
provinces of Europe, from out of which you would not easily expect to obtain offhand such good authors, poets, philosophers, and correspondents of the Paris
Academy; and on the other hand, there is no so-called savage nation known under
the sun which has so much distinguished itself by such examples of perfectibility
and original capacity for scientific culture, and thereby attached itself so closely
to the most civilized nations of the earth, as the Negro.41
Here, while admitting the capacity for intellectual acuity in blacks, Blumenbach seems to
both suggest that this capacity is more observable in Europe and that blacks need to be in
contact with “civilized” nations (which is a code-word for European nations) for their
intellectual acuity to develop well. Thus, Blumenbach denies the natural superiority of
white intellectual capacity that Kant admits (namely that it is permanent), while affirming
the equivalent racial superiority that Kant ends with. And this non-natural version of
racial superiority is equally problematic in establishing a cosmopolitan community
because it elevates certain people (namely, their values) and makes other groups less
worthy of respect. In fact, Blumenbach's non-natural version of racial superiority would
seem to aver that blacks must acknowledge the superiority of European values in making
strides to cultivate develop their intellectual acuity. Thus, if it could lead to the
establishment of a cosmopolitan community, adopting Blumenbach's version would lead
to a uniformitarian method of establishing a cosmopolitan community, one where strict
and intolerant adherence to one set of values is the basis of a lasting peace. For many
reasons, this uniformitarian method is one that Locke vehemently rejects.
Gobineau and the Divine Superiority of Whites:
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Insofar as the views of Kant and Blumenbach have been elucidated, we now have
some grounding for understanding Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology (which is that
body of work that Locke’s philosophical anthropology attempts to challenge most). My
argument is that both Kant and Blumenbach provide key anthropological ideas that
Gobineau constructs his philosophical anthropology around. Kant gives Gobineau the
idea of monogenesis and non-white inferiority, along with the concept of race as a
concept “whose scientific status could at least be debated.”42 Blumenbach gives
Gobineau degeneration theory, which is the theory that differences in races can be
explained by the degeneration of humans in accordance with external changes.
Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology, which incorporates ideas from Kant and
Blumenbach, emerges out of his attempt to satisfy two inquiries. First, Gobineau inquires
into the nature of a state's failure. Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology emerges out of
an attempt to “know not merely the immediate causes of the plagues that are supposed to
chasten us, but also to trace the more remote reasons for those social evils which the most
meagre knowledge of history will show to have prevailed, inexactly the same form,
among all nations that ever lived, as well as those which survive to-day, evils that in all
likelihood will exist among nations yet unborn.”43 Gobineau’s philosophical
anthropology emerges out of a very noble goal, which is to account for those necessary
and sufficient––and thus universal and consistent––factors that cause states to fail.
Gobineau’s answer to the question is “that the inequality of the races from whose fusion a
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people is formed is enough to explain the whole course of history.”44 Thus, Gobineau’s
philosophical anthropology is an attempt to satisfy a second inquiry: “Are there serious
and ultimate differences of value between the human races; and can these differences be
estimated?” 45 As we will see, for Gobineau, naturally unequal groups of people
conjoining together, and more to the point, groups of people coming together in such a
way that equality is conferred to unequals, is the plague that causes nations to fail.
Gobineau’s thinking on the failure of states has implications for establishing a
cosmopolitan community. What this explanation for the failure of states will amount to is
that establishing cosmopolitan community is the worst thing for the world, insofar as
cosmopolitanism brings people together in a way that naturally leads to the mixing of
blood by conferring equal rights, and therefore equal respect, to all persons––persons
who are unequal by nature. And thus, while Gobineau will concede that principles of
cosmopolitanism are noble, they are unnatural. Taking this into account, it is no wonder
why Locke targets Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology specifically. I begin with this
idea (as Gobineau himself does), namely that mixing blood leads to the decay of states
and that cosmopolitanism is unnatural. Afterwards, I illustrate Gobineau's theory of race
and the problematic nature that it creates for the establishment of a cosmopolitan
community.
Now, in determining the consistent and universal laws governing the decline and
ultimate failure of all states, it is important to begin with the understanding that for
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Gobineau, God’s hand guides history. Considering this principal for understanding
history from the ancients, Gobineau writes that: “The wisdom of the ancients yields little
that throws light on the subject, except one fundamental axiom, the recognition of the
finger of God in the conduct of this world; to this firm and ultimate principal we must
adhere.”46 This principal is important because it shows that for Gobineau, the laws by
which states fail are (in essence) divinely inspired. God has set into place certain
universal laws in God’s movement through the history of the world. Gobineau also
adheres to a second principal, namely that “all societies perish because they are sinful.” 47
This principal is important because it shows that any human ideas, commitments, values,
or principals causing states to fail derive from human sin, and as sinful must be
understood to be contrary to God’s commands. What we are licensed to infer from these
two laws is as follows: if any human ideas, commitments, values, or principals that cause
states to fail derive from human sin, then they must be understood to be contrary to God’s
command. Thus, since human ideas about, commitments to, or values or principals of
cosmopolitanism are those that cause the failures of states, then those relating to
cosmopolitanism are sinful and are contrary to the command of God. Further, if we add to
this that the finger of God is in the conduct of this world, then we may infer that God is
behind the failure of states that embrace cosmopolitanism, precisely because they
embrace principals of cosmopolitanism. As such, for Gobineau, cosmopolitanism––
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because it is sinful––is divinely unjust (though, again, Gobineau will acknowledge that
principals fundamental to cosmopolitanism are noble).
In arguing that mixing blood leads to the decay of states, and that principals that
promote it––principals that confer equality to natural unequals in a way that can perhaps
be understood as overvaluing lesser valuable items on a divinely-set chain of natural
beings––are unjust, Gobineau first lists conditions that are not both necessary and
sufficient causes of a state's decay. These conditions are fanaticism, luxury, moral
corruption, and irreligion. Using the Aztecs and other New World (but non-European)
peoples as examples, Gobineau seems to use the term fanaticism to convey the idea of a
deplorable or heinous religion, perhaps religion that is either too rigid or extreme in its
beliefs or practices. For Gobineau, fanaticism cannot be the cause of decay in states
because there have been European nations that have decayed without practicing
fanaticism. Additionally, there have also been New World nations that have possessed
power and wealth at the height of embracing fanatic views or practices. “Thus fanaticism
does not cause the fall of States.” 48 Further for Gobineau, luxury is neither a necessary
nor sufficient condition for the decay of a state because he claims to observe such in
England and Russia, two states that for him are at the height of vitality.
Very interestingly, Gobineau claims that moral corruption is neither a necessary
nor sufficient condition for the decay of a state. Gobineau's reasoning is that: “From the
beginning of history, there has been no human society, however small, that has not
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contained the germ of every vice.”49 While not claiming that moral corruption goes handin-hand with the formation of the state, Gobineau seems to think that states have not
functioned without every imaginable vice. Moreover, Gobineau claims that there need not
be an imbalance between moral and immoral agents in a state for the state to decay,
where moral agents are outnumbered by immoral agents. To the contrary, Gobineau
claims that “men of strong character, men of talent and energy, so far from being
unknown to human societies in the time of their decadence and old age, are actually
found in greater abundance than in the days when an empire is young.” 50 Gobineau does
not mean to suggest that there are more moral agents in a totalitarian, dictatorial, or
tyrannical state. What Gobineau thinks is that the state’s social and political temperament
is more moral in its decay. Gobineau tells us that “the ordinary level of morality is higher
in the later period than in the earlier.” Gobineau’s claim is that in decline, a state becomes
more moral, both as an entity possessing a greater quantity of moral agents as well as an
entity possessing more moral laws and values. “Far from admitting the superior moral
character of early societies, I have no doubt that nations, as they grow older and draw
nearer their fall, present a far more satisfactory appearance from the censor’s point of
view.”51 For Gobineau, "the real vitality of a nation has little to do with its moral
condition."52
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The reason why Gobineau's thinking on the lack of a necessary connection
between moral corruption and a state's decay is interesting is because Gobineau seem to
draw a distinction between morality/moral corruption and divine justice/sin (contrarity to
God’s commands). Both moral laws/values and an increase in moral men seem to be
operating contrary to God’s commands in a decaying state, such that a state’s increasing
moral commitments lead to a state’s increasing sin because the state’s moral laws/values
confer equality to natural unequals. What one can see here is the strength of the idea of a
hierarchy in nature whose respect is mandated by God. One can think of this by appeal to
the idea of a great chain of being. 53 From it one can infer the power of the belief in, and
commitment to, non-white inferiority. Treating non-white lesser beings equally will be
sinful, and will be sinful even if we assume the morality of the principals aimed at
conferring equality to non-white beings.
Likewise it is interesting that Gobineau argues that irreligion, which he describes
as merely the loss of the faith of the “fathers” of the state, is neither a necessary nor
sufficient factor that causes the decay of a state. Gobineau's reasoning is that he sees no
discontinuity or breaks in the religious views of (European) nations, particularly before
Christianity.54 This is interesting because one would expect Gobineau to argue that states
have failed insofar as they have not been Christian states, and that a Christian state that
53
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looses its commitment to Christianity would fail. However, Gobineau seems to think that
even Christian states could fail, and their failure could have nothing to do with a loss of
Christianity. Thus, Gobineau thinks that he has “shown that fanaticism, luxury, and the
corruption of morals have not necessarily any power of destruction, and that irreligion
has no political reality at all….”55
So, Gobineau gives his impressions about what factors are neither necessary nor
sufficiently for causing a state to decay. Gobineau, giving us the necessary and sufficient
factor that causes a state to decay, claims that when a state decays, “it is because it has no
longer the same vigor as it had of old in battling with the dangers of life; in a word,
because it is degenerate.”56 Gobineau claims that the necessary and sufficient factor
causing a state to decay is a state’s degeneration, where what declines is the vigor that
once defined such a state’s glorious vitality. In a very important passage defining
degeneration, Gobineau writes the following:
The word degenerate, when applied to a people, means (as it ought to mean) that
the people has no longer the same intrinsic value as it had before, because it has
no longer the same blood in its veins, continual adulterations having gradually
affected the quality of that blood. In other words, though the nation bears the
name given by its founders, the name no longer connotes the same race; in fact,
the man of a decadent time, the degenerate man properly so called, is a different
being, from the racial point of view, from the heroes of the great ages.57
Here, Gobineau’s philosophical anthropology begins to come into play when answering
the question of what accounts for the decay of states. For Gobineau, races’ blood exists
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with a God-given level or type of vigor that gives it a particular value. 58 The level or type
of vigor that characterizes the blood of different races is neither qualitatively nor
quantitatively equal. As such, one can see immediately that all human beings have not
been created equally. Some people are qualitatively better, or more valuable, than others.
This God-given vitality within the blood of races accounts for certain groups’ ability to
successfully produce better cultural gifts and civilizations. However, when blood mixture
occurs between greater and lesser (superior and inferior) groups, the vitality of the
superior blood diminishes. Thus, the cultural gifts and civilizations of superior people
lessen and decay. Now, if the blood of particular people is divinely infused with certain
talents for greatness, then these groups must have some kind of teleological end for
which the blood was given.59 Given this idea, one can see why Gobineau thinks that
blood admixture with inferior groups would be sinful, insofar as diminishing the vigor in
the blood would cause the superior group to fail to produce the end for which its blood
was given by God.
Now, in proving that the decay of states is caused by degeneration, Gobineau
gives us a way to conceptualize a people’s formation into a state that leads up to
civilization. This way is broken into three stages of civilization at which races can be
observed. About the first a stage, Gobineau tells us that: “I take a people, or better, a
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tribe, at the moment when, yielding to a definite vital instinct, it provides itself with laws
and begins to play a part in the world. By the mere fact of its wants and powers
increasing, it inevitably finds itself in contact with other similar associations, and by war
and peaceful measures succeeds in incorporating them with itself.”60 This step, for
Gobineau, marks the first step in a race becoming a nation (call it the embryo society),
and thus is the lowest rung on the ladder of civilization. Gobineau reserves this step for
the Polynesian negroes, Samoyedes, and the majority of African races. 61 Gobineau thinks
that these races are absolutely incapable of civilization.
Those who have reached the second stage in a race becoming a nation
“understand that if they wish to increase their power and prosperity, they are absolutely
compelled, either by war or peaceful measures, to draw their neighbors within their
sphere of influence.”62 For Gobineau, communities at this stage have some of the
characteristics of a highly developed civilization such as class distinctions and an
industrial system. Still, Gobineau tells us that those stuck at this stage are stagnant.
Finally, “there are others, more imaginative and energetic, whose ideas soar
beyond mere brigandage. They manage to conquer great territory, and assume rights of
ownership not only over the inhabitants, but also over their land.”63 For Gobineau, these
are the highest or qualitatively better races. And thus, if the great chain of being organizes
beings in distinct ways, and tells us how much respect to accord to each type on the
60 Arthur

de Gobineau, The Inequality of Human Races, 26.

61

Ibid, 27.

62

Ibid, 28.

63

Ibid.

!81

chain, then within the chain there is a chain of human races, telling us how much respect
we must accord to humans that regards the stage of a races’ civilization that derives from
the vigor in the blood that God has infused the races with.
We are able to see the different stages of civilization that accords to different races
and how certain races are qualitatively better than others because of the vigor or energy
given by God. However, one might question what this has to do with cosmopolitanism.
While Gobineau does not use the word “cosmopolitanism,” he clearly has it in mind
when considering decay in the state. Gobineau thinks that every state, at its beginning,
both recognizes and respects a fundamental principal that it loses sight of as it matures,
namely that human races are unequal. Gobineau tells us that: “Every people, great or
small, has begun by making inequality its chief political motto. This is the origin of all
systems of caste, of nobility, and of aristocracy, in so far as the last is founded on the
right of birth.”64 Gobineau seems to think that respect for this divinely-mandated and
therefore natural principal makes nations great, insofar as “[t]he stronger will play the
parts of kings and rulers in the tragedy of the world. The weaker will be content with a
more humble position.”65 What we see here is that the idea of natural inequality informs
how agents within the state are to relate to each other, and is in a way that unevenly
distributes goods and gives certain members more rights than others. This creates castes,
classes, etc., on which the social markers that higher civilization stages are predicated.
Thus, civilization presupposes inequality and regard for the principal of inequality.
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However, problems arise when, as states mature, the stronger and lesser races
within the state begin to behave more favorably towards each other, and because of the
mixing of blood, reject this principal of natural inequality in favor of the idea of human
equality, thereby lessening the necessity of keeping the blood of the better races pure.
Gobineau writes that “when the majority of citizens have mixed blood flowing in their
veins, they erect into a universal and absolute truth what is only true of themselves, and
feel it their duty to assert that all men are equal.”66 Gobineau continues: “They are also
moved by praiseworthy dislike of oppression, a legitimate hatred towards the abuse of
power; to all thinking men these cast an ugly shadow on the memory of races which have
once been dominant, and which have never failed…to justify to some extent many of the
charges that have been brought against them.”67 Thinking in this way causes citizens
(both the greater and weaker race-members who compose a state) to reject the laws of the
ancestors that respected the principal of inequality among humans, which is the
presupposed and divine law upon which high civilization was built. As a result, laws and
customs are changed.68 And this movement away from the laws and customs of the
ancestors of the state causes the decay of the state.
Several things can be inferred from Gobineau’s thinking. First, it is clear that
Gobineau does not think that this movement is immoral. Gobineau thinks that the “dislike
of oppression” is praiseworthy. He refers to the morality of humans in the late stages of a
state’s life as noble, and seems to applaud members of the state for their devotion to
66
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cosmopolitan ideas of human brotherhood. Still, Gobineau thinks that this idea of human
brotherhood is both contrary to fact and nature: “The curious point is that the theory of
equality, which is held by the majority of men and so has permeated our customs and
institutions, has not been powerful enough to overthrow the evidence against it; and those
who are most convinced of its truth pay homage every day to its opposite.”69 And if
human brotherhood is contrary to both fact and nature, then cosmopolitanism (which
relies on the idea of human brotherhood in claiming that all humans are citizens of the
world) is both contrary to fact and nature.
Secondly, it would appear that Gobineau rejects cosmopolitanism for the reason
that cosmopolitanism ultimately relies on respect for all humans, which he views as being
inconsistent with the factual, natural, and divinely-mandated principal of racial
superiority (as an inequality of gifts distributed to human races where Europeans possess
greater intellectual, aesthetic, and bodily gifts), which implies value hierarchies. For
Gobineau, it is certainly true that the mixing of blood causes the decay of a state, and as
such is sin. But beyond this, Gobineau seems to be committed to the view that the
equality of rights, and thus the respect accorded to inferior races, is just as sinful.
For Gobineau there is a natural order to the universe that ought be regarded, and
regard for this natural order requires inferior races understanding their inferiority, and
thus accepting the humble positions in the state that are proper to them. Superior races
must understand their superiority and rule over inferior races. And Gobineau does not
think that superior races should rule without “oppression.” It is unclear what oppression
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is for Gobineau, outside of the idea that superior races rule. Beyond this, when defining
the “bad” institution, Gobineau asserts that “bad institutions are those which, however
well they look on paper, are not in harmony with the national qualities or caprices, and so
do not suit a particular State, though they might be very successful in the neighboring
country.”70 Notice that Gobineau does not define the bad state as that state that abuses
power, but as a state that does not remain true to the spirit of the ancestors that cause it to
flourish in accordance with its divine end.
Likewise, Gobineau seems to claim that a good state can be oppressive, so long as
those who ought to rule do in fact rule and do so in a manner that is consistent with its
ancestors. Gobineau writes that: “On the contrary, other institutions are good for the
opposite reason, though they might be condemned, from a particular point of view or
even absolutely, by the political philosopher or the moralist.”71 What this shows is that,
unlike Locke, Gobineau does not think that healthy social and political relations imply
respect, but that inequality in rights, and therefore inequality in respect, is the basis of
healthy social and political relations. Cosmopolitanism, and the equality in respect that it
requires, destabilizes the state. And this is expressly the pattern of argument that Locke
wants to reject, insofar as Locke is attempting to argue that the establishment of a
cosmopolitan community is possible only if the value hierarchies of racial superiority are
false and rejected. Locke's argument, much like Kant’s, is that the possibility of a
cosmopolitan community implies healthy social and political relations that imply respect.
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This respect is inconsistent with racial superiority because of the value hierarchies that
are implied by racial superiority.
Now, the racial superiority that implies value-hierarchies is cashed out in terms of
Gobineau's commitment to white Europeans’ intellectual, aesthetic, and bodily
superiority. In giving us his racial hierarchy, Gobineau gives us three human types: black;
yellow; and white. For Gobineau: “The negroid (black) is the lowest, and stands at the
foot of the latter, the animal character, that appears in the shape of the pelvis, is stamped
on the negro from birth, and foreshadows his destiny. His intellect will always move
within a very narrow circle.”72 And though Gobineau argues that the intensities of black
people’s desires, passions, and will––in a word, sensations––are strong, he tells us that:
“The very strength of his sensations is the most striking proof of his inferiority.”73 Blacks’
sensations lead them to violently pursue objects of desire, and thus render blacks
immoral.74
The yellow type is the exact opposite. He lacks ambition and physical energy, is
apathetic, and has feeble desires.75 This lack of ambition causes mediocrity and the feeble
desires cause comfort with life that could never create beauty or technology. Still,
Gobineau argues that Asians are superior to blacks, insofar as they are neither violent nor
antisocial. Asians can at least temper their wills so as to create and live within society.
Thus, civilization is at least possible for Asians.
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Whites have a higher intellectual capacity than both Asians and blacks. They are
ambitious, setting them above Asians in their capacity for innovations, and yet not too
ambitious, setting them above blacks in their ability to temper their wills. 76 With regard to
morality, Gobineau tells us that: “When they are cruel, they are conscious of their
cruelty…”77, which seems to suggest that whites are at least conscious of moral
obligations, and therefore have the capacity for moral principles. Unlike both the yellow
and black races, whites have honor, which gives them “reasons why they should
surrender this busy life of theirs, that is so precious to them.”78
As such, there will exist value-hierarchies in both the humans and the cultureproducts that are produced by them. And for Gobineau, these hierarchies, particularly as
relating to blacks, are immune to influences such as Christianity and educational
training.79 Christianity and educational training can only affect those who have the
capacity to be civilized. As such, the hierarchies are permanent and unchangeable.80
The Racial Superiority that Became:
What we see in each of these thinkers is a commitment to the idea that white
peoples are inherently superior to non-white peoples. We see that the commitment to
racial-superiority is grounded in inherent and permanent differences in aesthetic,
physical, and psychical traits that have an affect on the cultures that necessarily derive
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from each people.81 These culture-differences are reducible to value-differences, and
allow us to rank-order each people. On this point, Locke tells us that “the denial of
[cultural] equality, through the hard discipline it inflicts, has just this tendency to spur on
and build up a moral and spiritual superiority.” 82 Bound up with the commitment to the
idea that whites are inherently superior to non-whites is the idea that non-whites are less
worthy of respect. Natural inequalities in traits lead to suggested inequalities in rights that
result in inequalities in treatment. This inequality in treatment can be understood as the
result of prejudice (defined as race antipathy),83 which Locke describes in the following
way:
[P]rejudice[,] as far as we have traced it in this lecture[,] is simply an abnormal
social sense, a [perversion] of a normal social instinct, which falsely attributes to
certain arbitrary ethnological and biological factors, sociological and social
standards which do not pertain to them at all, and which therefore operate to bring
about the discrepancies which we confront when we see people who are on the
way to conforming to the civilization type, denied participation and recognition in
society, as if nothing mattered but their color or their kind.84
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For Locke, humans have a natural sociability that causes them to want to commune and
share with others (as stated in chapter one), though they may feel a stronger level of
confraternity with members who share their value-systems (as will be discussed in
chapter three). This desire to commune and share with others can become perverted by
beliefs about the inherent nature of a group’s value-systems, perhaps because of beliefs
about the groups’ intellectual, aesthetic, and physical traits that produce the valuesystems. These systems become indicative of races' color or particular phenotypical traits
that are inherent and come to define the group. And the group is denied participation and
recognition, in a word––respect, because of the phenotypes that signal value-differences.
All three of the thinkers who are the subjects of this chapter are committed to this
thinking, and Locke thinks that this thinking is quite pervasive. The pervasive nature of
this thinking, for Locke, is a serious challenge to establishing a cosmopolitan community:
Even in circles that are so representative and stable that they should have no
hysteria on the subject of race amalgamation, “no social equality,”— in short,
“White Supremacy,”— is held to be the one reservation every typical White man
is supposed to make and every typical Negro is expected to concede. Cultural
recognition, on the other hand, means the removal of wholesale social
proscription and, therefore, the conscious scrapping of the mood and creed of
“White Supremacy.” It means an open society instead of a closed ethnic shop. For
what? For making possible free and unbiased contacts between the races on the
selective basis of common interests and mutual consent, in contrast with what
prevails at present,— dictated relations of inequality based on caste psychology
and class exploitation.85
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Here, one can see that Locke thinks that racial superiority is an ideology that whites
expect other whites to embrace, while every black (and non-white) person concedes. In a
word, Locke thinks that whites expect to govern the world.86
Locke tells us that cultural recognition leads to the removal of racial superiority.
These two seem to go hand in hand, and thus cultural recognition and what follows from
it cannot both be consistently affirmed if racial superiority is affirmed. What unfolds from
the removal of racial superiority is nothing other than our movement towards
cosmopolitanism, namely the opening up of society in a way that promotes the free and
unbiased contacts that serves common interests, along with mutual consent. As such,
what is required if we are to move towards cosmopolitanism is a displacement of racial
superiority, which relies on differences in the worth of races, and which are grounded in
differences in value-systems that can be rank-ordered. Locke seeks to displace racial
superiority with in two ways. First, Locke attempts to rethink the concept of race in the
study of humanity, which is to say that Locke develops a philosophical anthropology
relating to race that is distinct from those who are the subject of the present chapter. This
shows that racial differences are not products of nature or God. Second, Locke attempts
to displace the value-hierarchy that undergirds racial superiority directly, arguing against
the view that certain values are “better” than others. I now turn to Locke’s philosophical
anthropology that relates to race, saving Locke’s second attempt for chapter four.
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Chapter 3
Alain Locke on Science and Race, and the Science of Race:

“Reason, feeling, and imagination, united in the most beautiful dance, are the Graces of
life…. Oh, how has anybody dared to accuse nature of denying this beautiful harmony of
predispositions to nine-tenths of our brothers! For the point of unification of all nations
lies in the core of their essence….”
––Georg Forster, “On Local and General Bildung”

Introduction:
In the previous chapter, we saw three philosophical anthropological positions that
create a necessary link between race and culture such as to rank-order certain racial
groups. Certain cultures, defined by their values, are inherently and irrevocably better
than others. This makes the people who compose certain groups better or more valuable
than others. This cashes out to those people being more worthy of respect. And what this
ultimately does is that it challenges the possibility of establishing the cosmopolitan
community that was the subject of the first chapter. In this chapter, I would like to
elucidate Locke’s understanding of race and culture/cultural differences as one half of
Locke’s attempt to challenge the racial superiority that ultimately makes the
establishment of a cosmopolitan community impossible. Locke had a rather peculiar view
of race and culture (particularly for his time) that, in addition to an avalanche of racial
theories and prejudiced treatment, needs to be understood so that one may have a proper
framework for understanding Locke’s thinking on value. In fact, one might aver that the
pluralism of Locke’s value theory emerges out of his anthropological arguments on race
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and culture such that there is an ontology that produces his axiology. And as such, in
understanding his axiology, we must begin by understanding the anthropology lying
underneath it.
Now, it is my argument that Locke wants to prove value-hierarchies false so as to
be able to assert the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community. However,
Locke does not merely attack the falsity of racial superiority with his value theory, but
attacks the theories of race that imply value-hierarchies, namely that there are divinelymandated or natural differences between racial groups that confer certain groups a
capacity for certain types of culture that are better or more advanced than others. And
Locke does this in a number of ways.
Firstly, Locke attacks the anthropological (biological/physiological) method of
investigating races, and argues that we need a correct starting-point for understanding
race. For Locke, a correct starting-point for understanding races is of such significance
for three principal reasons. First, Locke thinks that the concept of race is both wedded to
American society, and though it can shift or take different meanings, it will not be
eliminated. Second, Locke thinks that the concept of race is a useful concept for both
understanding cultural development as well as for an oppressed people. For Locke, the
concept of race has pragmatic value. Third, Locke thinks that understanding race is the
first step towards solving race-conflict. For Locke, understanding race gives us an
understanding of society. Locke conceptualizes race and race contacts as a much older,
much more pervasive, form of contact that provides insights into other complex social
relations.
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Secondly, Locke attacks anthropological theories that support value-hierarchies
insofar as he attacks the objectivity of analysis as it regards anthropological notions of
humanity. For Locke, one cannot understand humanity divorced of bias. One never
merely interpreting physiological movements. When one investigates humanity, one
attempts to understand motivations. Understanding human motivations requires
interpretation, which implies the influence of biases. In attacking objectivity, Locke
seems to be attacking scientific notions of race, though, perhaps paradoxically, Locke
will argue that a (sociological, as opposed to a biological) science of race is necessary. In
evaluating Locke, I seek to show that Locke is correct in his thinking, insofar as he aims
to give us a critique of anthropologists’ claim to be presenting unbiased or objective
understandings of race; anthropologists claim to present a view of humanity uninfluenced
by human motives. Thus, the anthropologists claim to study humans like biologists study
fish or geologists study rocks.
In addition to clearing up the starting-point for inquiry into the study of races, as
well as attacking the method and fundamental assumptions in anthropological
investigations, Locke attacks the connection between culture and race. For Locke, we
should think of races as being the products of culture, not culture being the determined
product of races. Thus, while preserving the connection between race and culture, Locke
both severs the necessary correlation between the two, and gives race a socio-historical
origin.
What Locke does by forcing us to rethink the connection between race and culture
is to redefine race, moving it away from biology and placing it in sociology. However, as
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one can already see, this is not enough to combat white racism, insofar as Locke’s more
sociolo-historical understanding can still leave value-hierarchies intact, merely locating
them in history as opposed to making them timeless by either nature or divinity. Thus,
Locke will need to attack value-hierarchies implied by racial superiority. And this, in part,
is the reason for Locke’s theory of value, which will be the subject of the next chapter.
Locke on the Significance of, and Starting-point for, Understanding Race:
Locke gives us his understanding of the significance of studying race throughout
his life, beginning with his text, Race Contacts. Locke begins the text with the statement
that “so complicated the idea and conception of race that there are a great many people
who fancy that the best thing that can be done, if possible at all, is to throw race out of
the categories of human thinking.”1 Here, Locke does not appeal to the concept’s
potential or actual harm in societies or their histories. And this is significant because later
in the text Locke will state that race is a much older concept than people think, and
further will seemingly imply that racial thinking or categorization is natural for humans.
(Locke seems to think that race and race-thinking in some sense is permanent both
because of the kind of beings that humans are and given the manner in which it manifests
itself America.) Locke’s response to this eliminativist perspective on race is that “even if
it were possible to eliminate the concept that has been the center of so much social
thinking, let us not presume, at least at the outset of a study professing a critical basis,
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that it would be desirable.”2 This one statement tells us two significant things about
Locke’s thinking.
First, Locke gives an indication that he does not believe the concept of race to be
eliminable. For Locke, attempts to eliminate race and race-thinking are rather useless.
And this is in part because race has become a way to categorize humans, which Locke
considers to be a natural phenomenon; categorization is a natural human phenomenon,
and race has come to serve as a way to categorize other humans rather easily. In
introducing the second lecture of the text, Locke tells us that: “The sense of race really
almost antedates anything in its name, in the etymology of it, because just as you have
groups of people knit together by a kinship feeling and [who] reali[z]e that different
practices [operate in] their society from those which [operate in other societies and
therefore] determine their treatment of other groups, [then] you really have what is the
germ [of] the race sense.” 3 Locke thinks that race-distinctions are grounded in the age-old
way of recognizing that there are other human groups in the world who neither perceive
nor act in the world in the same manner that we do. This leads to a “kinship feeling” with
other members of our group, along with an understanding of how others are to be treated.
In other words, one recognizes that others navigate the world differently from him/her,
and this recognition creates in him/her a greater appreciation of the manner in which he/
she navigates the world. Consequently a bond with those who navigate the world as he/
she does is more strongly formed. Fundamentally, race is grounded in recognizing
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difference, confraternity with those who are considered similar to me, and considerations
of how to treat others. And as stated, this appears to be natural to world-discriminating
beings.
Now, so that it will not appear that Locke is inconsistent, this idea that humans
naturally make discriminations with regard to how people perceive and act in the world
does not contradict the conception of cosmopolitanism established as the end of society
that was elucidated in the first chapter of this dissertation. Locke does not conceptualize
recognizing difference as either synonymous with, or necessarily leading to, alterity. By
alterity I have in mind a sense of “othering” people, where it is particular differences in
culture-products, values, religious commitments, etc., that makes “others” inferior or
unworthy of respect. Locke asserts that: “The race sense, as you see, is something which
is not vicious in itself, but which may become so if invidious social practices are based
upon it.”4 Locke argues that value-hierarchies are not the necessary result of the natural
phenomenon of differential discrimination. Thus, that whites (or blacks, asians, etc.)
conceptualize differences in groups (and do so in terms of broad, perhaps inaccurate
ways), and further that they have some sense of confraternity with other members of their
group because of it, treating others in a particular way because they are considered
different, does not imply that they must devalue or inferiorize others insofar as it does not
imply that they can only distinguish themselves from others on the basis of overvaluing
what makes them similar to other members of their group. In fact, not only will Locke
argue that cultural progression both is and ought to be composite, and thus is grounded in
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reciprocity between cultural groups (which implies racial groups), and that
cosmopolitanism, which relies on reciprocity and pluralism, actually needs differences in
groups and values that justifies his idea that the highest type of art is that which is both
universal (in its ability to reach members of any culture in the world) and particular (as an
expression of the will, aspirations, and temperament of a specific group),5 but Locke will
also argue that what is fundamental to cosmopolitanism is understanding what makes
every cultural group similar, namely the cultural constants that must be at play in order
for a community (as an assemblage of persons) to be a community at all. Certain constant
values are necessary preconditions for a group of individuals becoming a community.
These constants are what allows social cohesion. All communities will have these, and to
a lesser or greater degree, all communities must remain faithful to them. Recall from
chapter one that what makes establishing a cosmopolitan community possible is that
these cultural constants seem to be best fulfilled by the establishment of a cosmopolitan
community.
So, from this we may gauge that with regard to the significance of studying race,
along with the study’s necessary starting-points, Locke seems to suggest that a necessary
starting-point is the idea that race is grounded in a very human phenomenon of
recognizing difference and confraternity with members of an in-group. This is important
because it would appear that beginning with this starting-point would not allow someone
to be judged negatively for noticing that others around them are different. Merely
5
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noticing racial, cultural, or religious differences does not make a “bad” person, and thus
does not license us to negatively judge the person. Locke (and I think rightly) fears that
seeking to either eliminate all distinctions or failing to see distinctions between
individuals can be just as harmful as othering people, insofar as attempts to fail to see
distinctions could become a weapon for ignoring harmful biases, while seeking to
eliminate differences has the aim and end of the uniformitarianism, which aims at making
everyone the “same.” This cashes out to failing to be tolerant and forcing the dominant
culture’s values and products on everyone. 6
Further, this starting-point seems to cast doubt on notions of color-blindness,
wherein individuals makes statements such as “I do not notice race.” 7 It is true that one
does not need to notice differences in the same way as race-distinctions have been carved
up in the West, such that one who claims to be color-blind is not, of necessity, lying. One
who makes the claim that they do not see race could be distinguishing people in different
ways, thereby observing what is a natural human phenomenon without doing so in
accordance with Western notions. Locke’s argument is, in fact, that race is a kind of way
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that humans can be categorized, and not that it is the only way of categorizing humans.
Still, if one takes Locke’s claim that race-distinctions are grounded in the natural
phenomenon of distinguishing humans, and further takes into account the history of this
way of distinguishing humans into which Westerners are born, then one might become
suspicious of the claim that people (particularly Westerners) do not see race. Making
distinctions between in-group and out-group members is natural, and the West has given
us a very easy way to do it (problematic as it might be). Still, starting with the idea of it
being grounded in a natural phenomenon makes it easier for us to be sensitive to it, while
not judging others too harshly for their doing it.
Now, there is another reason why studying race is of such importance. For Locke,
studying race and contacts between races gives us insight into the inter-workings of larger
social relationships, and can thus tell us about how society is and ought to be. Thus,
studying race is important for both understanding and shaping society. In the third lecture
of Race Contacts, Locke attempts to investigate the phenomena and laws of race and race
contacts. Locke asserts that: "We want to try to record those forces that are invariable
phenomena of racial contacts and we want also to see if in investigating these
phenomena[,] we [can] catch their drift or tendency."8 Locke does not think that
“catching their drift or tendency” will (or should) lead to any claims of universal natural
laws about race or race contacts. Still, Locke’s goal is to engage race and race contacts
impartially and dispassionately. 9 Locke tells us that: “Our effort isn't to find a [natural]
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law, [that is] to arrive by very hasty generalization at anything which might be construed
as law, but simply to observe as calmly and dispassionately as we can, the phenomena
attendant upon race contacts.” 10 The criterion for establishing such phenomena as lawlike will depend on generalities. And as stated, studying the phenomena is important
insofar as we can make descriptive and prescriptive claims regarding society.
Later in the lecture Locke argues that studying race “is an important phase of
social study and for us important far beyond any consideration of race relationships,
because the same tendencies which separate class groups (and groups other than class
groups) in society, will be identical with those that affect the racial groups.” 11 Locke
thinks that class- and general societal-conflicts follow the same trends as race-conflicts. 12
And Locke seems to have proper grounds for this, having argued that race follows a
particular type of relationship that precedes the term “race.” In essence, what Locke is
suggesting is that social-relations follow the same trends as race-relations in being
grounded in recognizing difference and ways of perceiving that produce confraternity
between members of in-groups that separate them from out-groups. Thus, “a systematic
10
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study of race contacts will teach us a great deal concerning the actual nature of human
society.” 13 On the issue of race- and class-feelings, relations, and conflict, Locke tells us
that “race feelings (group sense that moves on racial lines) is only different in degree and
not different in kind from class sense and class groupings.”14 Now, Locke does not
explain in what way he is using “degree.” However, he seems to think that there is more
confraternity and intensity that occurs with race-feelings, and thus the potential for more
animosity or hatred that occurs with in-group/out-group racial contacts, than with classfeelings. However, Locke thinks that class-feelings can be just as “tense” as race-feelings,
which can produce conflicts that are just as violent and arouse emotions that are just as
instinctive and passionate as race-feelings. And in the case of the caste system of India,
Locke thinks that class divisions have actually created racial distinctions.
Fundamentally, Locke thinks that both the significance in, and starting-point for,
studying race is bound up in its being derived from a very natural phenomena. For Locke,
when this idea is coupled with American history and its practice of distinguishing people
along racial lines, we should conclude that race is something that we should not expect to
disappear. Thus, studying it becomes imperative, insofar as making racial distinctions
appears to be a permanent American (and perhaps worldly) phenomenon. Additionally,
Locke thinks that the significance of studying race is bound up in its telling us something
more broadly about social relationships and their conflicts, which can ultimately give us
insight into how to better the society. With this understanding of the significance of
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studying race, along with a proper starting-point, Locke critiques particular assumptions
relating to anthropological investigations into race.
Locke's Critique of Anthropological Assumptions:
Beyond telling us why studying race contacts is important and what a proper
starting-point for such a study is, Locke critiques two assumptions of foundational (early)
anthropology as they apply to race. This critique allows Locke the intellectual space to
craft his own understanding of race and racial development, though one that will need a
specific understanding of values to combat racial superiority. Locke criticizes early (late
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century) anthropologists for their thinking that they can
derive universal and static anthropological laws about races without history and an
understanding of how society shapes humans. Additionally, Locke criticizes
anthropologists for their not having a pragmatic end for anthropological investigations.
Locke reasons that if early anthropologists understood the role of history and society in
racial formation and development, along with the implications that history and society
have on investigating race, then they would be less tentative about having a pragmatic
end guide their investigations into race. By criticizing these two assumptions, Locke
criticizes a method that depends on a rejection of human import into investigations. And
these criticisms allow Locke to see certain conditions that allow race-differences to
emerge.
Locke criticizes foundational anthropologists’ assumption that there can be certain
universal and unchanging laws discovered about the being, development, and interactions
of human beings as they relate to races without engaging history and theories of society.
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What this suggests is that anthropologists attempt to study human races with the method
of a “pure” science. 15 And one can see this commitment with an examination of the
philosophical anthropologies of Kant, Blumenbach, and Gobineau that were the focus of
the last chapter. For each theorist, static natural laws were assumed and races developed
from them while these races developed society from these static natural laws. The
development of specific societies were inevitable and unchangeable after the races were
either affected by nature (Kant) or directed by God (Blumenbach and Gobineau).
Particular cultures necessarily followed from certain races. Societal factors could do little
or nothing to change these races, and thus an examination of them with regard to social
theory was unnecessary. Thus, all three of these thinkers, and Locke would claim most of
the foundational anthropologists, had little or no regard for cultural exchange and found
little wrong with either colonization or imperialism. Thus, Locke claims that both
colonization and imperialism follow from the static laws of race-development that are
assumed in philosophical anthropologies.
In assuming that society had no affect on races and race-development, and that
static laws can be found out about races, foundational anthropologists study laws of
human development and contact like geographers study the development of rocks.
Humans are studied as if they were static objects (in this case, objects without agency)
15
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much like types of rocks or soil. For Locke, this approach was fundamentally flawed
insofar as it assumes that humans do not have motivations, and that the very concepts of
“races” and “humanity” are not concepts affected by society. And this flawed position
leads anthropologists to conclude that human histories and societies develop from static
natural capacities in human beings. For Locke, humans cannot be studied like inanimate
objects or animate beings who cannot value, and thus we need not think that humans can
be studied like pure sciences. Beyond this, society and history can be thought to
participate in the production of humans insofar as humans continue to change in light of
society and history.
Locke poses the following set of questions aimed at a critique of foundational
anthropology: “what of a pure science of race? Is it necessary? Is it desirable? Is it
possible if it were desirable and necessary? I fancy in the present state of the sciences of
[man,] it must be admitted impossible.”16 For Locke, a science of race cannot be pure
insofar as “race theory is essentially committed to the historical”, which entails that “like
history itself, [race] must incorporate the factor of human belief, because history is not
merely a record of facts, but as well, a record of beliefs, and an historical opinion (be it
an individual opinion or a group opinion) [which] is as important a factor of history as the
objective fact itself.”17 Here Locke gives us two reasons for why we are licensed to doubt
the purity of any science of race. First, Locke thinks that investigations into human races
necessarily presuppose the agency of the subjects studied. We will need to make
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inferences about agents' motivations, which we cannot be certain about. Second, race
science, like history, can only be conducted with interpretations/inferences, which
presupposes that we interject ourselves into the science. In short, like history, when we
study human races we study agents, which we ourselves must interpret.
Beyond doubting the ability to study races purely, Locke questions whether a pure
science is desirable even if we assume it to be possible. For Locke, a pure science of race
is not desirable because of its lack of a practical end. Thus, Locke is critical of
anthropologists’ lack of a practical end for their scientific endeavors. Locke tells us that
modern thinkers on race, a camp into which Locke partially places himself, "believe that
a really pure science of race is, after all, undesirable, not so much because it is
impossible, but because even though it were realized, it would be impracticable,
particularly as contrasted with whatever current practical theories of race are prevailing in
society.” 18 Pure scientific theories of race must, in some way, service society. However:
"It could never successfully hope to compete with what men really believe human society
to be." 19 Pure scientific theories of race could never be useful to society because pure
scientific theories of race could not map onto what people believe about society.
Now it is a question as to what Locke wants to say regarding people’s beliefs
about human society, and thus how beliefs about society apply to theories of race. One
might think that Locke is suggesting that anthropologists need to end with a notion of
race that matches or confirms ordinary/folk notions of races. However, in my view, Locke
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does not have this in mind. He is not conceding the “wisdom” of common beliefs about
races. Rather, Locke seems to think that we need a notion of race that allows us to live up
to the values that we hold in our society. In other words, if we profess to value liberty,
democracy, equality, freedoms of conscience/expression/association, and the like, we
need a notion of race that pushes our thinking and social actions toward those values.
Theories of race should coincide with larger social values, serving as a corrective of
social ills. Locke writes that: “It is the idea [,] then[,] that instead of a perfectly objective
science of human society, that we should have a corrective or a normative conception of
society which should aim to improve upon and better those predominant notions and
ideals which are prevalent.”20
This thinking, that theories of race should confirm larger social values (that they
be pragmatic), may seem problematic. What is the point of having a science if it is
skewed in this way? Locke's answer to the question is that the question itself assumes that
there is a way to conduct scientific studies of race that are free from history and societal
import. A science of race cannot but be skewed, and as such should be skewed in a
particular direction, namely one that serves society by moving us closer to our overall
social and political values.
Further, Locke has oppressed minorities in view when he makes the assertion that
conceptions of race are desirable and should serve a pragmatic purpose. Here, Locke
likens to W.E.B. Du Bois, writes that: "As American Negroes, we believe in unity of
racial effort, so far as this is necessary for self-defense and self-expression, leading
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ultimately to the goal of a united humanity and the abolition of all racial distinctions."21
Like Du Bois, race is an important tool for an oppressed group. Locke sees that racial
distinction, even in being a natural phenomenon, is both a method for oppressed groups
to unify around, find protection in, and even “discover” themselves through. In his
seminal essay on the New Negro, Locke tells us that: “American Negroes have been a
race more in name than in fact, or to be exact, more in sentiment than in experience. The
chief bond between them has been that of a common condition rather than a common
consciousness; a problem in common rather than a life in common.” 22 Here, Locke seems
to lament the bonds that have brought African Americans together. They have not unified
in the manner that Locke thinks races (as groups engaged in the natural phenomenon of
recognizing value-differences that causes greater confraternity) have, and on the basis
that Du Bois writes about. However, Locke argues that: “In Harlem, Negro life is seizing
upon its first chances for group expression and self-determination. It is––or promises at
least to be––a race capital.”23 When Locke wrote these words in 1925 he saw an
oppressed group of people progressing in artistic expression, becoming more motivated
towards social mobility, and developing a deeper sense of understanding because of
confraternity with each other that occurs through the use of a racial term. In fact, Locke
thought that art and culture increases because of the kind of particularization that occurs
with racial divisions, so long as the division does not “other” different groups.
21

W.E.B. Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race
Concept (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002) 320.

22 Alain

Locke, “The New Negro,” in The New Negro: Voices of the Harlem Renaissance,
ed. Alain Locke (New York: Touchstone, 1992) 7.

23

Ibid.

!107

So, one can see from this that Locke, as a pragmatist in much of his thinking,
wants to argue that science should serve a pragmatic purpose. Here, rather than criticize
anthropologists on the grounds that their determinations are made to serve racial
superiority (which has been claimed by African American theorists from Martin Delany
to Charles Mills), Locke argues that anthropologists have attempted to remain too neutral,
stressing the importance of purity and rejecting pragmatic ends for the science. 24 For
Locke, these anthropologists fail to see how race does and can operate in the real world,
and how science should serve to ameliorate social conditions. They wrongly assume the
possibility of purity and universality with regard to the science of race, so much so that
they reject practical occurrences and a pragmatic end for the science that could both help
the science and make it useful to society.
So, in short, Locke critiques two assumptions that have led anthropologists to
make claims that have both reshaped and justified racial superiority. Locke critiques
anthropology’s fundamental assumption that it can get universal laws of human beings
and human contacts as they regard races, and can do so without looking at human
motivations and social influences. Racial groups produce certain cultures and have
certain values because of the kinds of beings that either nature or God has made them to
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be. For foundational anthropologists, exploitation, colonialism, etc., in a word, racial
inequalities in social interaction, are effects of racial differences. And the way that
investigating race in this way plays out in society is that racial inequalities are able to be
justified by racial differences. For Locke: "Racial differences parallel what we know in
human society as racial inequalities." 25 However, they do not have a cause/effect
relationship. Locke thinks that instead of explaining inequality with appeals to
anthropological or ethnological factors, which would translate to race-differences, we
should explain race inequality by historical, social, and economic factors. We should
explain anthropological and ethnological factors in another way, which leads us to an
explanation of the parallel between racial differences and racial inequalities in divergent
way.26 Locke, with a critique of a second assumption, namely the denial of a necessary
practical end for anthropology, gives us a clear way to get past racial inequalities. If racial
inequalities emerge out of historical, economic, and societal conditions that produce
inequality, then the practical end of anthropology is to eradicate these inequalities by
investigating race-differences.
To conclude this section, from a critique of anthropological assumptions, Locke
will divide the science of anthropology into two views. The first, Locke describes as the
older (foundational) view. This view relies on an assumption of human races as static
products of either nature or God's design. As static products races necessarily produce
certain levels of culture that can be ranked-ordered, and whose value can be objectively
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determined. Locke distinguishes this view from a modern view. Locke’s acceptance of
many of the themes of the modern view led him to incorporate socio-history and
pragmatic ends into his thinking on the divisions of human races. As such, we can say
with Clevis Headley that Locke's inclusion of history and social/cultural elements into the
conversation of race allows him to observe "the extent to which race functions, not as
shapely defined concept embedded in a natural scientific theory, but as a conceptual
artifact readily malleable to cultural exploitation."27 Conceptions of race will then have
the pragmatic end of challenging this exploitation by providing, in addition to racial
divisions, reasons for the divisions that make the divisions more understandable and
appreciable. It is to Locke’s notion of race that I now turn.
Locke's Philosophical Anthropology: On Race and Culture:
In an essay entitled “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,” “Locke's
interest in the idea of race stems primarily from an attempt to combat notions of national,
racial, and cultural superiority.”28 My argument is that Locke’s theory of race has the end
of participating, as one half of an argument, in combating racial superiority that has the
aim of establishing a cosmopolitan community. In partially combating ideologies of
superiority (in my case, racial superiority), Locke attempts to answer a longstanding
impasse regarding the relationship between races and cultures. Robert Bernasconi writes
that “for most of their history the terms race and culture were not easily separated. The
27
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term race was, from its first definition in the late eighteenth century, used to talk about
specific peoples who were as readily identifiable by their behavior as by their physical
appearance.”29 Bernasconi asserts that early theorists of racial divisions did not think in
terms of matchings between physical traits and moral/cultural attributes. They merely
observed differences. As seen in chapter two, Bernasconi thinks that Kant’s philosophical
anthropology creates more of an intimate relationship between physical types and moral/
cultural value. Bernasconi tells us that: “Early in the nineteenth century the term race was
beginning to take hold to describe broad groupings of such peoples and this led to
questions about their origin, their number, their destiny, and the effect of race mixing
between such groups.”30 Bernasconi later continues: “Most thinkers in the nineteenth
century saw the racial as manifesting itself in both physical aspects and ‘moral’ or
cultural aspects. In other words, for them, race was as visible in behavior and in
dispositions or talents as it was in physical appearance.” 31 We saw this in chapter two.
So, on one side of the debate, anthropologists took culture to depend on race, such
that races, of necessity, produce particular cultural gifts. These gifts, at least at the time
during which Locke wrote, derived from biological traits that owe their existence to
either nature or God. As stated in the prior chapter, one can view the idea of a necessary
correlation between race and culture in Kant’s, Blumenbach's, and Gobineau’s
philosophical anthropologies. For Kant, psychological qualities become permanent when
29
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germs within races ferment due to climate. Thus, a racial group’s cultural gifts, which
must emanate from these psychological qualities, are fixed, even though diet and other
culture-products can have minimal effects on the race, and therefore further cultural gifts
produced by the race. Therefore, Kant must think there to be a necessary connection
between culture and race, and one that is permanent. Likewise Blumenbach's teleology,
one in which God mandates certain differences in human capacities through blood,
necessitates a connection between race and culture. And finally for Gobineau, because
God creates races with certain purposes that regard culture, cultural gifts necessarily
derive from human races.
Bernasconi (as well as Locke) tells us that the work of Robert Lowie marks a
change in thinking on race and culture. “Lowie explained that, if culture is defined in
terms of social acquisition, then racial characteristics, precisely as innate, could not by
definition determine culture.”32 Lowie saw the transformative nature of race and culture,
and thus thought that he was licensed to infer a lack of a correlation between the two
terms.
As such, on the other side of the debate anthropologists argue that there is no
correlation between race and culture. On this view, the culture-products of certain groups
are more or less arbitrary and capricious. Racial groups have a proclivity to create or
embrace any culture-product, and no race’s culture, or capacity for producing a particular
type of culture, is permanent. On this view, either there are no racial groups in the world
to produce cultures from necessity or there are racial groups in the world, though the
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cultural productions of these groups are arbitrary. Locke sought a middle-ground between
the two competing views. And it is out of this debate that Locke carved out a definition of
race.
Locke’s goal in the article, and in a number of his essays on race throughout his
life, was to explain why we should not think culture to be determined by race. Instead,
Locke thought that we should think that races are social phenomena that derive from
culture (which derives from environmental conditions that present to us different avenues
of response). Thus, Locke denied that any race's behavior and cultural products is either
natural or divine, and fixed (placing him in opposition to the three thinkers who were the
subjects of the last chapter). Still, Locke “identified a defect in Lowie’s position: the fact
that Lowie presented no account of why many ‘culture traits’ are so persistent to the point
where they come to be thought of as ethnically characteristic.”33 Locke realized a certain
stability in races’ cultural characteristics. Locke attempted to explain why some cultural
traits have marked certain racial groups. Thus, Locke neither wanted to deny that certain
cultural productions are trackable in certain groups nor that race (and race-talk), as it
applies to culture, is meaningless.
As stated, Locke attempted to loosen (without breaking) the connection between
race and culture. In the extreme case, those who connect race to culture think that race, as
a natural set of physical and psychical attributes and capacities, are responsible for
cultural productions and the degree of cultural achievements because of the internal or
intrinsic abilities of particular races. Locke’s position, in
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differing from that of the school of interpretation which denies all significant
connection between racial and cultural factors, does not deny that race stands for
significant social characters and culture-traits or represents in given historical
contexts characteristic differentiations of culture-type. However, it does insist
against the assumption of any such constancy, historical or intrinsic, as would
make it possible to posit an organic connection between them and to argue on
such grounds the determination of one by the other.34
Race and culture have something to do with each other, as Locke defines race in terms of
the culture-traits that are preserved by a group of people (“race stands for significant
social characters and culture-traits”). 35 Locke wants to deny that there is a one-to-one
correlation between race and culture, such that productions do/must derive from specific
people due to their innate ability, as was supposed by social evolutionists who thought
that there were stages of cultural progression that corresponded to racial evolution.36 For
Locke, though race is culture-heredity, there is nothing static in the continuance of
culture-types in groups, and no necessity of groups having or passing on specific cultures.
Locke’s denial of the social evolutionists’ claim is grounded in two facts. First,
primitivism and advancement in culture can be found in a number of different people at a
number of different times, which suggests that there is no cultural evolution occurring
among peoples.37 Cultural progress waxes and wanes when one looks at history. One
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need only consider the advances of the Moors, and certain cultural backwardnesses
occurring after them (and perhaps amongst the same group of people) to see this fact.
Second, Locke thinks that if one takes an earnest look at cultural development in
civilizations, one is more likely to find that these developments are composite in nature.38
Cultures most often develop because of a mixture or blending of different cultures by
interactions between culture-groups. One need notice here that cultural evolution and
progression are dependent upon tolerant intergroup contact, reciprocity, openness to
learning from others that implies equality in ability to voice concerns and opinions
(democracy), and pluralism. As we have seen, these ideas are the ground for Locke’s
conception of cosmopolitanism.
Likewise, these are principals fundamental to the formation of human societies
and social interactions such that they undergird the formation of all states. They will be
probably cultural constants (with the exception of democracy, which is a cultural
constant), both illustrating that human beings and states are more alike than different, and
that cosmopolitanism (in which these concepts find completion in the world) is a natural
development from human beings forming states. One can immediately see how this
thinking seems to challenge the philosophical anthropologies that we have discussed,
particularly Gobineau’s teleological view. God cannot be said to implant a specific
quantity and quality of vigor into the blood of superior and inferior races that must
produce certain culture-products because culture is the result of reciprocation in groupcontact.
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Still for Locke, we can think of culture-products as representations of distinctive
race-types. And this thinking challenges the notion that there is no connection between
culture and race. Against theorists like Lowie, whose positions cannot explain the
undeniable relative consistency of particular races producing particular cultural-traits,
Locke claims that “there are certain traits the peculiarly stable and stock character of
which must be interpreted as ethnically characteristic.” 39 It would appear that Locke
thinks that we can both notice and predict culture-traits and types in particular racial
groups. Thus, “we do not need to deny the existence of these characteristic racial molds
in denying that they are rooted in ‘inherent hereditary traits either of a biological or a
psychological nature.’”40 While it is true that there is nothing inherent in the blood of
certain races that allows/forces them to produce certain culture-traits, the correlation
between them is significant, and therefore capable of scientific inquiry and explanation.
Locke's goal, subsequent to dismissing both claims of a necessary relationship
between race and culture and claims that there is no connection between the two, is to
understand why certain cultures are distinct representations of particular race-types given
that there is no necessary correlation between racial groups and cultural types,
particularly given the composite nature of cultures. And it is here that Locke gives us his
definition of race as something socio-historical.
In order to understand Locke’s position on the correlation between race and
culture, we must begin by understanding that for Locke races, as culture-heredity, are not
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natural phenomena but social constructions that relate to culture in a particular way. And
when we talk about culture as something hereditary, we should not refer to biology.
Culture is inherited through social relationships such that when we talk about heredity as
applied to culture, we ought to mean social heredity. Locke tells us that:
The best consensus of opinion then seems to be that race is a fact in the social or
ethnic sense, that it has been erroneously associated with race in the physical
sense and is therefore not scientifically commensurate with factors or conditions
which explain or have produced physical race characters and differentiation, that
it has a vital and significant relation to social culture, and that it must be explained
in terms of social and historical causes such as have caused similar
differentiations of culture-type as pertain in lesser degree between nations,
classes, and even family strains.41
Here, Locke tells us that races begin, much like nations and classes, as historically and
socially contingent. Social and historical conditions section off people in certain sorts of
ways that tend to produce a varying degree of proclivities that make it easier for people to
endorse and reject certain values because of the proclivities having informed their ways
of seeing the world, modes of expression, etc.42 These values, ways of seeing the world,
modes of expression, etc., make up specific culture-traits. For Locke, what binds these
groups together is the conditions that produce a likeness in culture-types, which we may
understand as a set of culture-traits. Race, then, becomes the concept (a sort of name
under which the group understands itself) that better binds the group. Locke writes that
race lies in “that particular selective preference for certain culture-traits and resistance to
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certain others which is characteristic of all types and levels of social organization.”43
Thus, race (or a racial name) becomes a value in itself, one in which further unifies
culture-types by its causing a robust sense of solidarity amongst those who understand
themselves as a unified group with specific culture-traits. 44 And though Locke tells us
that this solidarity occurs with a “resistance” to other values, he does not think that it
must lead to lack of appreciation or devaluation of other values. As a result, race is to be
understood as culture-heredity, and “[i]nstead therefore of regarding culture as expressive
of race, race by this interpretation is regarded as itself a culture product.” 45 Race as
culture-heredity is socio-historical, and not biological.
So, what Locke tells us is that race is socio-historical, insofar as it is the result of
conditions that produce proclivities to endorse or reject certain values because of the
ways in which conditions inform perceptions of the world, expressive techniques, etc. It
is the concept under which similarities in how a group defines itself are unified. And
further, it is a value in itself “since it determines the stressed values which become the
conscious symbols and tradition of the culture.” 46 What Locke has in mind is that a group
faces certain conditions that produce certain ways of engaging those conditions, whether
consciously or unconsciously. 47 These responses, ways of understanding the conditions,
abstracted ways of understanding the world in light of these conditions, etc. become
43
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“canonized” as the group’s more or less “official” manner of dealing with these
conditions by being placed under a name. What this implies is that the group will begin to
see these traits as theirs, or as markers of group-identification; these traits become a large
part of how the group-members identify with themselves––it strengthens the “we” in
group self-concepts. It seems to be a way of suggesting that this way is ours/yours/theirs
(though Locke argues that this is contrary to reality, insofar as there is a composite nature
to all cultures). Over time, a technique, way of expression, etc., will be emphasized
greater, become more developed or expanded, and will be so because of its having been
included into this group’s cannon.
To grasp this, one may think of why cultures are created. Locke writes that:
[T]hough there is lacking for the present any demonstrable explanation, there are
certain ethnic traits the peculiarly stable and stock character of which must be
interpreted as ethnically characteristic. They are in no sense absolutely permanent,
the best psychological evidence as yet gives us no reason for construing them as
inherent, yet they are factors not without an integral relationship one to the other
not satisfactorily explained as mere historical combinations.48
Locke then considers why certain traits are “stable and stock.” For Locke, it would
appear that certain culture-traits are “stable and stock” in relation to certain people
because certain people experience an environment where certain responses become
necessary to attain a sense of being/belonging or realize certain values such as a
validation or affirmation of a people’s humanity, strides towards benefits that people are
rejected from, privileges that certain people’s have, etc. Certain environments possess
materials and create conditions where certain responses are called for or more naturally
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developed. Ralph Ellison, when describing this in relation to the “blues,” puts the point in
the following way:
The blues is an impulse to keep the painful details and episodes of a brutal
experience alive in one's aching consciousness, to finger its jagged grain, and to
transcend it, not by the consolation of philosophy, but by squeezing from it a neartragic, near-comic lyricism. As a form, the blues is an autobiographical chronicle
of personal catastrophe expressed lyrically…. Let us close with one final word
about the blues: Their attraction lies in this, that they at once express both the
agony of life and the possibility of conquering it through sheer toughness of spirit.
They fall short of tragedy only in that they provide no solution, offer no scapegoat
but the self.49
The “blues” are a survival tool that a group has created and embraces wherein a people
realizes that they cannot escape the pain of life, but must face it, and further that facing it
requires smiling or sharing a laugh. Now, Ellison does not attempt to racialize bluesculture (unlike Houston Baker, Jr. and Amiri Baraka). Still, his implicit point is that the
“blues” is a culture-product that derives from, and is embraced in, a particular set of
conditions that a group deals with.
From this, one might suggest that culture is a group-response to better deal with
what environments, whether physical or social, impose upon them. The “blues,” in being
a response to certain conditions that a group has to deal with, gets included into the
identity of the group with the concept of a racial name. This culture-trait gets emphasized
in locations where this group’s members meet and when the group engages other groups.
The culture-trait is developed and expanded to create new traits, jazz, gospel, rhythm and
blues, hip-hop. A race-term is the name that canonizes or organizes traits like the “blues.”
What this suggests is that the correlation between the two (the race-term and the “blues”)
49
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maintains a “stable and stock” character without being biological. There is a correlation
between race and culture such that races produce certain culture-traits (and culture-types
as the set of those traits) rather stably because they are responding to certain conditions
and have canonized their responses in a particular way, valuing them through continued
emphasis, development, and expansion. Thus, “these determine what is the dominant
pattern in any given culture, and it is toward these dominant so as social norms that social
conformation converges and according to which it eventually establishes the type.”50
Again, none of this is to suggest that Locke thinks that culture-traits and -types
have been or must remain separately developed or appreciated. Locke does not think that
certain races must make exclusive claims on culture-traits, or that those traits are a result
of that race’s production solely. They have become characteristic, meaning they have
been adopted and canonized by the group. However, Locke thinks that when we look at
the actual occurrence of these traits, we cannot earnestly say that they are exclusive
products of any one group:
Indeed, the evidence shows most cultures to be highly composite. Sometimes
there seems to be a race relatively purely physically with a considerably mixed
culture, sometimes, perhaps more frequently, a highly mixed race with a relatively
fussed culture. But in the large majority of cases the culture is only to be
explained as the resultant of the meeting and reciprocal influence of several
culture strains, several ethnic contributions.51
Reciprocation is one of the means by which culture is produced and developed. And
reciprocation and the composite nature of these traits and types are, in part, reasons why
races can come together to establish a cosmopolitan community. Thus, they are, in some
50
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sense, the basis for how we should interact with each other insofar as establishing such a
community is our aim.
As a result of being committed to the ideas of reciprocation and the composite
nature of culture, Locke must think that races themselves, not merely the culture-traits or
-types, can change without a necessary change in biological features. Locke cannot be
committed to the idea that phenotypical traits play a part in racial distinctions, as
evidenced by his critique of Ronald Dixon’s text The Racial History of Man. 52 Locke
denies that there is a static nature to races once racial names have been applied to culturetypes. Locke tells us that: “Race operates as tradition, as preferred traits and values, and
when these things change culturally speaking ethic remoulding is taking place.”53 Now,
one must take care to notice that Locke tells us that “ethic” changes occur as a result of
changing culture-traits and values. Thus, it would appear that Locke seems to think that
races can change without biological changes, particularly if Bernasconi is correct to say
that Locke has a conception of “ethic race.”54 As such, if Locke thinks this to be the case,
he is committed to the view that contact with other groups is affective.
What we see here is a commitment that Locke makes to the idea that reciprocation
and the composite nature of culture leads to “remoulding,” which seems to imply the
possibility of a cosmopolitan community.
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Still, Locke is quite clear that race contact does not occur without friction. For
Locke, social friction is the result of the same principle that unifies the various peoples of
society, and that living in a society ultimately generates social conflict.55 As such, Locke
thinks that races (at least unconsciously) have initial difficulty committing to the
reciprocity necessary for cultures to both shape and be reshaped (and would thus have
difficulty committing to principals that lead to establishing a cosmopolitain community).
Locke tells us that race “intensifies therefore with contacts and increases with the
increasing complexity of the culture elements in any particular area. A diversity of
cultural types temporarily at least accentuates the racial stresses involved, so that even
when a fusion eventuates it takes place under the conditions determined by the resistance
developed and the relative strength of the several cultural components.” 56 As peoples
meet racial stresses, and therefore conflict between the meeting races, increases. Locke
seems to think that there is, in the nature of group-contact, a proclivity that groups have
to both cling to, and further to rather harshly emphasize those values, ways of seeing the
world, etc.––in a word, culture-types––that make them races. And this thinking diverges
slightly from Gobineau, who argues that races have a natural repulsion of other races. 57 If
Gobineau’s argument holds, then human beings would be incapable of coming together,
or reciprocating culture, which one might think is necessary for the establishment of a
cosmopolitan community. Instead, Locke holds that their is an initial resistance to other
cultures, which is not an innate repulsion, and therefore not one that has no possibility of
55
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being overcome. Further, there can be no claims made that morally requiring groups to
abandon this resistance is contrary to nature or God’s divine will/mandate.
Now, insofar as Locke thinks that there is an initial resistance to other groups’
culture-types, he is committed to the view that groups cling harder to the racial names
under which these culture-types are referred. It is perhaps the case, though he does not
explicitly state this, that Locke thinks that groups cling to these culture-types, and thus
racial names, harder in times of contact with other groups because of a perceived threat of
values, ways of seeing the world, etc., that are not understood to be their own; out-group
cultures are perceived to threaten to supplant in-group cultures. And this, for Locke,
seems to be a very natural phenomena, much like the phenomenon of distinguishing
between those who embrace values that are like ours and those who do not. Thus, Locke
seems to understand that progressive inter-race contact naturally begins in inter-race
conflict. Perhaps this is why Locke tells us that: “Civilization very often produces
counter-currents. Civilization is something which in itself seems to involve very often
these rough places, these antagonisms, these struggles, these actions and reactions,
because the reactions are, after all, just as inevitabl[y] part of the process, it seems, as the
positive actions themselves.” 58 Here it sounds as though Locke is suggesting that social
conflict is a part of civilization. And when one adds Locke’s view of progression towards
cosmopolitanism to this idea, one can either infer that Locke thinks that social conflict is
inherent to the progress towards cosmopolitanism, or that Locke thinks that
cosmopolitanism does not exclude (at leas the possibility of) social conflict, such that
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Locke does not think that a cosmopolitan community is an actual community where
everyone loves everyone, but that there is respect between humans.
In any case, one can see here that Locke has neither a quixotic view of racerelations nor contempt for white people grounded in some abominable way of being. For
Locke, race-antipathy (or perhaps less harshly, race-antagonism) is a natural occurrence
given the natural phenomena of “that peculiar selective preference for certain culturetraits and resistance to certain others” that is the ground of group-identity and the feeling
that it must be protected when there is a possibility of its being attacked by the imposition
of others’ values, ways of seeing the world, etc. However, Locke seems to think that this
conflict can be mitigated and perhaps even eliminated when engaged by an earnest
attempt to understand other groups’ culture-types, which must begin in with a rejection of
the assumption that our own culture-types, even in their difference from others’, is by no
means better.
Thus, we may summarize Locke’s philosophical anthropology as an attempt to
carve out a particular notion of race. Locke also wants to produce an understanding for
why studying race is necessary along with an understanding of the proper starting-points
for such a study. For Locke, these understandings show us certain assumptions in
foundational anthropological arguments regarding race, and lead us to reject these
assumptions and the theories based upon them. For Locke, with an understanding of the
proper starting-points for the science of race, we can have a correct understanding of
race, which should lead us to think of races as socio-historical, and not biological,
products. Further, studying races with a proper starting-point gives us a correct
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understanding of humanity. For Locke, a proper understanding of humanity is pertinent in
attempting to establish a world in which is defined by peace. What I mean to claim here
is that for Locke, cosmopolitanism depends on a correct understanding of humanity and
human culture because it depends on an understanding of the possibility of humans
coming together through an understanding of how humans conceptualize and act on
perceived similarities/differences in other humans. What this amounts to is that
cosmopolitan theory must begin in anthropology. Thus, Locke thought it necessary to
answer anthropological questions that are pertinent to the possibility of establishing a
cosmopolitan community. For Locke, if things were truly as philosophers,
anthropologists, and biologists, particularly those mentioned in the last chapter, said that
they were, then cosmopolitanism would be impossible. Perhaps like the late Kant, Locke
realizes that cosmopolitanism relies on races having particular potentialities, dispositions,
and qualities if cosmopolitanism is to be a community that can possibility be established.
To conclude this understanding of Locke's philosophical anthropology, as it
regards questions of race, I would like to leave the reader with two significant inferences.
First, Locke’s commitment to what I have called a middle-ground on the correlation
between race and culture is derived from his view that history and social conditions, the
instruments responsible for shaping people, have an affect on people in ways that produce
certain responses. As Ernest Mason tells us, Locke thinks that “we should make an honest
attempt to understand the social and historical factors that determine races'” values and
culture.59 What this seems to do is to allow for an appreciative, or at least a sympathetic,
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understanding of particular peoples whose culture-traits or types we may not find
interesting. Locke seems to understand that not everyone will find all others' cultureproducts attractive. Still, Locke thinks that understanding them from a historical
perspective allows us to appreciate them more than seeing them as natural or divine and
fixed. It is not God who gave these people a culture that I do not find interesting, but
historical circumstances. And because historical circumstances have allowed a people to
develop in this way, we can, by understanding them in their historical circumstances,
appreciate the way that these people have responded. We can, in a sense, place ourselves
into their shoes, saying to ourselves something like: “if we found ourselves in these
circumstances, we would have done similar.”
As such, Locke thinks that there is a greater capacity, and thus more ability, to
respect others when there is some respect for others’ culture-traits/types. This respect,
namely the respect of others’ culture-traits/types, is more likely when there is an
appreciation for how these traits/types have developed throughout history and within
particular social settings. Thus, if we learn to appreciate the social and historical settings
that surround races and their cultures, then we will be more likely to respect the peoples
that make up these races, and value these cultures. Thusly, we need a theory of race that
takes this into account, particularly when cultures have something to do with races. And
one can see the proper practical aim of anthropology deriving from this. However, one
can also see limitations in Locke’s anthropological argument as the sole method for
combating racial superiority, which allows for the possibility of establishing a
cosmopolitan community.
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As shown through the philosophical anthropologies of Kant, Blumenbach, and
Gobineau, racial superiority does not merely rely on the superiority of whites over nonwhites in the abstract, but asserts differences in races as necessarily connected to
differences in culture, which reduces to differences in values. Racial differences imply
value-differences because culture-difference is perceived as value-difference. To claim
that one race is better an another is to perceive that its culture is better, which is to say
that the race’s culture has better values than the other's. There is no way to talk of a race
that is superior to another, yet one that lacks a superior culture to the other. However, talk
of culture implies talk of value and values. Thus, to claim that a race is better than
another is to talk about a race’s value and values as better than the other's. As a result,
Locke, in wanting to show that races are not superior to others, needs to show that values
are not better in those supposedly superior races. A philosophical anthropology that
denies the inherent correlation between race and culture, and one that demonstrates that
neither nature nor God makes races possessors of particular cultures, but a philosophical
anthropology that shows races to be socio-historical, does not (in itself) combat racial
superiority, therewith showing the possibility of establishing a cosmopolitan community.
A race that claims supremacy over other races can still claim superior values as products
of socio-history, as opposed to nature or divinity. As a result, Locke’s philosophical
anthropology would need to be supplemented with a theory of values that shows the
equivalences of values and value-systems.
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Chapter 4
Alain Locke on the Facts about Value:

“Enough has been said to show that the view generally held of the relation between race
and culture may well be reversed. According to the prevailing view, man is many and
civilization one, meaning by this that the races differ significantly in potential ability and
that only one, the white race, could have and has achieved civilization. The reverse view,
forced upon the ethnologist and the historian by a more critical and open-minded survey
of the facts, reads thus: man is one, civilizations are many, meaning by this that the races
do not differ significantly in psychological endowment, that the variety of possible
civilizations is great and of actual ones, considerable, and that many civilizations other
than ours have achieved things of genuine and unique worth.”
––Alexander Guldenweiser, Early Civilization: An Introduction to Anthropology

Introduction:
In the last chapter we saw Locke denying that race-talk involves talk about
inherent differences in physical and psychical traits, particularly where those traits are
natural or divinely-mandated. Locke wants to deny races in this way because Locke
wants to combat racial superiority, and in so doing wants to give a proper ground for
establishing a cosmopolitan community. For Locke, race is a more fluid socio-historical
concept from which inherent superiority with regard to races cannot be inferred. This
argument, Locke thinks, goes a long way in uprooting the theoretical commitments of
racial superiority. However, racial superiority does not merely rely on the superiority of
one race over another––in Locke’s case whites over non-whites––in the abstract, or as
products of nature or God. Racial superiority asserts differences in races as necessarily
connected to differences in culture, which reduces to differences in values. Racial

!129

differences imply value-differences because culture-differences, as necessary productions
of race, are perceived as value-differences. To claim that a race is superior to another is to
perceive that race’s culture as superior to the other’s, which is to say that such race’s
culture has values that are superior to the other’s. Thus, in addition to denying racial
origins and differences like the ones produced by the thinkers illustrated in chapter two,
Locke needs to displace the value-hierarchies that undergird these anthropologies that
regard race. 1 Locke needs to produce a theory of value if he is to successfully assert
grounds for the establishment of a cosmopolitan community.
Chief among Locke’s interests in value theory is the problem of whether certain
objects or states of affairs have objective value, or whether the value of all objects and
states of affairs are neither correct nor incorrect, but dependent solely on the individual
valuer. Here, I define value objectivity as the belief that our aesthetic and ethical
evaluations, whether judgments, beliefs, or feelings, are either correct or incorrect
independently of our individual valuations, and can be known to be such. 2

1

Locke’s understanding of race, as a socio-historical product that relies on culture (and
thus on values), does not, by itself, displace the idea that certain races are superior to
others. One can merely concede Locke’s argument that there is neither anything
inherent nor natural/divine about race and still assert that the superiority of some races
over others, and can do so relying on Locke’s socio-historical understanding of race.
One can argue that a race’s superiority derives from socio-historical circumstances that
give the superior race the right to deny inferior races the respect necessary for the
establishment of a cosmopolitan community. In order to combat white-supremacist
ideology that denies respect for non-white peoples, Locke needs more than merely the
philosophical anthropology regarding race that he developed. Now, Locke can simply
deny race, or a correlation between race and culture. However, Locke (as a pragmatist)
cannot commit to the former (that there are no things as races, insofar as Locke wants
to preserve race-talk on pragmatist grounds), and in rejecting the former (in affirming
race) Locke sees an undeniable correlation between the two latter concepts (race and
culture).
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Additionally, Locke was interested in related value problems such as value
realism and the intrinsic nature of value. By value realism, I have in mind the idea that
there are properties within a particular object (either physical or intellectual) or state of
affairs that give the object or state of affairs its value. By intrinsic value, I mean merely
that what gives these objects or states of affairs their value regards the objects or states of
affairs themselves, as opposed to objects’ value being dependent solely on other objects
or states of affairs for their value.3 So, for any object or state of affairs that is intrinsically
valuable, whatever it must be that makes the object or state of affairs valuable must be
found in, or apply only to, the object or state of affairs itself/themselves, rather than
depending solely on something outside of it for its value.
In responding to these problems (particularly the overarching problem of value
objectivity), my claim is that Locke’s aim was to produce a sort of in-between position
wherein we think of values as neither ontologically objective, a position that Locke
thought led easily to austere demands placed on agents to accept them, nor radically
subjective, a position that Locke considered to have a tendency to produce anarchism and
pessimism as related to imperatives. 4 My argument is that though Locke denied that value
was either correct or incorrect in the way that objectivists tend to, he also denied that the
value conferred upon all objects was dependent on the valuations of individual agents in
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One can very easily see Locke’s problem with value objectivity. If it is the case that
values are objective, and some group of white peoples (say Kant’s Germans) had better
values than all other peoples, then this group of whites (Kant’s Germans) seem licensed
to colonized other peoples. Likewise, if Locke accepts radical subjectivism, then it
would seem that we are never licensed to argue against people(s) who deny respect to
other people(s).
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the way that subjectivist positions tend to. A sketch of the argument is as follows. Let us
take objectivity, as it relates to value, to express the following: values are either correct or
incorrect, and they cannot be said to depend on agents’ value judgments about objects
([C∨¬C]∧¬I).5 Let us take subjectivity, as it relates to value, to express the following:
values are neither correct nor incorrect, and must be thought to depend on individual
agents’ value judgments (¬[C∨¬C]∧[I]). My argument is that Locke's in-between position
expresses the following: values are neither correct nor incorrect (ontologically), but
cannot be said to depend on individual agents’ value judgments, which confers a kind of
objectivity or objective reality to them (¬[C∨¬C]∧[¬I]). Locke seems to think that this
position allows him to avoid the implications of both extremes, and further allows him to
justify what some may consider to be a tension in his thinking, namely how he is
committed to cultural constants and more permanent values such as toleration,
reciprocity, and democracy which are necessary for the creation of a cosmopolitain
community on the one hand, and how he argues for a constant process of reflective
reconsideration of all values that he terms a transvaluation of values on the other hand.
On an Appropriate Starting-point for Value Theory:
Now, insofar as Locke wanted to produce this in-between position because of a
tendency towards draconian results from either extreme, we are able to aver that Locke is
concerned with the practical/political world. We may aver this because of Locke’s deep
concern for how these results play out in human interactions with each other. Further, we
may aver that Locke considers the practical/political world as an appropriate starting5

C = Correct, I = Dependent on Individual Agent’s Value Judgments.
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point for an analysis of value. In saying that Locke is concerned with the practical/
political world, what I am claiming is that Locke is concerned with the world wherein
humans interact, and understands value theory to be a discipline that must consider how
its theories are able to affect the world, and not merely describe or intellectualize it. This
concern deeply affects Locke's arguments regarding the objectivity/subjectivity debate
about values.
Further, this concern is what led Locke to commit to a functional approach to
value theory whereby there is no uncoupling “the theoretical from such practical aspects
of the value problem, and [which] may eventually find its best leads and most satisfactory
solutions coming by way of an insistence on such correlation.”6 For Locke, theoretical
questions include, and in fact are guided by, value-conflicts and the more political
problems of values in our world. This concern with the practical/political world is what
separates Locke from more positivistic and purely scientific thinkers on value, and what
aligns Locke with pragmatists such as William James and John Dewey, who take into
account how theoretical disquisitions must be applicable to the political world and are in
fact justified by their engagement with people’s lives.7 So as to give a clearer view of
Locke’s thinking on value theory as a discipline that must be applicable to the practical/

6 Alain
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political world, I would like to focus on key aspects of James’ pragmatism, a system that
Locke both appreciates and partially critiques.
James’ concern with the practical/political world is illustrated in both his
conceptions of truth and value. With regard to truth, James rejects the correspondence
theory of truth whereby a statement is true just in case it matches the world wherein the
statement is made. For James, “intellectualists,” or those who accept a correspondence
theory of truth, ground truth in the agreement between a statement and the world.8
However, agreement along these terms is merely epistemological. It merely regards the
understanding of the world by the agent, and does not regard the application of, or
possibility for, an idea or statement in the world. So, to say that “a book exists at a
location at a particular time” is true just in case there is actually a book that exists at a
location at a particular time. The truth of this statement does not regard how the idea of
the book affects the world, or any possibilities for the book.
James claims that this epistemological understanding of truth is deficient insofar
as intellectualists are not able to ground truth in agreement with reality in the manner that
they would like to. James asks us to take some object such as a clock. Of course a
statement such as “Clock(x) is in Location(y)” is true just in case there is actually a clock
in a particular location that matches the idea reflected in the statement. One can produce
an idea of a clock that is a copy of the clock in the world, such that the statement
“Clock(x) is in Location(y)” is true. However, “your idea of its ‘works’ (unless you are a
clock-maker) is much less of a copy, yet it passes muster, for it in no way clashes with the

8
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!134

reality.” James continues: “Even though it should shrink to the mere word ‘works,’ that
word still serves you truly; and when you speak of the ‘time-keeping function’ of the
clock, or of its spring’s ‘elasticity,’ it is hard to see exactly what your ideas can copy.”9
James’ point in appealing to the clock is that if it is the case that truth is an agreement
between our statements and the world, we have no grounds to believe that many, if any,
of our statements actually agree with the world, and therefore it would appear that we can
possess little to nothing in the way of truth. In fact, James seems to be suggesting that the
term “agreement” is rather ambiguous in this correspondence notion of truth: “Where our
ideas cannot copy definitely their object, what does agreement with the object mean?” 10
The term “agreement” would then become superfluous when there is little to no
possibility of connecting our ideas/statements with the world.
What James seems to think is that the intellectualists miss something critical in
their understanding of truth, namely that there is a practical or functional aspect to truth.
Intellectualists define truth in such a way that would make possessing it unable to change.
James argues that “the great assumption of the intellectualists is that truth means
essentially an inert static relation. When you’ve got your true idea of anything, there’s an
end of the matter. You're in possession; you know; you have fulfilled your thinking
destiny.”11
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In responding to intellectualists James asserts that pragmatists are also committed
to grounding truth in agreement with reality. However, pragmatists and intellectualists
“begin to quarrel only after the question is raised as to what may precisely be meant by
the term ‘agreement,’ and what by the term ‘reality,’ when reality is taken as something
for our ideas to agree with.” 12 It is not the case that intellectualists and pragmatists have
completely distinct notions of truth, insofar as pragmatists would deny that the agreement
between idea/statement and reality serves as the criterion for truth. However, in thinking
through the criteria for truth, pragmatists ask “‘what concrete difference will its [the
idea’s] being true make in any one’s actual life’” given that the idea is true? 13 James’
thinking adds a functional aspect to the epistemological assertions of the intellectuals,
and thus brings truth into the practical world. For James, truth regards considering the
relevancy of an idea taken to be true in the world. Thus, truth is not merely about
agreement between claims and the world, but an engagement with the world that claims
agree with. And as such, an idea’s being/becoming true depends on whether they can be
assimilated, validated, corroborated, or verified in the world. 14 James tells us that: “The
truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It
becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process
namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity is the process of its validation.”15 Thus James’ thinks that what is “true is whatever ‘proves itself to be good in the
12
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way of belief’, it must be good for ‘definite, assignable reasons.’”16 What is true is
intimately connected to what is of value, which is determined by the manner in which
society is progressed. This is an idea that Locke accepts and will be committed to when
developing a philosophical anthropology, which we have already seen, as well as a theory
of value.
Now, if it is the case that what is true is intimately connected to what is of value,
then what is of value––that is, what progresses society in a particular way, which for
James becomes what is of greatest value––becomes truth. That value, as what progresses
society in a particular way, becomes truth implies that James rejects ontological realism
as applied to value. 17 Like Locke, James “found little room for sui generis ethical facts in
his ontology, and since neither moral relations nor the moral law could ‘swing in vacuo’,
he took the ‘only habitat’ for goodness, badness, and obligation to be ‘the mind which
feels them.’”18 James asserts that: “Surely there is no status for good and evil to exist in,
in a purely insentient world. How can one physical fact, considered simply as a physical
fact, be ‘better’ than another?”19 Good and evil, unlike elemental properties such as
helium or oxygen, require valuers. Thus for James, “any facts about values have to be
understood in terms of facts about the practice of valuing, and this might seem to make

16

Henry Jackman, “William James,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy,
ed. Cheryl Misak (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 77.

17

Ibid, 74.

18

Ibid.

19

William James, “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life,” in William James:
Writings, 1902-1910 (New York: The Library of America, 1987) 599.

!137

goodness, like the valuations that it depends upon, a purely ‘subjective’ phenomenon.”20
James takes values to be grounded in the subjective experience of valuing objects and
dependent on agential valuations, which implies that they are not found in nature. James
claims that “nothing can be good or right except so far as some consiousness feels it to be
good or thinks it to be right….”21 This might seem to make values subjective, or more
plainly might seem to make James a subjectivist about value. However, “James still
wants our values to be ‘objective’, since while values are constructed out of our
valuations, we intend them to be more than simply expressions of our preferences.” 22
Values, thus can be thought to be truth-apt.
James locates the objectivity of value in the equilibrium of claims for objects in
the world in which agents desire, and in judgments about value that produces the best
results (in terms of producing the most benefits without harm from a societal
standpoint).23 James begins by imagining a solitary agent, whose agency is a necessary
condition for the possibility of value to emerge. A solitary agent can produce objective
values by reaching an equilibrium or consistency among his/her desires and his/her
demands. “If now we introduce a second thinker with his likes and dislikes into the
universe, the ethical situation becomes much more complex, and several possibilities are
immediately seen to obtain.”24 We can seem much of this thinking in Locke’s work.
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Locke justifies a pragmatic approach to truth and value in perhaps his most cited
work entitled “Values and Imperatives.” Locke opens by telling us that all philosophies
refer to given times and locations, and do not refer to objective realities.25 Philosophical
discourses are conditioned by the needs and perspectives of the communities within
which they are developed, and are judged to be sound insofar as they accurately reflect
the needs of the community. They begin with the concepts and contexts provided by the
community. Locke, as we have seen with his philosophical anthropology as it regards
race, and will see with his value theory, thinks that they must refer back to the
community.26
Immediately we can see that Locke rejects a correspondence theory of truth as it
applies to philosophical inquiry. If philosophical inquiry can capture truth, and Locke
seems to think that it can, then Locke must think that the truth that it captures need not
correspond to the world as it is “objectively.” Locke submits the tenability of
philosophical discourse to the practical needs (along with the dispositional attitudes) of
those about whom the discourse was constructed, which places Locke squarely in line
with James’ rejection of the correspondence theory of truth on practical grounds. And this
is in part what justifies the practical world’s being a starting-point for Locke. Philosophy
need not be concerned with reporting objective facts about the world, and thus statements
about the world need not correspond to the factual world in order for those statements to

25 Alain
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be true. For Locke, there is nothing wrong with a philosophical system grounded in the
usefulness that it has to a community. Thus Locke, like James, thinks that something like
the belief in God as a true idea is not grounded in God’s corresponding to some Being in/
beyond the world, but the manner in which the statement or idea affects the people of the
world. And so, for Locke, there is nothing "ugly" about judging a philosophical system as
either valuable or lacking value because of its ability or inability to solve practical
problems. Thus, Locke, in being committed to a rejection of the correspondence theory of
truth, seems able to commit to a practical theory of value.
Now, as Ernest Mason tells us, Locke does not think that value theory (or any
philosophical discourse) should be tailored to support any particular argument or system.
Mason writes that Locke’s “psychological approach to values was never intended to be an
end in itself. Rather, he was interested in the psychological nature of valuating
consciousness in an effort to better understand the nature of our agreements and conflicts
over values.”27 What this means is that Locke is deeply committed to solving practical
problems when constructing his value theory, and constructs it to that end; his value
theory is not merely abstract or an intellectual endeavor. “This does not mean that
axiology should have the task of formulating and expressing a specific ethical system, but
that it should serve as a methodology for the investigation of ethical and moral
phenomena in an effort to offer us a more accurate approach to the problem of normative
judgments.”28 Axiology, and Locke would suggest any theory about phenomena, should
27
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not be constructed to support a system or world view, but must begin with the world, and
have the aim of relating back to the world in its goal of progressing the world. And this
idea about axiology places Locke squarely in-line with pragmatist thinking. Still, Locke
is not completely satisfied with pragmatism as an appropriate starting-point for value
theory.
Locke tells us that “pragmatism has only transposed the question from the
traditional one of how what ends should govern life to the more provocative one of how
and why activity created them.”29 For Locke, pragmatism merely wants to replace
dogmatic principles of value with understanding the principles’ genesis and why we rely
on them. Pragmatism, on Locke’s account, does not do anything to challenge value
dogmatism. Pragmatism asks questions about the genesis of beliefs about value without
giving us new methods of determining values and solving conflicts about them. So Locke
would say that James, in tracing the genesis of values in processes of valuating, leaves
dogmatism unchallenged.
Further for Locke, “pragmatism and instrumentalism has set up at the center of its
philosophy a doctrine of truth as itself a functional value.”30 What Locke means here is
that pragmatism and instrumentalism have set up an ends-means relationship whereby
means become justifiable because of the ends that are desired. For Locke, this leads to
value anarchism while avoiding the problem of absolutism that it was constructed to
engage.31 In this system, we are not able to criticize communities or groups who have
29
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“oppressive” values, or assert something like the inequality of human beings whereby
respect for certain humans is denied because of some good for some larger number of
people. What Locke is worried about is that people will get lost in pragmatism’s
functional theory of value. And further, Locke sees that rejecting the normativity of
values does not license the inference that they no longer govern our lives. Locke asserts
that “by wavering the question of the validity of value ultimates as ‘absolutes,’ we do not
escape the problem of their functional categorical character as imperatives of action and
as norms of preference and choice.” 32 Thus, the problem that Locke engages is how to
ground a theory that preserves the necessity of respect accorded to humans qua humans
without supporting the idea that certain values, and thus certain people, are inferior
because of their value-systems given that people will choose from these systems. Locke’s
approach is through engaging questions of objectivity, realism, and the intrinsic nature of
value in objects, ultimately leading to both a rejection of ontological objectivity and
radical subjectivity.
Realism, Objectivity, and the Intrinsic Nature of Value:
That Locke accepts many of the pragmatists’ claims on the issue of the practical
importance to truth and value inquiry has now been asserted. I would now like to begin a
proper inquiry into Locke’s theory of value. For Locke, like most thinkers on the question
of value, the first and perhaps most significant theoretical problem in value theory is the
problem of the status of value as it relates to objects and states of affairs. Unlike many
inquirers into value, Locke thinks that engaging this problem is significant for a solution
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to value-conflicts that get in the way of cosmopolitanism, particularly those conflicts that
are grounded in a group considering itself to be superior to others. Thus, we must begin
to understand Locke’s value theory by looking at Locke’s statements that regard realism,
objectivity, and the intrinsic nature of value in objects and states of affairs.
Recall that Locke thinks that philosophical discourses are both time- and locationconditioned. If we relate the idea that philosophical discourses are both time- and
location-conditioned to the issue of the objectivity of values, we may infer that either
Locke thinks that we cannot know about, or more plainly that we have no direct access to
knowledge regarding, the ontological objectivity of value in our philosophical discourses,
though we have grounds to believe in the ontological objectivity of value, or that our
philosophical discourses can be complete (that is to say accurate within finite limits) on
the question of value, and still be time- and location-conditioned. If the latter is the case,
then one may infer that value itself, about which we discourse, is not an ontologically
objective reality. If value was ontologically objective and our knowledge about them can
be complete, then there would be no reason to say that all philosophical discourses are
time- and location-tempered. Now, insofar as Locke thinks that he can correctly talk
about value philosophically, he must think that value itself is not ontologically objective.
Non-inferential evidence that Locke is not committed to the objectivity of values
can be provided from an article written some years after “Values and Imperatives.” In this
article, Locke rejects ontologically real, objective, and intrinsic values. Afterwards,
Locke provides us with a process through which objects become both objectively and
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intrinsically valuable in a quasi-real sense that is not dependent on their having an
ontologically real status. 33
In the article, Locke gives us an implicit rejection of what I have been calling
value-realism by telling us that: “If value is conferred upon an object by a personal
attitude towards it, it is clear that all objects can be valued by being included in a
valuation-process.”34 Locke’s view that all objects are capability of being valued (though
some can perhaps be valued more easily than others) seems to be a rejection of a
particular type of argument used to support value-realism, one that asserts that there is a
natural attraction/repulsion towards/away from certain objects because of certain
objectively or intrinsically valuable qualities within the objects, or that one's emotions,
intuition, and/or reasoning faculty/faculties pick(s) out particular natural or nonnatural
value-qualities in objects that make them worthy of a certain sort of esteem.35 Locke
seems to reason that if all objects possess the ability to be valued, then attitudes pick out
nothing in them. For Locke, the value conferred onto objects derives from our attitudes.
One might still think that Locke can be committed to the view that all objects
possess the ability to be valued even if there are properties in the objects that make them
worthy of a certain sort of esteem. One might argue that nothing that I have stated denies
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this if Locke thinks that an agent can merely be mistaken about the appropriate valueproperties within objects. Though there are properties in objects that make them
objectively valuable, Locke might still think that an agent’s sensing faculties must be
trained in a certain way so as to pick out the value-properties within objects
appropriately. Thus, Locke might think that there are properties within objects that make
them valuable even if it is possible that all objects are capable of being valued.
However, Locke seems to be committed to the view that a rejection of objectivity
in an ontological sense implies a rejection of value-realism. 36 If there is no ontological
objectivity with regard to the value of objects, then there cannot be real value-properties
within objects. Further, as Locke tells us very early in the article, “value differs in kind
from consciousness of fact. It is posterior to the latter, and represents a reaction upon
fact…. [V]alues are something superadded upon the other qualities of objects by the
mind, in order to express their relation to its purpose and acts, and do not inhere in
objects per se.”37 Value, for Locke, is something added to the factual object by the mind,
or more precisely for Locke, by the personality of the valuing agent. 38
Moreover, Locke thinks that value-realism fails to account for either value-change
or value-transposition. Locke understands there to be changes in value content, or the
goodness/badness conferred onto objects. Locke challenges value-realists to explain these
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radical shifts in the value of objects, particularly if it is the case that value-properties are
implied by the existence of the object, or more plainly if it is the case that there are
properties within objects that make them valuable. Locke writes that “what is revealed or
developed in experience as better becomes the new good, shifting the position of
normative acceptance or agency formerly occupied by the older value content.”39 Here
Locke is claiming that an object that we judge to be better than another object, but not
necessarily a good object, becomes a good object because of its being reevaluated in
certain contexts. 40 It’s goodness is contextual, and dependent on circumstances in which
contexts become important, which can only be connected to the experiences (that is the
socio-historical contexts) of agents. These experiences will shape and be interpreted by
the personalities of agents. Locke thinks that this could not be the case if there were
properties within certain objects that made them qualitatively better than other objects,
though not necessarily good.
From changes in value content, Locke argues that we get changes in the
normative force that the value of the object produces; whether we ought or ought not
pursue an object shifts with the shifts of the goodness/badness of the object as negotiated
in changing contexts. However, these shifts are difficult to explain if it is the case that
value resides within objects. Consider Locke's claim that: “The process continuity of the
normative character of values is demonstrated not merely by the substitution of new
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value content for the old, but even more clearly by the displacement and retroactive
devaluing of the old, a procedure which transforms yesterday’s good into a relatively [sic]
bad.”41 This shift in the value content is doubtful if value realism is true.
For Locke, our imperatives are derived from either how we feel or judge an object
as either good or bad, or as either better or worse than another object. “When explicit
judgment ensues, it is revamped in evaluative thought accordingly.”42 For Locke, this
evaluation both should and usually does occur in accordance with the functional character
of the object or abstract value (democracy, love, freedom of speech, etc.).43 Locke argues
that “it seems to be the progressively corrective character of the value norm more than
the stability of specific value content which endows our abstract values with normative
ultimacy.” 44 Thus, Locke is making both a historical and normative claim about the
functional character of value, and he takes this as evidence in exposing weaknesses in
arguments that favor value-realism.
After rejecting value-realism, Locke targets the ontological status of objective and
intrinsic values, and attempts to answer why it appears that there are objective and
intrinsic values in an ontological sense. In other words, Locke’s concern is whether there
is objective and intrinsic value in an ontological sense and why people tend to think of
41 Alain
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particular objects as containing both an inner worth and one that can be recognized as
either true or false if there is not a recognizable inner worth attributable to objects. Locke
tells us that:
If value is conferred upon an object by a personal attitude towards it, it is clear
that all objects can be valued by being included in a valuation-process. Many
objects, however, are so variously valued according to circumstances, or are so
really important enough to be valued at all, that they are conceived as neutral or
indifferent per se. So it is only if an object is constantly valued in a particular way
that its value adheres to it and it comes to seem intrinsically valuable. Value
acquires objectivity in other ways also.45
For Locke, what separates the appearance of objects as possessing extrinsic and
subjective value from those that appear to have intrinsic and objective value is not
internal to the object, or a kind of fittingness of the objects that can be discriminated by
any valuer, but rather their being valued in a certain sort of way in society, along with the
longevity of their being valued in this way.46 Thus, one is able to see Locke stripping
away both the ontological status of objectivity and the intrinsic nature of value in objects.
Value in objects merely appears to be objective and intrinsic in an ontological sense. And
as such, one is not licensed to subject others to his/her values, or to deny the legitimacy
of others’ values without grounding. Insofar as values are superadded onto objects, and
are not ontologically objective, we cannot assume the superiority of particular values.
Now, if value is socio-historically dependent, then we would, for Locke, need to
45 Alain
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understand a community’s socio-historical circumstances before making judgments about
their values or the value that they place on certain objects.
Though Locke denies ontological objectivity, he does not want to support a
radical subjectivist view of values wherein values are dependent on individual agents. Of
particular interest for Locke is this view’s tendency to promote the abdication of talk
about values. Though Locke finds value to be dependent on socio-historical context, he
does not want to commit to the view that judgments made about communities’ valuesystems are never licensed. This would, in arguing that we be more open to others’ valuesystems, lead to an inability to critique racial superiority.
Further for Locke, we live by our imperatives, and values ground these
imperatives. This is what produces a responsibility for philosophical discourse about
values. In “Values and Imperatives,” Locke tells us that: "In de-throning our absolutes,
we must take care not to exile our imperatives, for afterall, we live by them. We must
realize more fully that values create these imperatives as well as the more formally superimposed absolutes, that norms govern our behavior as well as guide our reasoning."47
Locke grounds an argument for the importance of the study of values in human
experience––a practical responsibility that a certain sort of radical subjectivist thinking
would abandon. What Locke wants to say is that the study of value is valuable, and is so
because of the way that human beings are constructed. Humans are value-having and
value-operating beings. Radical subjectivism abandons discussion of values. However,
abdicating talk about value does not solve the problem that austere imperatives derived
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from objective theories of value pose, and in abdicating talk about value, "we do not
escape the problem of their functional categorical character as imperatives of action and
as norms of preference and choice."48
Locke’s goal then, is to avoid objectivity’s rigidity and wrongheadedness, and
subjectivism’s amorphousness and dangerousness. Locke thinks that he can show this
through a genetic exposition of our experiences in valuing objects, both personally and as
a human race, and in so doing grounds a type of objectivity of value in communality and
its affects on the process through which objects and states of affairs become valuable. As
such, I would like to elucidate Locke’s conception of the valuation-process, connecting it
to an understanding of the human being in community, which Locke uses to ground his
thinking on the objectivity of value.
At the beginning of the valuation-process, perhaps very early in agents’ lives, the
value conferred onto certain objects is strictly subjective. Locke thinks that each
individual begins their value experiences by considering him/herself to be the measure of
all things. Because each individual considers him/herself to be the measure of all things,
all personal reaction to objects carry a “formal claim to universality” for valuing agents. 49
What this means is that at the beginning of the valuation-process, agents engage certain
objects with an immediate disposition towards them, and the value of objects concurs
with the disposition. If the agent has a favorable disposition towards the object, then the
object has positive value. If the reverse, then the object has negative value. Agents then
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infer that all other agents do/should value these objects in the equivalent manner. (As we
will see, this amounts to is an assumption by Locke that agents begin life by viewing
particular objects in a non-communal manner, and then later in life come to view objects
under communal classificatory constraints of language and usage that have caused new
perceptions of objects.)
Here, we can see that at the beginning of agential value experiences, there is a
one-to-one correlation between the disposition of the agent and value attributed to
objects. As the agent engages his/her community, communal interaction has an impact on
the experiences of objects to which value is attributed. Locke tells us that the one-to-one
correlation between the disposition of the valuer and objects begins to break down when
the value conferred onto objects comes into question in community. In this way the
valuing agent’s value-judgments are rejected and referred to as “merely subjective” or are
affirmed and “may thereby acquire every degree of 'objectivity.'” 50 For Locke, “objects
which have obtained social recognition as valuable come to rank as objective values.”51
Thus, the seeming objectivity regarding the value of some object is accounted for by the
consistency of communal opinion, and is not something over and above the judgments of
the collective. As such, objectively valuable objects possess no ontologically “real” value.
From the object’s being valued on an individual basis, the object “emancipates itself from
the personal valuation and makes its valuation look like a mere recognition of an already
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existing value.”52 This value is, in a sense, communal or negotiated by the collective, and
cannot be reduced to individual valuations.
Let us return to Locke’s use of the term “emancipates” in the last quotation above.
This use is interesting, particularly when considered with Locke’s words “look like a
mere recognition of an already existing value.” By “emancipates” Locke could mean
either that there is something of a failed recognition that the object's value is subjective––
that valuers merely fail to appreciate the subjective nature of valued objects when they
“recognize” them as “already existing values,” or that there is an actual elevation of the
value of the object beyond its merely ontologically subjective status––that in a certain
sense, the object quite literally becomes objectively valuable. I would like to explore this
second possibility when returning to the grounds of agreement regarding objects’ value
that was discussed in the prior paragraph.
Now for Locke, objectively valuable objects are not considered objectively
valuable merely because they have a certain sort of communal status that is recognized by
many valuing agents. It is indeed the case that an object that is judged to be objectively
valuable must have been recognized in a certain sort of way in community in order for it
to be considered objectively valuable. However, after the object has been recognized in
this way, Locke wants to say that it need not continue to be esteemed in the way in which
it was when judged objectively valuable. Locke writes that: “A value that has risen to be
objective may then maintain itself without continuing to be valued, and even though,
under the circumstances, its value may have been converted into the opposite. Thus, once
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a literary work is ranked as a ‘classic,’ its value remains uncontested, even though few
care for it or even read it….”53 For Locke, community is merely responsible for setting
up the value of the object. However, the object need not be esteemed or desired whenever
considered. Thus, one can see Locke distancing himself from desire-theories of value,
whereby value regards our desires for some object. If I no longer desire an object, but
recognize it as objectively and intrinsically valuable, then its objective and intrinsic value
(and in fact, its value simpliciter) is not a product of my desiring it.54 Further for Locke:
“It cannot always be assumed therefore that, because a value is current and is recognized,
it is fully functional, any more than it is right.”55 Thus, unlike one might expect from a
pragmatists, value is not a function of the object, or is not conferred onto an object (and
further is not continually conferred onto an object) because the object has or maintains a
certain use for a community of agents. We might still think marriage to be valuable even
if there is not a practical use for it, or if it were no longer desired.
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Now, in fairness to the range of potential interpretations of Locke’s view, one could
plausibly interpret Locke as thinking the following: even though one’s valuing some X
does not necessarily mean that one desires X, or more plainly that value does not equate
to desire, we might still think that to value X implicates a desire that one has for X, or
more plainly that a desire that one has for X signals that one values X. When one desires
X, we are licensed to infer that one values X, even if desiring X does not equate to
valuing X. A potential interpretation of this kind can be grounded from statements that
Locke makes about facts and value, where Locke tells us that one of the reasons why
fact and value cannot be separated completely is that we seem to have a desire for
(which implicates that we value) the possession of facts. This would allow Locke to
hold that because we desire X (Facts), we are licensed to infer that we value X (Facts)
even though to desire X (Facts) is not to value X (Facts).
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So, what we have learned is that it is through community that objects take on
objective value. And we might think that communal recognition, or what we may refer to
as a sort of consensus of the value of some object, is merely a necessary condition for
some object's becoming objectively valuable. However in my view, Locke must not
(cannot) think communal recognition to be a sufficient condition for an object’s
becoming objectively valuable if his thinking is to be accurate. Note here that my
argument is that, in a sense, subjectively valued objects become objectively valuable
because of their status in community. Thus, being recognized by community in a certain
sort of way is necessary for them to become objectively valuable. However, more is
needed for an object to become objectively valuable, which is to say that communal
recognition is not sufficient for an object’s value becoming objective. If it were both
necessary and sufficient, then there would be nothing to distinguish Locke’s value theory
from radically subjectivist ones. To see what else is needed we must understand just why/
how there is an immediate apprehension of a certain value conferred onto an object when
the object is perceived.
So, let us say that there is a merely subjective value-judgment that results from a
disposition towards an object at the beginning of value-experiences that occur early in an
agent’s life. Further, let us say that objects that have agreement as valuable in community
become those objects that attain an objective value. However, none of this explains why
objects appear immediately valuable after our personal value-judgments are subjected to
communal scrutiny and are affirmed. What explains the immediate representation of an
object as possessing a certain value (which, for Locke, cannot be properties within the
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object) seems to be the training of our perceptive faculties to see objects in certain ways.
It is this training of our perceptive faculties that seems to be reflected in confirmations
about valuable objects such that there is agreement about certain objects’ value.
So, Locke thinks that agreement on the value of certain objects and states of
affairs confers a kind of objectivity to the value of the object. Communal experience
trains humans to perceive objects as possessing a certain value. Locke’s thinking is
grounded in a harmonic relationship between: 1) the value that is attributed to an object
as an object of perception; 2) the way in which an object is classified in a given
community; 3) the agent's natural classificatory categories as it relates to feeling-kinds.
The first focuses on the relationship between value and perception. The second focuses
on how objects are classified in accordance with language and usage. The third focuses
on the psychological schemata of valuers.
A Lockean Harmony: Value and Perception:
Let us begin with facts about objects in the world and their relationships to value
and perception, which is to say, let us start with the first component of what we may call
a Lockean harmony. However, before looking specifically at the relationship between
value and perception, let us look at the relationship between facts and values. Doing so
will ground just how perceiving “factual” objects occurs. For Locke, perceiving existing
objects does not occur without perceiving values. Thus, Locke conceptualizes a rather
strong relationship between value and perception such that perception involves value
through valuations.
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Locke thinks that value is implied by our ability to recognize both the existence of
objects and facts as they relate to objects (physical, abstract, and mental). Locke tells us
that: "Facts, being the objects of truth, must all imply values, and it must be in vain to
search for any existence which is wholly free from valuations."56 Here, one is able to see
that Locke is making an epistemological claim. It is not the case that the existence of
objects outside of human cognition implies value, but rather that our either affirming or
disaffirming statements that relate to objects implies valuations. Thus, what Locke argues
is that an object’s becoming an object for us––insofar as we affirm/disaffirm it (in
recognizing it) and particular statements relating to it (in recognizing facts about it)––
implies value. When looking at some object, our perception of the object, insofar as we
affirm the object’s existence, along with various statements we make about the existing
object, implies value. Further, Locke seems willing to aver that to perceive some object is
to perceive it as a particular kind of object, which implies classification; to classify
objects implies value attributed to them because of their being the particular kinds of
things that they are classified as. Under its classification as a particular kind of thing,
there will be a particular understanding of how it is to be used, which is to say how it is to
be engaged. This seems, for Locke, to give it a certain sort of value.
Now, it is one thing for Locke to claim that knowledge of a thing or fact implies
value, and quite another for him to justify his claim. Locke argues that the “truth” of his
assertion that facts imply values can be demonstrated in four ways. First, Locke concedes
the idealist point that the search for truth uninfluenced by the mind has been
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unproductive. “Only the moral to be drawn is not, as idealism supposes, that reality is the
work of ‘pure thought.’ The thought which cannot be rooted out is a valuing thought,
which is aiming at ends and selecting means, and accepting, rejecting, and variously
manipulating the data represented to it in the whole process of ‘recognizing’ reality.” 57
What Locke is arguing is that philosophy’s inability to reach or settle on a method of
arriving at abstracted reality shows that reality, or at least our knowledge of it––which is
to say reality for us––requires the human mind’s additions, namely valuations.
Second, Locke recognizes that the mere fact that we want truth proves that it is
impossible to completely separate fact from value.58 Here Locke understands that we (not
merely philosophers, but human beings generally) value the possession of truth over
falsity. One need only recall Aristotle's declaration at the beginning of Metaphysics that
all human beings by nature desire to be in a state of knowledge, to see Locke’s point.59
Locke tells us that: “For the importance attributed to the discovery of fact, and the
eulogistic sense in which ‘reality’ is opposed to ‘appearance' or ‘illusion’ are, in fact,
values.”60 What Locke tells us is simple. Our language demonstrates the value that we
place on the possession and discovery of facts, and this demonstrates something
psychological, namely that valuations guide or drive us towards facts in a way that allows
for a fact to be possessed or discovered. That humans place value on facts motivates the
57
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pursuance of facts. So, if a fact is valuable because it is a fact, and this motivates us to
seek it out, then there can be, for Locke, no knowledge of facts without our attribution of
value.61
Further than this, one can see Locke making claims about the ontological status of
knowledge and the existence of objects. If value is not ontologically objective, then our
knowledge of facts (with reference to what kind of object that such is being classified
as)––being inseparable from value––is not ontologically objective. And, as we will see, if
it is the case that existence concerns facts, insofar as existence (for us) regards what we
can know, then existence (for us) is not ontologically objective. What an object is, or how
it is classified, lacks an ontologically objective status.
Third, Locke argues that: “It is not psychologically possible to reach any ‘fact’
except by a process permeated throughout by values, viz, a purposive endeavor to attain
an end (‘good’) by choice of the ‘right’ means, which implies selective attention,
preferences for what seems valuable, and the influence of concomitant value-feelings and
a variety of prejudices and forms of bias.”62 Here Locke understands that the affirmation/
disaffirmation-process is rooted in a teleological end that is thought to be valuable, and
one in which is rooted in human preferences, which signals psychological modes and
orientations not related to the subject of the fact. It would be absurd to say otherwise. No
one who affirms or disaffirms aims at being incorrect. Further, people do not aim at being
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incorrect, and do not do so principally because people consider being incorrect to be
unwelcome, which is to say that people are disinclined from being incorrect. What this
amounts to is that people devalue being incorrect. So, this process is undergirded by
value insofar as the end for which it has been employed is value-laden. Still further, it is
not merely that reaching the end for which the process has been undertaken is valuable,
but that the process itself seems to imply a discriminative nature that is value-laden
insofar as one focuses one’s attention on a more valuable set of solutions to problems,
evidence, etc. that one takes to lead to facts. This is why we regard “method” in
philosophical, psychological, mathematical, anthropological, etc., studies as of such
importance.
Finally, Locke tells us that all facts contain latent values insofar as, in judging
facts, we implicitly judge that it is better to know than to be ignorant. Just as it is the case
that one is inclined towards what is correct and disinclined away from what is incorrect,
we may say that one is inclined towards knowing a thing and disinclined away from
ignorance of a thing. “Hence, the value-relation and attitude can never be eradicated from
even the merest and most stubborn ‘fact.’”63 We cannot be aware of any fact without the
imputation of value, which seems to root out objectivity in facts (as value is something
superadded onto fact by the agent), and thus objectivity in our knowledge of existing
things.
Now for Locke, there is a reciprocal relationship between facts and values. So,
while it is appropriate to say that one cannot be aware of a fact without the imputation of

63

Ibid.

!159

value, it is equally appropriate to say that “[p]ure value exists as little as pure fact. It
would be pure fancy or sheer postulation, and neither fancies nor postulations are
elaborated without regards to facts. They are made to be realized, and when they are
recognized as impossible their value is destroyed or impaired.”64 What Locke tells us
here is that value requires reference to something; value requires an object (for us). One
cannot say “this has no value” without there being a referential object that they are
claiming has no positive value. Likewise, the statement “nothing has value” requires
there to be factual objects that relate to claims about positive value. Thus, one might say
that value requires facts because value is intentional. 65 To value is to direct one's attention
and motivation towards something that relates to emotion, which requires both the
perceived existence of the “something” and the belief in factual claims about the
“something” that is perceived.
Consider Locke here:
Reality in its fullness contains and exhibits values, and they are ejected from it
only by an effort of abstraction, which is relative to certain restricted purposes, and
is never quite successful. Values therefore are not to be regarded as gratuitous
additions to reality, made out of the superfluity of human perversity, but as its
highest qualities and the culminating points of its significance for us.66
Again, as we have seen earlier in the examination of Locke's theory of value, Locke
wants to close the distinction between value and fact, such that the two, in many ways,
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rely on each other. Now, it would appear that Locke collapses the distinction, arguing that
the two are merely different aspects of the same phenomena. Locke seems to want to say
that we can separate them abstractly, much like he will say that we can do with emotion
and will. Still, in experience, there is no way to parse them out. “Values are the highest
qualities of facts.” They are, in a sense, the facts of facts.
Further, Locke wants to say that values are not gratuitous in relation to reality
merely because they are not ontologically objective. He holds on to relativism (though
not subjectivism). The reason for their non-gratuitous, non-ontological nature as the facts
of facts must be that Locke thinks facts are relative, and relative neither as phenomena
that produces factual content nor what we take as a fact, but the perceived factual content.
One must take care to notice the implications that Locke's inferences about the
relationship between value and truth have on the relationship between emotion and
reason. If value is emotion-laden, and truth does not occur without value, such that even
logical connections require emotion because of their connection to value, then reasoning
itself must require emotion. And this is precisely what Locke thinks. Locke states that
“norms control our behavior and guide our reasoning.”67 From this we may infer that
values, which undergird norms and are undergirded by feelings, undergird our behavior
and guide our reasoning. As such, Locke thinks that feeling, in some capacity guides our
reasoning. Now, Locke could follow David Hume in thinking that reason is a slave to the
passions, such that we think in accordance with what we desire. However, I think that
Locke considers the connection between emotion and reason to be a bit more intimate.
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Hume, even in arguing that reason is a slave to the passions, separates reason and
emotion in a very fundamental way. They are two separate processes that, while
connected, are not intertwined. I think that Locke saw emotion as a fundamental part of
our reasoning, such that emotions such as inquisitiveness are both necessary for, and
intertwined throughout, logical or scientific investigation.
Locke follows many traditions and thinkers including the Gestalt tradition in his
agreement with those who think that “the fact/value dichotomy is weaker than it might
appear at first sight.” 68 For Locke the relationship between fact and value is one of
dependency, such that facts cannot exist without value, and value requires facts. Further,
Locke seems to think that existing objects, which is to say objects that exist for us
(objects that we make statements about, use, classify, etc.), all require value.
In addition to following the Gestalt tradition on the relationship between facts and
values, Locke will take much of this thinking from Wilbur Urban’s claims in Valuation,
where Urban has an aim of investigating the relationship between facts and values. Like
Locke, Urban separates facts from values. Consider the following: “When I say that the
object is good or beautiful or noble, I assert a direct relation of the object to my feeling
and will, a harmony between the object and my subjective dispositions which is relatively
independent of my judgment of [the] existence of the object or judgment of the truth of
the idea I have of the object. Existence is perceived; truth is thought; value is felt.”69 For
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Urban, facts relate to objects of perception and the knowledge of facts (truth) will be
determined both by reasoning about objects of perception and the relations between these
objects and human subjectivity. Value relates to feelings about the objects of perception.
Still Urban, like Locke, holds that “while the worth predicates (value-terms) are in
the first place felt and not cognised, while they are at the third removed from pure
objectivity, nevertheless, there is presupposed in every appreciation, in every judgment of
value, a reference to reality and truth.”70 What Urban tells us is that value is not in the
world like objects of perception; they are not qualities in objects. And further, they follow
a different path than those of perceived objects and reasoned truth. Still, whether the
immediate appreciation of a perceived object or the judgment regarding the value of
appreciating a perceived object (that is to say, a possible perception and experience of an
object), there needs to be perceived objects that are presupposed in valuation. “The
feeling of value includes the feeling of reality. Appreciative meanings presuppose reality
meanings.”71 Further, Urban’s use of the term “feeling,” as it relates to reality, seems to
suggest that, like those who follow the Gestalt tradition (a tradition that Locke himself
follows), feeling undergirds judgments about reality and truth. Though these three modes
of human experience (feeling, truth, and perception) can be separated conceptually, they
cannot be separated in actual experience. As such, there seems to be an intimate
relationship between value and perception.
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We can infer from what has been said that the perception of objects requires
value, and that one perceives value when perceiving objects. Consequently this is what
produces the immediacy of a certain sort of value conferred onto an object in community.
In a word, for Locke, the immediate representation of objects as possessing particular
values that derive from how communities both value objects and teache agents to see
objects accounts for the objectivity and seeming intrinsic value of particular objects.
Consider Locke's statement:
There are then plenty of objective values, which any valuer encounters and has to
recognize as given. But they may nevertheless all be conceived as products of
valuation-processes, and as presupposing prior value-judgments. For when the
valuation of an object has been repeated and has grown familiar, the conscious
and reflective value-judgment becomes superfluous, and an immediate
apprehension of value results, just as immediate perception supersedes judgment
about familiar objects of cognition.72
In this passage, Locke tells us that the objectivity, and perhaps the intrinsic nature of
value (as the intrinsic nature of value in objects was Locke’s focus throughout the section
of the article from which this quotation derives) is immediately recognized by agents
with the presentation of the object, which is to say how the object is perceived by the
valuer (the way that the object appears to the valuer). However, for Locke it is not the
case that objective and intrinsic value applies to, or is ontologically within, the object, as
has already been discussed. Rather, the seeming objectivity and intrinsic quality of value
trace back to a valuation-process whereby certain value-judgments about the object have
already been established. These judgments need not be repeated at each perception of the
object, but rather the value can be thought to be attributed to the object at the time of
72
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perception if the valuer has repeatedly embraced the prior value-judgments about the
object (or at the very least, refused to raise questions about the value attributed to the
object).
Now, from the passage above one might think that Locke understands the
immediate attributions of value to some object upon its being perceived to occur on a
more individual level such that one engages in a valuation-process whereby one makes
individual value-judgments about objects, and then, because of repetition, need not
continue to make judgments about perceived objects’ value when he/she perceives them.
In short, an agent begins by evaluating the object, and after many repeated perceptions of,
and value-judgments about, the object, the agent immediately perceives the value of the
object upon perceiving it. However, on my reading of Locke, Locke seems to think that a
certain value has been attributed to objects in community prior to the individual’s
valuations of them, and that the individual need not make particular value-judgments
about objects in order to attribute value to them in certain sorts of ways. One learns how
to perceive objects––that is, in community, one learns how perceptive phenomena is to be
classified, which necessarily includes certain valuations.
So, in teaching agents how to perceive objects classified as certain socially
relevant things, which allows agents to participate in communal engagements,
communities teach agents to confer value to objects. This is why Locke tells us that an
agent’s claim that an object’s value is objective “maintains itself only while it is not
disputed,” (my emphasis) and that “objects which have obtained social recognition as
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valuable come to rank as objective values.”73 If Locke considered the valuation-process
to occur merely at the individual level, namely that value is perceived when we (as
individuals) perceive objects because of our repetitiously perceiving them and judging
them as having a certain sort of value, then Locke need not suggest that there are changes
in the value of objects when there are disputes about them or that there is a social nature
to objective values. What these statements (that there is a change in the value of objects
when there are disputes about the value of objects and that there is a social nature to
objective values) seem to suggest is that there is a change in the manner in which objects
are perceived after disputes, and that the social nature of objective valuations is a product
of the manner in which individuals are taught to see objects.
The argument here is that the objectivity in value accords to individuals in a
society coming to view some object in a particular way. Individuals may in fact have a
certain inclination towards, or disinclination away from, some object very early in life.
However with certain objects––in order for them to mean something in community––the
agent must perceive them as particular sorts of objects, which means that objects must be
classified in particular ways. When objects are classified in a particular sort of way,
which implies perceiving them in particular ways that are not without certain values
attributed to them, changes to individuals’ ways of perceiving (and thus valuing) occur.
Individuals begin to see and value objects from within communal constraints.
My argument on this point is thus two-fold. First, I hold that Locke thinks that
value is perceived at the time that the object is perceived (this will be mediated through
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feeling). Second, I hold that Locke thinks that there is a communality to perception, such
that communities “teach” individuals how to perceive phenomena as objects, and this
confers a type of non-ontological objective value onto objects.
Locke provides further evidence for these arguments. In a critical passage to
understanding Locke’s theory of the valuation-process, when speaking about the
valuation-process whereby repetition disqualifies or cancels out the need for valuejudgments, Locke asserts the following:
[T]his process does not occur in the history of the individual, but it can be traced
in that of the race, whose achievements the individual inherits. An object may, for
example, be apprehended as pleasant, beautiful, or right, without a judgment or
process of valuation; but the immediacy of its value-claim is no bar to any inquiry
into why it is valued, how it has come to be so, and whether it ought to be so, and
really is as beautiful, right, or pleasant as it seems to be. 74
Now, Locke makes many claims in this passage. However, Locke’s basic point here is
that the immediacy of the value represented to the agent upon perceiving the object is no
indication of the appropriateness of the object's being valued in that way. We need not
think that objects have a certain ontological value simply because individuals do not
always engage in a valuation-process about the objects. Objects’ coming to have a certain
value does not depend on individual valuers’ experiences in valuing certain objects. For
Locke, the individual valuer inherits a world of valued objects––a world in which objects
have obtained a certain sort of value due to a valuation-process. Locke can only think that
communities have set up value-systems that they “teach” (culture, if you will) individuals
to perceive when individuals perceive objects.
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And as an aside, this is perhaps why Locke thinks that anthropologists must
understand communities’ socio-historical contexts wherein values arise in rendering
them. There seems to be an assertion here that perceiving (and valuing) objects reflects
socio-historical conditions, and that one needs to learn to perceive as members of the
communities that one studies in order to understand and make judgments about valuesystems.
We have seen that Locke thinks that individuals inherit a world of valued objects
from communities because communities teach individuals how to perceive objects, which
involves perceiving them with a certain value. I argue that the way that this is done is
through language and use. I will now turn to this argument, which makes up the second
component of the Lockean harmony, namely the classificatory schemes by which
communities give to individuals valued objects.
A Lockean Harmony: Value, Language, and Use:
With regard to Locke's value theory, classificatory schemes will refer to two
different processes. The first scheme relates to the way in which objects are classed in
community. The second scheme relates to the way in which socially classified objects
affect the emotions of valuers insofar as they are placed under value-kinds in accordance
with either a transgredient or an immanental reference-mode. These two modes are the
basic ways of sensing and feeling values that are attached to the perception of objects.
Locke explicitly tells us that community is responsible for the seeming objectivity of
values insofar as it teaches us how to perceive objects with a certain sort of value.
Further, Locke explicitly explains to us that value is an emotionally laden form of
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experience. Perceived objects affect our emotions, and value derives from the interplay of
perceived objects and emotions. What Locke does not state explicitly, but seems to need
to state is precisely how his two explicit claims relate to each other, which is to say, why
perceived objects are able to affect emotions of individual valuers in a way that would
produce non-ontological objectivity with regard to values.
Now, Locke gives us clues about the second scheme that relates to the way in
which socially classified objects affect the emotions of valuers. For Locke, when objects
are subsumed under classes that are in accord with communal constraints of language and
use, they affect the feelings, emotions, and/or attitudes of valuers in a way that makes
placement under a value-mode immediate.75 The manner in which they affect the valuers’
feelings, emotions, and/or attitudes are not thought to be arbitrary, and thus Locke must
allow for a kind of objective criteria for the evaluation of imperatives.
For Locke, there is a schema that is particular to humanity such that objects that
get classified in a certain way fit into a set number of value-modes, which refers to “the
qualitative character of a particular way of experiencing as mediated by a given emotion
or attitude which Locke terms the feeling-quality.”76 In this way, “values are immediately
recognized through an apprehension of their emotional quality; value-predicates are
determined by the affective volitional influence of the feeling quality; and the imperatives
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of a given value are given immediately once the primary feeling-quality has been
established.”77 This characterizes the second classificatory scheme.
Still, there must be a more fundamental way––besides the schema that places
objects directly under value-modes––that humans relate to objects of value, one prior to
the effects that objects have on value-modes wherein objects get classified. The argument
is that in order for Locke to hold that equivalences in human value-modes license us to
think of value as non-ontologically objective, Locke needs to think that perceived objects
accord to similarities in language and use in order to affect value-modes in equivalent
ways. As such, we will need to explore the classificatory scheme that relates to perceived
objects. This classificatory scheme must be understood in light of Locke’s understanding
of value generally.
Locke tells us that even though value, in relating to our interests, must be
understood by what is relative to our personalities: “This relativity [of interest], however,
is not to be regarded as importing any objectionable subjectivity into values, just because
it proves to be the source also of their objectivity. For it turns out that all objects are
pervaded by values and constituted for man by valuations, and hence their avowed values
may just as rightfully belong to them as the values latent in their other qualities.”78 Now,
one can infer that if all objects did not possess the same criteria for valuations, insofar as
they were seen as particular objects, possessing a general kind of usableness and under
certain linguistic constraints as the kinds of objects that they were classified as, then they

77

Ibid.

78

Alain Locke, “Value,” 476.

!170

would arbitrarily affect valuers’ feelings, emotions, and/or attitudes. Objects must be
classed by the psyche of valuers in a similar way so as to be able to affect the particular
emotions that evoke an immediate categorization of the value-mode under which the
value of the object falls if there is to be agreement about them in community.
Now, one might think that this type of classification is contrary to Locke’s own
words. Locke seems to express this when, in describing the constancy of value-content,
he writes that: “The further we investigate, the more we discover that there is no fixity of
content to values, and the more we are bound, then, to infer that there identity as general
as groups must rest on other elements.”79 Values, on Locke’s account, have no inflexible
content. And Locke does not seem to suggest this on a mere communal level, such that
the content for the value of a certain Objectx is inconstant across communities because of
divergences in the perception of the object that accords to language or use. Locke tells us
that an “awe-inspiring scene becomes, ‘holy,’ the logical proof, ‘beautiful,’ [or] creative
expression, a ‘duty.’” 80 Locke relates this to the ordinary occurrence that: “We are aware
of instances, for example, where a sequence of logical reasoning will take on an aesthetic
character as a ‘beautiful proof’ or a ‘pretty demonstration,’ or where a moral quality or
disposition is appraised not as ‘good’ but as ‘noble,’ or again, where a religious ritual is a
mystical ‘reality’ to the convinced believer but is only an aesthetic, symbolic show to the
non-credal spectator.”81 This seems to promote the idea that the predicates of valued
objects are inconstant irrespective of the community of valuers, such that two valuers in
79
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the same community can value some Objectx in very different ways, even given stability
in the perception of the object. Thus, it might appear from reading this that Locke thinks
that two valuers can perceive the same object, understanding it as having the same useand linguistic-contexts, which is to say the same context in which the object is placed,
and ascribe different value-predicates to the object. What this amounts to is the idea that
the perception of the object as a particular kind of object (an object subsumed underneath
the same scheme), one in which accords to similarities or exactnesses in language and
usages, tells us nothing of the value that will be perceived in the object. On this reading,
perception of objects in accordance with language and use means nothing to the value
attributed to objects. Thus, Locke, on this reading, would not hold that the perception of
objects as particular kinds of objects according to communal constraints can ground a
kind of non-ontological objectivity in value.
However, what I would like to maintain is that Locke must think that the
perception of objects must be similar for valuing agents of the community. This must
occur in order for there to be a sort of objectivity in value that is not reducible to the
value conferred onto objects merely in accordance with individuals’ wills, and thus one
that is non-ontological. Locke must think that the similarity in perception can be
accounted for by language and use.
Again, that similarities in perceiving value in objects is accounted for by language
and use is not something that Locke explicitly states and defends. I take it that either
Locke assumes it or needs it in order for his thinking on value to be adequate. The reason
that Locke needs this component of a harmony between agent, value, and object is
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because Locke argues that there is no ontologically real value in objects, and further that
value-content is not objective. Locke also argues that communities confer a kind of
value-objectivity onto objects that makes valuations more than merely a subjective
experience. Given all of these arguments, Locke must think that communities “give”
objects certain values insofar as they “teach” individuals to perceive objects as possessing
particular values. This can only be through language, which gives meaning and shapes
how we relate to objects. Language provides objects with meaning, and understanding the
meaning implies taking in account objects’ social value.
Further, Locke needs to say that similarities in perceiving value in objects is
accounted for by use. First, and quite obviously, if language provides objects with
meaning, which implies social value conferred onto objects, then perceiving objects in
accordance with language leads to understanding the use of objects in society. This must
be the case because language tells us what the object is and how the object should be
used in accordance with social norms. There seems to be an intimate connection between
language about objects and understanding the usages of objects.
Beyond this quite obvious point, however, Locke seems to rely on objects’ usages
when reflecting on transvaluation, which is significant for understanding changes in
objects’ value. Locke tells us that the transvaluation of values is: “The process of
reflective reconsideration of given values [that] continually leads to changes in their
status.”82 For Locke, transvaluations are normal and legitimate occurrences wherein the
value attributed to objects in a community changes. Locke argues that “valuations
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necessarily vary according to the changes in the organic needs which condition them.” 83
What Locke claims here is that the value of objects changes in accordance with whether
they satisfy certain needs, which is to say how we use them. That we no longer need to
use particular objects in a useful manner, in Locke’s view, causes changes in the way that
we value the objects. Thus, Locke must think that use contributes to similarities in
perceiving value in objects.
In fact, Locke’s thinking on transvaluations seems to give us insight into the
necessity (along with his understanding of the role) of language for similarities in
perceiving value in objects that was discussed above. Locke writes that: “Every society,
and nearly every soul, is full of conflicts between opposing valuations, and any variation
in their relative strengths may entail a change in values. The chief agency in which blinds
us to these transvaluations is the stability of words; for these change their form much less
rapidly than their meaning.”84 Here, Locke is concerned with our difficulty in
understanding the frequency and degree of transvaluations. Locke thinks that we fail to
see the constant transvaluation of our values because the definitions of terms in our
language remains the same. Still, what the object or state of affairs that is being
reevaluated means, which seems to accord to our use, changes after definitions have
become set. Now, this in no way means that language is not necessary for perceiving
value in objects. For Locke, language is necessary in our inheriting a world of value.
However, meaning seems to involve more than the definition of objects/ideas/states of
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affairs, but also involves usefulness, which can change even after language defines and
communicates terms.
So, I think that we have good grounds to infer that Locke is able to ground a sort
of value-objectivity in similarities of perception, which relies on language and use.
Communities teach their members how to perceive objects by defining objects and telling
members how objects are to be used. One might say that when objects are perceived, they
are perceived as something specific, and what they are perceived as accords to language
and use. Thus, when looking at some object, say some material that is termed a “tree” or
a “book,” we perceive the material under certain social constraints. We engage and value
it in certain ways because of what we see it as. Ultimately, however, Locke’s thinking on
value is grounded in its relation to emotion, which is how the object as some particular
object perceived under social constraints, affects members of the community. I now turn
to the third component of Locke’s harmony, which regards the relationship between value
and emotion.
A Lockean Harmony: Value and Emotion:
Alain Locke defines value in a multiplicity of ways and at a multiplicity of times,
all with the common understanding that “values are primarily rooted in human
attitudes.”85 In his Harvard dissertation, Locke tells us that:
Our view…is that value kinds or types represent for the most part psychologically
differentiated modes of valuation and that appropriate principles and units for
value classification can only issue from a general theory of value which succeeds
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in proving that affective factors discoverable and psychologically operative in the
primary process of valuation are determinative of value type.86
What this amounts to is that Locke thinks that value regards human psychology, or more
specifically human emotions. Now, it is not exactly clear as to what an emotion is, or
whether “preference,” “attitude,” “emotion,” “disposition,” all represent equivalent ideas.
Locke uses all of these words when speaking about value as being psychological.87 On
one occasion, Locke defines value as “a personal attitude, as a recognition of the
supremacy of the category of personality.” Value is a “personal attitude, of welcome or
the reverse, towards an object of interest.” 88 What this means is that for Locke the
experience of valuing is fundamentally an emotional experiences. Locke writes that: “In
fact, the value-mode establishes for itself, directly through feeling, a qualitative category
which, as discriminated by its appropriate feeling-quality, constitutes an emotionally
mediated form of experience.” 89 Here, Locke wants to ground a theory of value in the
experience of valuing, which he takes to prior to logical judgments made about objects. It
would seem that Locke thinks that perceiving an object produces an immediate
impression on the agent. This impression either inclines the agent towards, or disinclines
the agent away from, the object. If the former, then the object is perceived as having
86 Alain
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positive value. If the latter, then the object is perceived as having negative value. Thus,
we might infer that for Locke, one perceives an object, person, or state of affairs under
particular social constraints of language and use, which immediately impacts upon the
feelings/emotions of the agent, who then either values or devalues the object, person, or
state of affairs. Value, through perception of some representation under determinant
social constraints of language and use and the affect that it has on feelings/emotions, is
immediate and requires no logical judgments because it is prior to them.
In arguing the critical need to reject both objectivism (absolutism/dogmatism) and
subjectivism (anarchism) Locke writes that:
This [the in-between position that solves the problems of value-anarchism and
value-absolutism] calls for a functional analysis of value norms and a search for
normative principles in the immediate context of valuation. It raises the question
whether the fundamental value modes have a way of setting up automatically or
dispositionally their end-values prior to evaluative judgment. Should this be the
case, there would be available a more direct approach to the problem of value
ultimates, and we might discover their primary normative character to reside in
their functional role as stereotypes of feeling-attitudes and dispositional
imperatives of action-choices, with this character reenforced only secondarily by
reason and judgment about them as “absolutes.” We should then be nearer a
practical understanding of the operative mechanisms of valuation and of the
grounds for our agreements and conflicts over values.90
Locke argues that in value-experiences, values “set-up” prior to making evaluations,
which seems to amount to something like a judgment about either the fittingness of an
object’s possessing some value. In my view, given what was discussed in the prior two
sections, in order for Locke to maintain that objective values are grounded in the way that
community causes us to perceive objects through language and usage, Locke must think

90

Ibid, 454.

!177

that perceiving an object (which includes perceiving objects as particular objects––which
implicates its perception under communal constraints of language and use) triggers an
emotion that produces a value prior to judgments being made about objects or the
fittingness of objects being valued in a certain way. If Locke thinks that objectivity is
grounded in similarities in emotions, then Locke would, much like Segun Gbadegesin
suggests, be committed to value-objectivity.91
So, it would appear that Locke is committed to this in-between position on value
that seeks to displace value-hierarchies. What Locke wants to end with is the idea that no
values and value-systems are superior to others because they all owe their being and
seeming objectivity to perception under constraints, which is to say that they all owe their
being and seeming objectivity to a social process. For Locke, value and values are not
ontologically objective, real, or intrinsic.
Now one might think that this is inconsistent with the view that there are cultural
constants. Cultural constants seem to be both real and objective. They are seemingly
necessary conditions for any collection of individuals becoming a community. Yet, as we
have seen, Locke explicitly wants to deny value-realism and value-objectivity that is not
communally caused. Thus, there seems to be a bit of an impasse in Locke’s thinking.
Locke claims that we need cultural constants in order to establish a cosmopolitan
community, which might lead us to the conclusion that we need value-objectivity in order
to establish a cosmopolitan community. And likewise, Locke seems to claim that we need
91
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to reject value-objectivity in order to displace racial superiority that denies the possibility
of establishing a cosmopolitan community.
It is clear to me that I have not mistaken Locke’s commitments. Locke is clearly
committed to the idea that there are cultural constants that are objective values that ought
to be embraced. Further, Locke is clearly committed to a denial of value-realism and
ontological value-objectivity. What I suspect Locke would say about cultural constants
given his relativism is that, firstly, cultural constants are not natural or real values. They
are values that must condition progressive human interaction. They are values that allow
the socio-historical contexts out of which overlaying values are constructed. Thus,
cultural constants condition social values, which can gain an objective status in
community. Locke’s relativism regards these overlaying values, which cause many of our
conflicts, and which “cover up” cultural constants for one committed to racal superiority.
Locke sees there to be certain conditions that must be in place in order for you to get
values. And further, Locke would perhaps say that cultural constants should condition the
overlaying values that have socio-historical contexts, insofar as they would seemingly
stabilize the community. In short, Locke’s denial of value-objectivity regards overlaying
socio-historical values, which are only possible because of cultural constants.

!179

Conclusion
The Price of the Cosmopolitan Ticket:

“[C]osmopolitanism shouldn't be seen as some exalted attainment: it begins with the
simple idea that in the human community, as in national communities, we need to
develop habits of coexistence: conversation in its older meaning, of living together,
association.”
––Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers
“Now there are many who swear it's true, That brothers all we are, Yet it seems there are
very few, Who will answer a brother's call.”
––Abbey Lincoln, “Brother, Where Are You?”

So, we have seen that Locke is committed to cosmopolitanism, and likewise we
have seen that racial superiority is a problem that challenges the establishment of a
cosmopolitan community. Again, for Locke, we have both a practical and theoretical
reason to commit to cosmopolitanism. Pragmatically, our survival as a “race” depends on
peace. What this implicates is that every individual also has a reason to commit to the
establishment of a cosmopolitan community. Theoretically, Locke thinks that establishing
a cosmopolitan community completes our move from individual families into larger
communities, which satisfies a basic human desire to assemble. Cosmopolitanism is
blocked by theories of race that shape, reshape, and justify racial superiority. Racial
differences are seen as inherent and permanent products of either nature or God, and
racial differences reduce to value-differences by way of cultural differences. Because
cultural differences can be rank-ordered, value-differences can be rank-ordered. And
insofar as this is the case, certain races are taken to be inherently and permanently better,
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or more worthy of respect than others. This poses a problem for Locke because a
cosmopolitan community requires respect that is denied by racial superiority, which relies
on these theories of race. Locke’s response to this problem posed to the establishment of
a cosmopolitan community is two-fold. First, Locke attempts to rebut theories of race that
ground the racial superiority that denies respect for certain races. Second, Locke attempts
to deny the ontologically objective status of value, which seeks to displace valuehierarchies that these theories rely on.
I would like to end this examination of Locke’s work with a few brief remarks
about the limitations of Locke’s thinking. First, Locke fails to mention a problem that
appears to be both older and more pervasive than the problem of racial superiority. Locke
never mentions the problem gender superiority. One might expect Locke to have said
something about the position in society that women occupy, given the rise of feminism,
his relationship with women during the Harlem Renaissance, and his relationship with his
own mother.1 Still, I do think that one can easily raise questions about gender oppression
and cosmopolitanism given Locke’s framework. What I mean here is that even though
Locke is silent about gender superiority as a problem for cosmopolitanism, his thinking is
still quite useful insofar as it lends itself to an analysis of problems of gender and
cosmopolitanism.
Secondly, there is the question of motivation that seems to be a limitation of
Locke’s work. Terrence MacMullan raises a question about Locke’s pluralistic approach
that leads to questions about how to change peoples’ values who are committed to racial
1
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superiority. For MacMullan, Locke’s theory of pluralism cannot dissolve the problem of
absolutism because it does not give the absolutist a reason to engage the project. The
following question can be raised: “why should I engage in an attempt to articulate values
that are meaningful to all people when my values are the ones that all people should be
following?”2 Locke’s pluralism cannot answer this question. It seems that if people are
committed to racial (gender) superiority, and embrace values that support such
superiority, then there is perhaps no way to motivate them to give up their commitments.
In other words, what Locke needs is a separate argument for how to overcome racial/
gender animus.
Now, Locke will argue that one ought to be consistent in their views. Locke might
continue by arguing that in both freely associating with other people and valuing
assembly, one (albeit in a negative way) affirms cultural constants. We saw this in the
first chapter with regard to democracy, wherein equality is implicated. However, this
seems to assume that persons committed to values, especially to racial/gender superiority,
both are and desire to be reasonable. And this assumes something that Locke seems to
deny in his value theory, namely that people are essentially rational with regard to values.
However, we just saw how values are emotionally-laden forms of experience that are the
results of perceptions in accordance with language and use, which is to say perceptions
under socio-historical constraints. In a community that “teaches” agents to perceive
certain races and women under these constraints, which is to say reserves certain
2
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classificatory terms for (and ideas about) them and how they are to be used (related to/
engaged), it seems unlikely that there will be much effort to value certain races and
women differently. Further, it appears that appeals to logical judgment or reason will not
stop certain valuations because “value modes have a way of setting up automatically or
dispositionally their end-values prior to evaluative judgment.”3 What is needed is a way
to alter the perception of certain races and women such that they are perceived with a
particular value, and thus worthy of respect. And this requires a separate argument, a
more practical theory that goes beyond the theoretical theories of race and value that set
the conditions for the possible establishment of a cosmopolitan community.
In short, what is required, in addition to a philosophical anthropology and a value
theory that combats racial superiority, is a theory showing us how to get past racial/
gender/sexual/religious superiority. My intuition is that Locke gives us useful arguments
in both his philosophy of education and philosophy of art, which must be engaged (along
with Locke’s thinking on emotion, as emotion is fundamental to his thinking on art) in a
separate work. These will provide practical theories of how to change perceptions of
races (and women if applied to the problem of gender superiority).
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